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Structural vs. atheoretic approaches to econometrics

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ABSTRACT

In this paper I attempt to lay out the sources of conflict between the so-called “structural” and “experimentalist” camps in econometrics. Critics of the structural approach often assert that it produces results that rely on too many assumptions to be credible, and that the experimentalist approach provides an alternative that relies on fewer assumptions. Here, I argue that this is a false dichotomy. All econometric work relies heavily on *a priori* assumptions. The main difference between structural and experimental (or “atheoretic”) approaches is not in the number of assumptions but the extent to which they are made explicit.

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1. Introduction

The goal of this volume is to draw attention to the many researchers, especially young researchers, doing high quality structural econometric work in several areas of applied microeconomics. It is motivated by a perception that structural work has fallen out of favor in recent years, and that, as a result, the work being done by such young researchers has received too little attention. In this paper, I would like to talk about why structural work has fallen out of favor, whether that ought to be the case, and, if not, what can be done about it. I will argue that there is much room for optimism, as recent structural work has increased our understanding of many key issues.

Since roughly the early 90s, a so-called “experimentalist” approach to econometrics has been in vogue. This approach is well described by Angrist and Krueger (1999), who write that “Research in a structuralist style relies heavily on economic theory to guide empirical work . . . An alternative to structural modeling, . . . the “experimentalist” approach, . . . puts front and center the problem of identifying causal effects from specific events or situations”. By “events or situations”, they are referring to “natural experiments” that generate exogenous variation in certain variables that would otherwise be endogenous in the behavioral relationship of interest.

The basic idea here is this. Suppose we are interested in the effect of a variable X on an outcome Y , for example, the effect of an additional year of education on earnings. The view of the “experimentalist” school is that this question is very difficult to address precisely because education is not randomly assigned. People with different education levels tend to have different levels of other variables U , at least some of which are unobserved (e.g., innate ability), that also affect earnings. Thus, the “causal effect” of an additional year of education is hard to isolate.

However, the experimentalist school seems to offer us a way out of this difficult problem. If we can find an “instrumental variable” Z that is correlated with X but uncorrelated with the unobservables that also affect earnings, then we can use an instrumental variable (IV) procedure to estimate the effect of X on Y . The “ideal instrument” is a “natural experiment” that generates random assignment (or something that resembles it), whereby those with $Z = 1$ tend, *Ceteris paribus*, to choose a higher level of X than those with $Z = 0$. That is, some naturally occurring event affects a random subset of the population, inducing at least some members of that “treatment group” to choose or be assigned a higher level of X than they would have otherwise.¹ *Prima facie*, this approach

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¹ As Angrist and Krueger (1999) state: “In labor economics at least, the current popularity of quasi-experiments stems . . . from this concern: Because it is typically impossible to adequately control for all relevant variables, it is often desirable to seek situations where it is reasonable to presume that the omitted variables are uncorrelated with the variables of interest. Such situations may arise if . . . the forces of nature or human institutions provide something close to random assignment”.

does not seem to require strong assumptions about how economic agents chose X , or how U is generated.

This seemingly simple idea has found widespread appeal in the economics profession. It has led to the currently prevalent view that, if we can just find “natural experiments” or “clever instruments”, we can learn interesting things about behavior without making strong *a priori* assumptions, and without using “too much” economic theory. In fact, I have heard it said that: “empirical work is all about finding good instruments”, and that, conversely, results of structural econometric analysis cannot be trusted because they hinge on “too many assumptions”. These notions seem to account for both the current popularity of atheoretic approaches to econometrics, and the relative disfavor into which structural work has fallen.

Here, I want to challenge the popular view that “natural experiments” offer a simple, robust and relatively “assumption free” way to learn interesting things about economic relationships. Indeed, I will argue that it is not possible to learn anything of interest from data without theoretical assumptions, even when one has available an “ideal instrument”.² Data cannot determine interesting economic relationships without *a priori* identifying assumptions, regardless of what sort of idealized experiments, “natural experiments” or “quasi-experiments” are present in that data.³ Economic models are always needed to provide a window through which we interpret data, and our interpretation will always be subjective, in the sense that it is contingent on our model.

Furthermore, atheoretical “experimentalist” approaches do not rely on fewer or weaker assumptions than do structural approaches. The real distinction is that, in a structural approach, one’s *a priori* assumptions about behavior must be laid out explicitly, while in an experimentalist approach, key assumptions are left implicit. I will provide some examples of the strong implicit assumptions that underlie certain “simple” estimators to illustrate this point.

Of course, this point is not new. For instance, Heckman (1997) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) provide excellent discussions of the strong implicit assumptions that underlie conclusions from experimentalist studies, accompanied by many useful examples. Nevertheless, the perception that experimental approaches allow us to draw inferences without “too much” theory seems to stubbornly persist. Thus, it seems worthwhile to continue to stress the fallacy of this view. One thing I will try to do differently from the earlier critiques is to present even simpler examples. Some of these

² By “data” I mean the joint distribution of observed variables. To use the language of the Cowles Commission, “Suppose . . . B is faced with the problem of identifying . . . the structural equations that alone reflect specified laws of economic behavior . . . Statistical observation will in favorable circumstances permit him to estimate . . . the probability distribution of the variables. Under no circumstances whatever will passive statistical observation permit him to distinguish between different mathematically equivalent ways of writing down that distribution . . . The only way in which he can hope to identify and measure individual structural equations . . . is with the help of *a priori* specifications of the form of each structural equation” — see Koopmans et al. (1950).

³ The term “quasi-experiment” was developed in the classic work by Campbell and Stanley (1963). In the quasi-experiment, unlike a true experiment, subjects are not randomly assigned to treatment and control groups by the investigator. Rather, events that occur naturally in the field, such as administrative/legislative fiat, assign subjects to treatment and control groups. The ideal is that these groups appear very similar prior to the intervention, so that the event in the field closely resembles randomization. To gauge pre-treatment similarity, it is obviously necessary that the data contain a pre-treatment measure for the outcome of interest. Campbell and Stanley (1963) list several other types of research designs based on observational data which do not satisfy this criterion, such as studies based on “one-shot” cross-section surveys, which do not provide a pre-treatment outcome measure. They also emphasize that, even when treatment and control groups are very similar on observables prior to treatment, they may differ greatly on unobservables, making causal inferences from a quasi-experiment less clear than those from a true experiment.

examples are new, and I hope they will be persuasive to a target audience that does not yet have much formal training in either structural or experimentalist econometric approaches (e.g., first year graduate students).

If one accepts that inferences drawn from experimentalist work are just as contingent on *a priori* assumptions as those from structural work, the key presumed advantage of the experimentalist approach disappears. One is forced to accept that all empirical work in economics, whether “experimentalist” or “structural”, relies critically on *a priori* theoretical assumptions. But once we accept the key role of *a priori* assumptions and the inevitability of subjectivity in all inference, how can we make more progress in applied work in general?

I will argue that this key role of *a priori* theory in empirical work is not really a problem – its something economics has in common with other sciences – and that, once we recognize the contingency of all inference, it becomes apparent that structural, experimentalist and descriptive empirical work all have complimentary roles to play in advancing economics as a science. Finally, I will turn to a critique of prior work in the structural genre itself. I will argue that structural econometricians need to devote much more effort to validating structural models, a point previously stressed in Wolpin (1996) and Keane and Wolpin (1997a,b, 2007). This is a difficult area, but I will describe how I think progress can be made.

2. Even “ideal” instruments tell us nothing without *a priori* assumptions

When I argue we cannot ever learn anything from natural experiments without *a priori* theoretical assumptions, a response I often get, even from structural econometricians, is this: “you have to concede that when you have an ideal instrument, like a lottery number, results based on it are incontrovertible”. In fact, this is a serious misconception that needs to be refuted. One of the key papers that marked the rising popularity of the experimentalist approach was Angrist (1990), who used Vietnam era draft lottery numbers – which were randomly assigned but influenced the probability of “treatment” (i.e., military service) – as an instrument to estimate the effect of military service on subsequent earnings. This paper provides an excellent illustration of just how little can be learned without theory, even when we have such an “ideal” instrument.

A simple description of that paper is as follows: The sample consisted of men born from ’50–’53. The 1970 lottery affected men born in ’50; the ’71 lottery affected men born in ’51, etc. Each man was assigned a lottery number from 1 to 365 based on random drawings of birth dates, and only those with numbers below a certain ceiling (e.g., 95 in 1972) were draft eligible. Various tests and physical exams were then used to determine the subset of draft eligible men who were actually drafted into the military (which turned out to be about 15%). Thus, for each cohort, Angrist runs a regression of earnings in some subsequent year (’81 through ’84) on a constant and a dummy variable for veteran status. The instruments are a constant and a dummy variable for draft eligibility. Since there are two groups, this leads to the Wald (1940) estimator, $\hat{\beta} = (\bar{y}^E - \bar{y}^N)/(P^E - P^N)$, where \bar{y}^E denotes average earnings among the draft eligible group, P^E denotes the probability of military service for members of the eligible group, and \bar{y}^N and P^N are the corresponding values for the non-eligible group. The estimates imply that military service reduced annual earnings for whites by about \$1500 to \$3000 in 1978 dollars (with no effect for blacks), about a 15% decrease. The conclusion is that military service actually lowered earnings (i.e., veterans did not simply have lower earnings because they tended to have lower values of the error term U to begin with).

While this finding seems interesting, we have to ask just what it means. As several authors have pointed out, the quantitative magnitude of the estimate cannot be interpreted without further structure. For instance, as [Imbens and Angrist \(1994\)](#) note, if effects of “treatment” (e.g., military service) are heterogeneous in the population, then, at best, IV only identifies the effect on the sub-population whose behavior is influenced by the instrument.⁴

As [Heckman \(1997\)](#) also points out, when effects of service are heterogeneous in the population, the lottery number may not be a valid instrument, despite the fact that it is randomly assigned. To see this, note that people with high lottery numbers (who will not be drafted) may still choose to join the military if they expect a positive return from military service.⁵ But, in the draft eligible group, some people with negative returns to military service are also forced to join. Thus, while forced military service lowers average subsequent earnings among the draft eligible group, the option of military service actually *increases* average subsequent earnings among the non-eligible group. This causes the Wald estimator to exaggerate the negative effect of military experience, either on a randomly chosen person from the population, or on the typical person who is drafted, essentially because it relies on the assumption that \bar{y} always falls with P .

A simple numerical example illustrates that the problems created by heterogeneity are not merely academic. Suppose there are two types of people, both of whom would have subsequent earnings of \$100 if they do not serve in the military. Type 1s will have a 20% gain if they serve, and Type 2s will have a 20% loss. Say Type 1s are 20% of the population, and Type 2s 80%. So the average earnings loss for those who are drafted into service is -12% . Now, let us say that 20% of the draft eligible group is actually drafted (while the Type 1s volunteer regardless). Then, the Wald estimator gives $\hat{\beta} = (\bar{y}^E - \bar{y}^N)/(P^E - P^N) = (100.8 - 104.0)/(.36 - .20) = -20\%$. Notice that this is the effect for the Type 2's alone, who only serve if forced to by the draft. The Type 1's do not even matter in the calculation, because they increase both \bar{y}^E and \bar{y}^N by equal amounts. If volunteering were not possible, the Wald estimator would instead give $(97.6 - 100)/(.20 - 0) = -12\%$, correctly picking out the average effect. The particular numbers chosen here do not seem unreasonable (i.e., the percentage of draftees and volunteers is similar to that in Angrist's SIPP data on the 1950 birth cohort), yet the Wald estimator grossly exaggerates the average effect of the draft.

Abstracting from these issues, an even more basic point is this: It is not clear from Angrist's estimates what causes the adverse effect of military experience on earnings. Is the return to military experience lower than that to civilian experience, or does the draft interrupt schooling, or were there negative psychic or physical effects for the subset of draftees who served in Vietnam (e.g., mental illness or disability), or some combination of all three?

⁴ As [Bjorklund and Moffitt \(1987\)](#) show, by using more structure, the average effect in the population, the average effect on those who are treated, and the effect on the marginal treated person, can all be uncovered in such a case. [Heckman and Robb \(1985\)](#) contains an early discussion of heterogeneous treatment effects. As [Heckman and Vytlacil \(2005\)](#) emphasize, when treatment effects are heterogeneous, the [Imbens–Angrist interpretation that IV estimates the effect of treatment on a subset of the population relies crucially on their monotonicity assumption](#). Basically, this says that when Z shifts from 0 to 1, a subset of the population is shifted into treatment, but no one shifts out. This is highly plausible in the case of draft eligibility, but is not plausible in many other contexts. In a context where the shift in the instrument may move people in or out of treatment, the IV estimator is rendered completely uninterpretable. I'll give a specific example of this below.

⁵ Let S_i be an indicator for military service, α denote the population average effect of military service, $(\alpha_i - \alpha)$ denote the person i specific component of the effect, and Z_i denote the lottery number. We have that $\text{Cov}(S_i, (\alpha_i - \alpha), Z_i) > 0$, since, among those with high lottery numbers, only those with large α_i will choose to enlist.

If the work is to guide future policy, it is important to understand what mechanism was at work.

[Rosenzweig and Wolpin \(2000\)](#) stress that Angrist's results tell us nothing about the mechanism whereby military service affects earnings. For instance, suppose wages depend on education, private sector work experience, and military work experience, as in a Mincer earnings function augmented to include military experience. [Rosenzweig and Wolpin](#) note that Angrist's approach can only tell us the effect of military experience on earnings if we assume: (i) completed schooling is uncorrelated with draft lottery number (which seems implausible as the draft interrupts schooling) and (ii) private sector experience is determined mechanically as age minus years of military service minus years of school. Otherwise, the draft lottery instrument is not valid, because it is correlated with schooling and experience, which are relegated to the error term — **randomization alone does not guarantee exogeneity.**

Furthermore, even these conditions are necessary but not sufficient. It is plausible that schooling could be positively or negatively affected by a low lottery number, as those with low numbers might (a) stay in school to avoid the draft, (b) have their school interrupted by being drafted, or (c) receive tuition benefits after being drafted and leaving the service. These three effects might leave average schooling among the draft eligible unaffected – so that (i) is satisfied – yet change the composition of who attends school within the group.⁶ With heterogeneous returns to schooling, this compositional change may reduce average earnings of the draft eligible group, causing the IV procedure to understate the return to military experience itself.⁷

Another important point is that the draft lottery may itself affect behavior. That is, people who draw low numbers may realize that there is a high probability that their educational or labor market careers will be interrupted. This increased probability of future interruption reduces the return to human capital investment today.⁸ Thus, even if they are not actually drafted, men who draw low lottery numbers may experience lower subsequent earnings because, for a time, their higher level of uncertainty caused them to reduce their rate of investment. This would tend to lower \bar{y}^E relative to \bar{y}^N , exaggerating the negative effect of military service *per se*.⁹

This argument may *appear* to be equivalent to saying that the lottery number belongs in the main outcome equation, which is to

⁶ E.g., some low innate ability types get more schooling in an effort to avoid the draft, some high innate ability types get less schooling because of the adverse consequence of being drafted and having school interrupted.

⁷ As an aside, this scenario also provides a good example of the crucial role of monotonicity stressed by [Heckman and Vytlacil \(2005\)](#). Suppose we use draft eligibility as an IV for completed schooling in an earnings equation, which – as noted somewhat tongue-in-cheek by [Rosenzweig and Wolpin \(2000\)](#) – seems *prima facie* every bit as sensible as using it as an IV for military service (since draft eligibility presumably affects schooling while being uncorrelated with U). Amongst the draft eligible group, some stay in school longer than they otherwise would have, as a draft avoidance strategy. Others get less schooling than they otherwise would have, either because their school attendance is directly interrupted by the draft, or because the threat of school interruption lowers the option value of continuing school. Monotonicity is violated since the instrument, draft eligibility, lowers school for some and raises it for others. Here, IV does not identify the effect of schooling on earnings for any particular population subgroup. Indeed, the IV estimator is completely uninterpretable. In the extreme case described in the text, where mean schooling is unchanged in the draft eligible group (i.e., the flows in and out of school induced by the instrument cancel), and mean earnings in the draft eligible group are reduced by the shift in composition of who attends school, the plim of the Wald estimator is undefined, and its value in any finite sample is completely meaningless.

⁸ Note that draft number cutoffs for determining eligibility were announced some time after the lottery itself, leaving men uncertain about their eligibility status in the interim.

⁹ [Heckman \(1997\)](#), footnote 8, contains some similar arguments, such as that employers will invest more (less) in workers with high (low) lottery numbers.

some extent a testable hypothesis. Indeed, Angrist (1990) performs such a test. To do this, he disaggregates the lottery numbers into 73 groups of 5, that is, 1–5, 6–10, . . . , 361–365. This creates an over-identified model, so one can test if a subset of the instruments belongs in the main equation. To give the intuitive idea, suppose we group the lottery numbers into low, medium and high, and index these groups by $j = 1, 2, 3$. Then, defining $P^j = P(S_i = 1|Z_i \in j)$, the predicted military service probability from a first stage regression of service indicators on lottery group dummies, we could run the second stage regression:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 I[Z_i \in 1] + P^j \alpha + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where y_i denotes earnings of person i at some subsequent date. Given that there are three groups of lottery numbers, we can test the hypothesis that the lottery numbers only matter through their effect on the military enrolment probability P^j by testing if β_1 , the coefficient on an indicator for a low lottery number, is significant. Angrist and Krueger (1999) conducts an analogous over-identification test (using all 73 instrument groups, and also pooling data from multiple years and cohorts), and does not reject the over-identifying restrictions.¹⁰

However, this test does not actually address my concern about how the lottery may affect behavior. In my argument, a person's lottery number affects his rate of human capital investment through its effect on his probability of military service. Thus, I am talking about an effect of the lottery that operates through P^j , but that is (i) distinct from the effect of military service itself, and (ii) would exist within the treatment group even if none were ultimately drafted. Such an effect cannot be detected by estimating (1), because the coefficient α already picks it up.

To summarize, it is impossible to meaningfully interpret Angrist's –15% estimate without *a priori* theoretical assumptions. Under one (strong) set of assumptions, the estimate can be interpreted to mean that, for the subset of the population induced to serve by the draft (i.e., those who would not have otherwise voluntarily chosen the military), mean earnings were 15% lower in the early 80s than they would have been otherwise. But this set of assumptions rules out various plausible behavioral responses by the draft eligible who were not ultimately drafted.

3. Interpretation is prior to identification

Advocates of the “experimentalist” approach often criticize structural estimation because, they argue, it is not clear how parameters are “identified”. What is meant by “identified” here is subtly different from the traditional use of the term in econometric theory – i.e., that a model satisfies technical conditions insuring a unique global maximum for the statistical objective function. Here, the phrase “how a parameter is identified” refers instead to a more intuitive notion that can be roughly phrased as follows: What are the key features of the data, or the key sources of (assumed) exogenous variation in the data, or the key *a priori* theoretical or statistical assumptions imposed in the estimation, that drive the quantitative values of the parameter estimates, and strongly influence the substantive conclusions drawn from the estimation exercise?

¹⁰ Unfortunately, many applied researchers are under the false impression that over-identification tests allow one to test the assumed exogeneity of instruments. In fact, such tests require that at least one instrument be valid (which is why they are over-identification tests), and this assumption is not testable. To see this, note that we cannot also include $I[Z_i \in 2]$ in (1), as this creates perfect collinearity. As noted by Koopmans et al. (1950), “. . . the distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables is a theoretical, *a priori* distinction . . .”.

For example, Angrist (1995) argues: “Structural papers . . . often list key identifying assumptions (e.g., the instruments) in footnotes, at the bottom of a table, or not at all. In some cases, the estimation technique or write up is such that the reader cannot be sure just whose (or which) outcomes are being compared to make the key causal inference of interest”.

In my view, there is much validity to Angrist's criticism of structural work here. The main positive contribution of the “experimentalist” school has been to enhance the attention that empirical researchers pay to identification in the more intuitive sense noted above. This emphasis has also encouraged the formal literature on non-parametrics and semi-parametrics to ask useful questions about what assumptions are essential for estimation of certain models, and what assumptions can be relaxed or dispensed with.¹¹

However, while it has brought the issue to the fore, the “experimentalist” approach to empirical work *per se* has not helped clarify issues of identification. In fact, it has often tended to obscure them. The Angrist (1990) draft lottery paper again provides a good illustration. It is indeed obvious what the crucial identifying assumption is: A person's draft lottery number is uncorrelated with his characteristics, and only influences his subsequent labor market outcomes through its affect on his probability of veteran status. Nevertheless, despite this clarity, it is not at all clear or intuitive what the resultant estimate of the effect of military service on earnings of about –15% really means, or what “drives” that estimate.

As the discussion in the previous section stressed, many interpretations are possible. Is it the average effect, meaning the expected effect when a randomly chosen person from the population is drafted? Or, is the average effect much smaller? Are we just picking out a large negative effect that exists for a subset of the population? Is the effect a consequence of military service itself, or of interrupted schooling or lost experience? Or do higher probabilities of being drafted lead to reduced human capital investment due to increased risk of labor market separation? I find I have very little intuition for what drives the estimate, despite the clarity of the identifying assumption.

This brings me to two more general observations about atheoretical work that relies on “natural experiments” to generate instruments:

First, exogeneity assumptions are always *a priori*, and there is no such thing as an “ideal” instrument that is “obviously” exogenous. We've seen that even a lottery number can be exogenous or endogenous, depending on economic assumptions. “Experimentalist” approaches don't clarify the *a priori* economic assumptions that justify an exogeneity assumption, because work in that genre typically eschews being clear about the economic model that is being used to interpret the data. When the economic assumptions that underlie the validity of instruments are left implicit, the proper interpretation of inferences is obscured.

Second, interpretability is prior to identification. “Experimentalist” approaches are typically very “simple” in the sense that if one asks, “How is a parameter identified?”, the answer is “by the variation in variable Z , which is assumed exogenous”. But, if one asks “What is the meaning or interpretation of the parameter that is identified?” there is no clear answer. Rather, the ultimate answer is just: “It is that parameter which is identified when I use variation in Z ”.

I want to stress that this statement about the lack of interpretability of atheoretic, natural experiment based, IV estimates is not limited to the widely discussed case where the “treatment effect” is heterogeneous in the population. As we know from Imbens and Angrist (1994), and as discussed in Heckman (1997),

¹¹ See Heckman and Navarro (2007), or Heckman et al. (2005) and the discussion in Keane (2003), for good examples of this research program.

when treatment effects are heterogeneous, as in the equation $y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + u_i$, the IV estimator based on instrument Z_i identifies, at best, the “effect” of X on the subset of the population whose behavior is altered by the instrument. Thus, our estimate of the “effect” of X depends on what instrument we use. All we can say is that IV identifies “that parameter which is identified when I use variation in Z ”. Furthermore, as noted by Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), even this ambiguous interpretation hinges on the monotonicity assumption, which requires that the instrument shift subjects in only one direction (either into or out of treatment). But, as I will illustrate in Section 4, absent a theory, this lack of interpretability of IV estimates even applies in homogeneous coefficient models.

In a structural approach, in contrast, the parameters have clear economic interpretations. In some cases, the source of variation in the data that identifies a parameter or drives the behavior of a structural model may be difficult to understand, but I do not agree that such lack of clarity is a necessary feature of structural work. In fact, in Section 5, I will give an example of a structural estimation exercise where (i) an estimated parameter has a very clear theoretical interpretation, and (ii) it is perfectly clear what patterns in the data “identify” the parameter in the sense of driving its estimated value. In any case, it does not seem like progress to gain clarity about the source of identification while losing interpretability of what is being identified!

4. The general ambiguity of IV estimates, absent a theory

The problem that atheoretic IV type estimates are difficult to interpret is certainly not special to Angrist’s draft lottery paper, or, contrary to a widespread misperception, special to situations where “treatment effects” are heterogeneous. As another simple example, consider Bernal and Keane (2007).¹² This paper is part of a large literature that looks at effects of maternal contact time – specifically, the reduction in contact time that occurs if mothers work and place children in childcare – on child cognitive development (as measured by test scores). Obviously, we can’t simply compare child outcomes between children who were and were not in childcare to estimate the “effect” of childcare, because it seems likely that mothers who work and place children in childcare are different from mothers who don’t. Thus, what researchers typically do in this literature is regress a cognitive ability test score measured at, say, age 5, on a measure of how much time a child spent in day care up through age five, along with a set of “control variables”, like the mother’s education and AFQT score, meant to capture the differences in mothers’ cognitive ability endowments, socio-economic status, and so on.

But even with the most extensive controls available in survey data, there are still likely to be unobserved characteristics of mothers and children that are correlated with childcare use. Thus, we’d like to find a “good” instrument for childcare – a variable or set of variables that influences maternal work and childcare choices, but is plausibly uncorrelated with mother and child characteristics. Bernal and Keane (2007) argue the existing literature in this area has not come up with any good instruments, and propose that the major changes in welfare rules in the US in the 90s are a good candidate. These rule changes led to substantial increases in work and childcare use among single mothers, as the aim of the reforms was to encourage work. And it seems very plausible that the variation in welfare rules over time and across States had little or no correlation with mother and child

characteristics. So, as far as instruments go, I think this is about as good as it gets.

Now, I think it is fair to say that, in much recent empirical work in economics, a loose verbal discussion like that in the last two paragraphs is all the “theory” one would see. It would not be unusual to follow the above discussion with a description of the data, run the proposed IV regression, report the resultant coefficient on childcare as the “causal effect” of childcare on child outcomes, and leave it at that. In fact, when we implement the IV procedure, we get $-.0074$ as the coefficient on quarters of childcare in a log test score equation (standard error .0029), implying that a year of childcare lowers the test score by 3.0%, which is .13 standard deviations of the score distribution. But what does this estimate really mean? Absent a theoretical framework, it is no more interpretable than Angrist’s -15% figure for the “effect” of military service on earnings.

One way to provide a theoretical framework for interpreting the estimate is to specify a child cognitive ability production function. For concreteness, I’ll write this as:

$$\ln A_{it} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \hat{T}_{it} + \alpha_2 \hat{C}_{it} + \alpha_3 \ln \hat{G}_{it} + \omega_i \quad (2)$$

where A_{it} is child i ’s cognitive ability t periods after birth (assumed to be measured with classical error by a test score), \hat{T}_{it} , \hat{C}_{it} and \hat{G}_{it} are the cumulative maternal time, day-care/pre-school time, and goods inputs up through age t ,¹³ and ω_i is the child’s ability endowment. The key issue in estimating (2) is that \hat{T}_{it} , \hat{C}_{it} and ω_i are not observed in available data sets. As a consequence, the few studies that actually have a production framework in mind¹⁴ sometimes use household income I_{it} (and perhaps prices of goods) as a “proxy” for G_{it} . It is also typical to assume a specific relationship between childcare time and maternal time, so that \hat{T}_{it} drops out of the equation, and to include mother characteristics like education to proxy for ω_i . What are the effects of these decisions?

In a related context, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) discussed the literature on birth weight production functions. They noted that studies of effects of inputs like prenatal care on birth weight had typically dealt with problems of missing inputs, such as maternal nutrition, by including in the equation their determinants, such as household income and food prices. They referred to such an equation, which includes a subset of inputs along with determinants of the omitted inputs, as a “hybrid” production function, and noted that estimation of such an equation does not, in general, recover the *ceteris paribus* effects of the inputs on the outcome of interest.

In the cognitive ability production case, the use of household income to proxy for goods, and the assumption of a specific relationship between child-care and maternal time, also leads to a “hybrid” production function. To interpret estimates of such an equation – and in particular to understand conditions under which they reveal the *ceteris paribus* effect of the child-care time input on child outcomes – we need assumptions on how inputs are chosen, as I now illustrate.

First, decompose the child’s ability endowment into a part that is correlated with a vector of characteristics of the mother, E_i , such as her education, and a part $\hat{\omega}_i$ that is mean independent of the mother’s characteristics, as follows:

$$\omega_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 E_i + \hat{\omega}_i.$$

¹² By discussing one of my own papers, I hope to emphasize that my intent is not to criticize specific papers by others, like the Angrist (1990) paper discussed in Section 2, but rather to point out limitations of the IV approach in general.

¹³ The goods inputs would include things like books and toys that enhance cognitive development. The childcare/pre-school inputs would include contributions of alternative care providers’ time to child cognitive development. These may be more or less effective than mother’s own time. In addition, care in a group setting may contribute to the child’s development by stimulating interaction with other children, learning activities at pre-school, etc.

¹⁴ Besides Bernal and Keane (2007), I am thinking largely of James-Burdumy (2005), Bernal (2008), Blau (1999) and Leibowitz (1977).

Second, assume (as in the Appendix) a model where mothers choose four endogenous variables: hours of work, maternal “quality” contact time, childcare/pre-school time, and goods inputs. The exogenous factors that drive these choices are the mother’s wage (determined by her education and productivity shocks), the child’s skill endowment, the welfare rules and price of childcare, and the mother’s tastes for leisure and childcare use. In such a model, the mother’s decision rule (demand function) for the childcare time input at age t , C_{it} , can of course be written as a function of the exogenous variables, which for simplicity I assume is linear:

$$C_{it} = \pi_0 + \pi_1 E_i + \pi_2 \hat{\omega}_i + \pi_3 cc + \pi_4 R_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}^c.$$

Here cc is the price per unit of child-care time that the mother faces at time t , R_{it} is a set of welfare program rules facing the mother at time t , and ε_{it}^c is a stochastic term that subsumes several factors, including tastes for child care use, shocks to childcare availability, and shocks to the mother’s offered wage rate. [The fact that the price of child-care cc is assumed constant over mothers and time is not an accident. A key problem confronting the literature on childcare is that the geographic variation in cc seems too modest to use it as an IV for child-care usage.]

Third, we need expressions for the *unobserved* goods and maternal “quality” time inputs as a function of *observed* endogenous and exogenous variables (and stochastic terms), so that we can substitute the unobserved endogenous variables out of (2). In a model with multiple jointly determined endogenous variables (y_1, y_2) we can generally adopt a two-stage solution (i.e., solve for optimal y_2 as a function of y_1 , and then optimize with respect to y_1). For simplicity, I assume the optimal levels of the cumulative inputs of maternal time, \hat{T}_{it} , and goods, \hat{G}_{it} , up through age t can be written, conditional on the cumulative childcare and hours inputs, as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{T}_{it} &= (\phi_0 + \phi_1 E_i + \phi_2 \hat{\omega}_i) \cdot t + \phi_3 \hat{C}_{it} + \phi_4 \hat{H}_{it} \\ &\quad + \phi_5 \ln \hat{T}_{it}(W, H; R) + \varepsilon_{it}^T \\ \ln \hat{G}_{it} &= \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 E_i + \gamma_2 \hat{\omega}_i + \gamma_3 \hat{C}_{it} + \gamma_4 \hat{H}_{it} \\ &\quad + \gamma_5 \ln \hat{T}_{it}(W, H; R) + \gamma_6 t + \varepsilon_{it}^g. \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

The Appendix illustrates how, in a simple static model, such relationships, which I will call “conditional decision rules”, can be obtained as the second stage in an optimization process, where, in the first stage, the mother chooses the childcare time inputs C and hours of market work H . Typically, an analytic derivation is not feasible in a dynamic model, so the equations in (3) can be viewed as simple linear approximations to the more complex relationships that would exist given dynamics. The notation $\hat{T}_{it}(W, H; R)$ highlights the dependence of income on wages, hours of market work, and the welfare rules R that determine how benefits depend on income.

I won’t spend a great deal of time defending the specifications in (3), as they are meant to be illustrative, and as they play no role in estimation itself, but are used only to help interpret the estimates. The key thing captured by (3) is that a mother’s decisions about time and goods inputs into child development may be influenced by (i.e., made jointly with) her decisions about hours of market work and childcare. Both equations capture the notion that per-period inputs depend on the mother’s characteristics E (which determine her level of human capital), and the child’s ability endowment $\hat{\omega}_i$. The time trends in (3) capture the growth of cumulative inputs over time.

Now, if we substitute the equations for ω_i , T_{it} and $\ln G_{it}$ into (2), we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln A_{it} &= (\alpha_0 + \alpha_3 \gamma_0 + \beta_0) + (\alpha_2 + \alpha_1 \phi_3 + \alpha_3 \gamma_3) \cdot \hat{C}_{it} \\ &\quad + (\alpha_1 \phi_5 + \alpha_3 \gamma_5) \ln \hat{T}_{it} + (\alpha_1 \phi_4 + \alpha_3 \gamma_4) \hat{H}_{it} \\ &\quad + \{\alpha_1 (\phi_0 + \phi_1 E_i) + \alpha_3 \gamma_6\} \cdot t + (\beta_1 + \alpha_3 \gamma_1) \cdot E_i \\ &\quad + \{(1 + \alpha_3 \gamma_2) \hat{\omega}_i + \alpha_1 \phi_2 \hat{\omega}_i t + \alpha_1 \varepsilon_{it}^T + \alpha_3 \varepsilon_{it}^g\}. \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

This “hybrid” production function is estimable, since the independent variables are typically measurable in available data sets. But the issues of choice of an appropriate estimation method, and proper interpretation of the estimates, are both subtle.

The first notable thing about (4) is that the composite error term contains the unobserved part of the child’s ability endowment, $\hat{\omega}_i$, as well as the stochastic terms ε_{it}^g and ε_{it}^T , which capture mothers’ idiosyncratic tastes for investment in child quality via goods and time inputs. It seems likely that childcare usage, cumulative income and cumulative labor market hours are correlated with all of these error components. For the welfare rule parameters R_{it} to be valid instruments for cumulative childcare and income in estimating (4), they must be uncorrelated with these three error components, which seems like a plausible exogeneity assumption.

Assuming that IV based on R provides consistent estimates of (4), it is important to recognize that the child-care “effect” that is estimated is $(\alpha_2 + \alpha_1 \phi_3 + \alpha_3 \gamma_3)$. This is the “direct” effect of childcare time (α_2), holding other inputs fixed, plus indirect effects arising because the mother’s quality time input ($\alpha_1 \phi_3$) and the goods input ($\alpha_3 \gamma_3$) also vary as childcare time varies. While α_1 , α_2 , and α_3 are structural parameters of the production technology (2), the parameters ϕ_3 and γ_3 come from the conditional decision rules for time and goods inputs (3), which are not necessarily policy invariant. This has implications for both estimation and interpretation.

First, a valid instrument for estimation of (4) must have the property that it does not alter the parameters in (3). A good example of a *prima facie* plausible instrument that does not have this property is the price of childcare. Variation in this price will shift the conditional decision rule parameters, since it shifts the mother’s budget constraint conditional on C , H and I . In contrast, a change in welfare rules that determine how benefits affect income does not have this problem, since such a change is reflected in $I(W, H; R)$.

Second, given consistent estimates of (4), the estimated “effect” of childcare usage on child cognitive outcomes applies only to policy experiments that do not alter the conditional decision rules for time and goods investment in children (3). As these decision rules are conditional on work, income and childcare usage decisions, they should be invariant to policies that leave the budget constraint conditional on those decisions unchanged. A work requirement that induces a woman to work and use childcare, but that leaves her wage rate and the cost of care unaffected, would fall into this category. But childcare subsidies would not. Third, absent further assumptions, estimates of (4) cannot tell us if maternal time is more effective at producing child quality than childcare time. For instance, if $\phi_3 > -1$ then mother’s “quality” time with the child is reduced less than one-for-one as childcare time is increased. Then, the estimated childcare “effect” may be zero or positive even if $\alpha_2 < \alpha_1$ and $\alpha_3 \gamma_3 = 0$.¹⁵

¹⁵ To my knowledge, James-Burdumy (2005) is the first paper in the childcare literature that notes the ambiguity in the estimated “effect” of childcare that arises because, in general, the maternal quality time input may also be varied (via optimizing behavior of the mother) as childcare time is varied. On a related point, Todd and Wolpin (2003), provide a good discussion of the proper interpretation of production function estimates when proxy variables are used to control for omitted inputs. For instance, say one includes in the production function a specific maternal time input, like time spent reading to the child, along with a proxy for the total maternal time input (say, maternal work and childcare use, which reduce total maternal care time). Then, the coefficient on reading time captures the effect of reading time holding total time fixed, implying that time in some other activities must be *reduced*. Of course, excluding the proxy does not solve the problem, as the coefficient on reading time then captures variation of the omitted inputs with reading time. This is similar to the problem we note here, where the change in childcare time may be associated with changes in other unmeasured inputs (i.e., maternal quality time or goods inputs).

In contrast, consider a model where maternal contact time with the child is just a deterministic function of childcare use, as in $T_{it} = T - C_{it}$, where T is total time in a period. That is, we no longer make a distinction between total contact time and “quality” time.¹⁶ In that case, we get $\phi_0 = T$, $\phi_1 = \phi_2 = \phi_4 = \phi_5 = 0$, $\phi_3 = -1$, so that $\hat{T}_{it} = T \cdot t - \hat{C}_{it}$, and we obtain the simpler expression $(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1) + \alpha_3\gamma_3$ for the coefficient on \hat{C}_{it} in (4). This is the effect of childcare time relative to maternal time, plus the impact of any change in the goods input that the mother implements to compensate for the reduction in the maternal time input. To resolve the ambiguity regarding the impact of maternal time relative to childcare time, we need to impose some prior on reasonable magnitudes of $\alpha_3\gamma_3$. Only in a model with $\gamma_3 = 0$, so that goods inputs are invariant to the childcare input,¹⁷ does IV identify the structural (or policy invariant) parameter $(\alpha_2 - \alpha_1)$, the effect of time in childcare relative to the effect of mother’s time.

Thus, what is identified when one regresses child outcomes on childcare, using welfare policy rules as an instrument, along with income as a proxy for goods inputs, and mother socio-economic characteristics as “control” variables, may or may not be a structural parameter of the production technology, depending on *a priori* economic assumptions.¹⁸ IV estimates of (4) are not interpretable without specifying these assumptions.

Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a,b) pointed out the fundamental under-identification problem that arises in attempts to distinguish child quality production function parameters from mother’s (or parent’s) utility function parameters in household models. For instance, suppose we observe a “natural experiment” that reduces the cost of childcare. Say this leads to a substantial increase in childcare use and maternal work, and only a small drop in child test outcomes. We might conclude childcare time is a close substitute for mother’s time in child quality production.

But we might just as well conclude that the cross-price effect of childcare cost on demand for child quality is small (e.g., because the household is very unwilling to substitute consumption or leisure for child quality). Then, the increase in childcare use is accompanied by a substantial increase in the goods input into child quality production, and/or mother’s quality time input may be reduced much less than one-for-one. Absent strong assumptions, we cannot disentangle production function parameters from properties of the household’s utility function using estimates of (4).¹⁹ As Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a, b) note, even the “ideal” natural experiment that randomly assigns children to different levels of day-care

does not resolve this problem. One can only distinguish production from utility function parameters using *a priori* theoretical assumptions. **Point in this section is that IV estimates policy effects, not structural or ceteris paribus effects because cross effects on other inputs are not ruled out.**

5. Cases where there are no possible instruments

In this section, I will examine the limitations of IV from another perspective, by looking at a case where an important structural parameter of interest cannot be identified using IV, even under “ideal” conditions. In that case, only a fully structural approach is possible.

Consider a “standard” life-cycle labor supply model, with (i) agents free to borrow and lend across periods at a fixed interest rate r , (ii) wages evolving stochastically but exogenously, and (iii) period utility separable between consumption and leisure, and given by $u(c_t, l_t) = v(c_t) - b(t)h_t^\alpha$, $\alpha > 1$, where c_t , l_t and h_t are consumption, leisure and hours of work, respectively, and $b(t)$ is a time varying shift to tastes for leisure. This generates the Frisch labor supply function:

$$\ln h_t = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} [\ln W_t + \ln \lambda_t - \ln \alpha - \ln b(t)] \quad (5)$$

where W_t is the wage rate at age t , and λ_t is the marginal utility of wealth (see MaCurdy, 1981, 1985).

Note that $\eta \equiv 1/(\alpha - 1) = \partial \ln h_t / \partial \ln W_t$, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, is a key parameter of interest, as it determines both how agents respond to anticipated changes in wages over the life-cycle (as anticipated changes do not affect the marginal utility of wealth), and how agents respond to transitory wage shocks, regardless of whether they are anticipated or not (since a transitory shock, even if unanticipated, has little effect on λ_t). Given its importance in both labor economics and macroeconomics, a large literature is devoted to estimating this parameter.

Now, estimation of (5) is complicated by the fact that the marginal utility of wealth λ_t is unobserved. However, its change can be approximated by $\Delta \ln \lambda_t \approx (\rho - r) + \varepsilon_t$, where ρ is the discount rate and ε_t is a shock to the marginal utility of wealth that arises because of new information that is revealed between ages $t - 1$ and t . Hence, a number of papers work with a first differenced version of (5), given by:

$$\Delta \ln h_t = \eta \Delta \ln W_t + \eta(\rho - r) + \eta[\Delta \ln b(t) + \varepsilon_t]. \quad (6)$$

Eq. (6) cannot be estimated using OLS, because of the problem that $\Delta \ln W_t$ and ε_t are likely to be correlated. That is, the change in wages from $t - 1$ to t is likely to contain some surprise component that shifts the marginal utility of wealth, generating an income effect. However, under the assumptions of the model, a valid instrument for $\Delta \ln W_t$ is a variable Z_t that has the properties: (i) it predicts wage growth from $t - 1$ to t , (ii) it was known at time $t - 1$, and hence is uncorrelated with ε_t , and (iii) it is uncorrelated with the change in tastes $b(t)$ from $t - 1$ to t .

Typically, the instruments that have been used to identify the structural parameter η are variables like age, age² and age · education. These variables predict wage growth between $t - 1$ and t , because of the well know “hump shape” in the life-cycle earnings profile – that is, earnings tend to grow quickly age young ages, but they grow at a decreasing rate with age, until reaching a peak in roughly the late 40s or early 50s, after which they begin to head down. Also, the shape of the profile differs somewhat by education level, so age · education has predictive power as well. On the other hand, age at t is known at $t - 1$, as is education (provided the

¹⁶ In the Appendix, I consider a model where $C - H$ is the mother’s private leisure time, while $T - C$ is the total time the child is in the mother’s care. The mother chooses how much of the latter to devote to “quality” time with the child vs. other types of non-market activity (e.g., the child’s time could be divided between day-care, “quality” time with the mother, and time spent watching TV while the mother does housework). It is only to the extent that $C > H$ for some mothers that one can include both C and H in (3). In fact, Bernal and Keane (2007) find that C and H are so highly correlated for single mothers that they cannot both be included in (4).

¹⁷ If $\gamma_3 = 0$, the log goods input is a linear function of log income and hours of market work, which appear in (4), but not of childcare time. It is interesting that, in this case, where we have also set $\phi_4 = 0$, the maternal work hours coefficient in (4) does not capture an effect of maternal time at all, but rather an association between work hours and the goods input ($\alpha_3\gamma_4$).

¹⁸ Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) give other examples where the parameter that IV based on “truly random” instruments identifies depends on (i) the control variables that are included in the “main” equation, (ii) the maintained economic assumptions. Most notably, these examples include (i) estimates of the “causal effect” of education on earnings, using date of birth or gender of siblings as instruments, and (ii) estimates of effects of transitory income shocks on consumption, using weather as an instrument for farm income.

¹⁹ Obviously, direct measures of “quality” time and goods inputs would alleviate this problem. But, to make use of such data requires other assumptions. For instance, one would need to define “quality” time, and make assumptions about whether various types of quality time also enter the mother’s utility directly. Similarly, one would need to classify goods into those that enter quality production vs. ones that also enter utility directly vs. ones that do both.

Table 1
Changes in wages and hours over the life-cycle.

A. NLSY79 data				
Age	24	31	Percentage change	Implied elasticity
Annual hours	2034	2290	+12.6	
Wage rate	7.07	9.66	+36.6	.34
The data are for whites males who were 14–21 on Jan. 1, 1979. Only the employed who have left school are included.				
B. Simulation from Imai–Keane life-cycle model				
Annual hours	2088	2373	+13.6	
Wage rate	6.80	8.97	+31.9	.43
Shadow wage	11.76	12.36	+5.1	2.67

Note: All figures are taken from Imai and Keane (2004).

person had already finished the school and entered the labor force), so these variables satisfy requirement (ii).²⁰

Now, given our theoretical assumptions, the interpretation of η in (6) is quite clear. Furthermore, the source of identification when we estimate (6) using variables like age, age² and age · education as instruments is also quite clear. What will drive the estimate of η is how hours vary over the life-cycle as wages move along the predictable life-cycle age path. In other words, we identify η from the low frequency co-variation between hours and wages over the life-cycle.

Table 1 presents statistics from the NLSY79 on growth in wages and hours for young men. That data is described in detail in Imai and Keane (2004), so I will not go into details here. From age 24 to age 31, the average wage rate increases from \$7.07 per hour to \$9.66 per hour, a 36.6% increase. Meanwhile, average hours increase from 2034 to 2290, only a 12.6% increase. A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of roughly $12.6/36.6 = .34$. Not surprisingly, when Imai and Keane (2004) use these data to estimate η using the IV procedure described above, they get .26, with a standard error of .077 (see their Table 6). Every researcher who has estimated the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution for men, using a similar procedure, has obtained a similarly low estimate. It is very clear what pattern in the data drives the estimate: wages rise much more over the life-cycle path than do hours, in percentage terms. If we look at the data through the lens of the “standard” life-cycle model with exogenous wages, this implies the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution must be small.

Imai and Keane (2004) show how one comes to a very different conclusion by viewing the data through the lens of a model with endogenous wages. They consider a model where work experience increases wages through a learning-by-doing mechanism. In that case, the wage rate W_t is no longer equal to the opportunity cost of time. Let \tilde{W}_t denote the true opportunity cost of time, which now equals the current wage plus the present discounted value of increased future earnings that results from working an extra hour today. In that case, Eq. (6) becomes:

$$\Delta \ln h_t = \eta \Delta \ln W_t + \eta(\rho - r) + \eta[(\Delta \ln \tilde{W}_t - \Delta \ln W_t) + \Delta \ln b(t) + \varepsilon_t]. \quad (7)$$

²⁰ Whether age and education are also uncorrelated with changes in tastes for leisure is a problematic issue I will leave aside here. The typical paper in this literature uses variables like marital status and number of children to control for life-cycle factors that may systematically shift tastes for leisure. Another difficult issue is how to deal with aggregate shocks in estimation of (6). Most authors use time dummies to pick up both aggregate taste shocks and the annual interest rate terms. But Altug and Miller (1989) point out that time dummies only control for aggregate shocks if those shocks shift the marginal utility of consumption for all agents in the same way – which is tantamount to assuming complete markets.

Note that the difference $\ln \tilde{W}_t - \ln W_t$ between the opportunity cost of time and the wage rate now enters the composite error term in square brackets. Due to the horizon effect, the return to human capital investment declines with age. Thus, age is correlated with the error term, and is not a valid instrument for estimating η . Similarly, if the level of human capital enters the human capital production function (e.g., due to diminishing returns to human capital investment), then any variable that affects the level of human capital, like education, is not a valid instrument either.

In fact, I would argue that there are no valid instruments by construction. Any variable that is correlated with the change in wages from $t - 1$ to t will be correlated with the change in the return to human capital investment as well, and hence it will be correlated with the error term in (7). This includes even labor demand shocks that shift the rental price on human capital.

Thus, the only way to estimate η in this framework is to adopt a fully structural approach. This is what Imai and Keane (2004) do, and the intuition for how it works is simple. Essentially, we must estimate the Frisch supply function jointly with a human capital production function (or wage equation). We must then find values for the return to experience and the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution that together match (i) the observed wage path over the life-cycle and (ii) the observed hours path over the life-cycle.

The bottom panel of Table 1 presents some statistics from data simulated from the Imai–Keane model. Notice that the observed mean wage rises from \$6.80 at age 24 to \$8.97 at age 31, a 31.9% increase. However, the opportunity cost of time is estimated to be \$11.76 at age 24, and \$12.36 at age 31, so it only increases by 5.1%. Since the opportunity cost of time grew only 5.1%, while hours grew 13.6%, a back-of-the-envelope calculation implies an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of $.136/.051 = 2.7$. In fact, the Imai–Keane estimate of η exceeds 3.

Now, why do Imai and Keane find that the shadow wage is so much higher than the observed wage at young ages? Is the differential that they estimate consistent with reasonable values for the return to experience? Is it intuitive what drives the estimate of η ? In fact, the intuition for how Imai and Keane obtain this result is quite clear, as can be seen by another simple back-of-the-envelope calculation:

To begin, let us look at ages 20 and 40, to use round numbers to keep things simple. The Imai–Keane model implies that the opportunity cost of time exceeds the observed hourly wage rate by roughly \$5.70 per hour at age 20, and by roughly \$2.00 per hour at age 40.²¹ To assess whether these figures are consistent with reasonable assumptions about returns to experience, let us make some very simple assumptions:

- (1) People work 2000 hour per year from 20 through 65.
- (2) Interest rate = .05.
- (3) 2000 hours of work at age 20 raises wage rate in subsequent periods by 32 cents per hour.
- (4) 2000 hours of work at age 40 raises wage rate in subsequent periods by 14 cents per hour.

We will see why I choose the specific values in (3)–(4) in a moment. Given assumptions (1)–(4), the present value of increased future earnings due to working one extra hour at age 20 is given by the formula²²:

$$\frac{x}{r} - \frac{1}{(1+r)^T} \frac{x}{r} = \frac{.32}{.05} - \frac{1}{(1.05)^{45}} \frac{.32}{.05} = 6.40 - \frac{1}{9} 6.40 \approx \$5.70$$

²¹ Note that the observed wage rate at age 20 is about \$5.50 and that at age 40 is about \$10.90. Thus, the opportunity cost of time is \$11.20 at age 20 (more than double the wage rate!), and it is \$12.90 at age 40. So from age 20 to 40, the wage rate rises 98% but the cost of time only rises 15.2% (a factor of 6.5 difference!).

²² Note that one hour of work at age 20 raises the wage rate in subsequent periods by 32/2000 cents per hour, which assuming 2000 hours of work, translates into a 32 cent increase in annual earnings.

while that due to working one extra hour at age 40 is given by the formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{x}{r} - \frac{1}{(1+r)^T} \frac{x}{r} &= \frac{.14}{.05} - \frac{1}{(1.05)^{25}} \frac{.14}{.05} \\ &= 2.80 - \frac{1}{3.4} 2.80 \approx \$2.00. \end{aligned}$$

So these figures would generate the desired differentials between the observed wage and shadow wage at ages 20 and 40. Are such returns to experience plausible?

If we write down a Mincer type earnings function of the form:

$$\ln W = 1.74 + .057x - .0011x^2,$$

we get the desired result, i.e., the experience effects in (3)–(4), assuming people enter the labor market with experience $x = 0$ at age 20 and have experience $x = 20$ at age 40. Then, the effect of an additional year of experience on the wage rate is 5.7% at age 20 and drops to 1.4% at age 40. These figures are right in line with existing consensus evidence on returns to experience.

So, the result is clear: If we view the data through the lens of a life-cycle model where work experience increases wages, then the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution has to be roughly 2 to 3.²³ Reasonable estimates of returns to experience imply that the shadow wage increases by only about 15% from start to peak of the life-cycle wage-age profile, yet hours increase by roughly 30% to 50% over the same period.²⁴ So it is clear what “identifies” the parameter η in the Imai–Keane structural model, even though there is no “instrument” or “natural experiment” exploited in the estimation.²⁵

This discussion also illustrates a more general point. Critics of structural work often argue that we should just “let the data speak”, rather than imposing structure in estimation. Such a statement is incomprehensible in the life-cycle labor supply context. That is, the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is not something we can “see” simply by looking at data – no matter what sort of “ideal” variation the data might contain – because any calculation of η involves intrinsically unobservable constructs, like the opportunity cost of time and the marginal utility of wealth, that only exist in theory.

6. Too many assumptions

The most common criticism of structural econometric work is that it relies on “too many” assumptions. In fact, I have often seen structural work dismissed out of hand for this reason. In contrast, many believe “simple” empirical work is more “convincing”. I readily concede that the typical structural estimation exercise

relies on a long list of maintained *a priori* assumptions. But we are kidding ourselves if we think “simple” estimators do not rely on just as many assumptions.

As an illustration, let me return to the example of estimating effects of childcare on child outcomes from Section 4. Bernal (2008) structurally estimates a model of maternal work and childcare use decisions that incorporates a child cognitive ability production function similar to (2). To deal with missing T she assumes that $T_{it} = T - C_{it}$, and she uses income to proxy for the goods input. She estimates the modified production function jointly with decision rules for work and childcare generated by the structural model, implementing a dynamic selection correction for the fact that children placed in childcare may differ systematically from ones who are not.

As is typical, estimation of the model requires a number of functional form assumptions. One must specify the forms of mother’s utility function, the cognitive ability production function, and the mother’s wage equation. In addition, one must assume distributions for the stochastic terms that drive wages and choices (since the mother must integrate over these in forming expected values of future possible states). Aside from these types of assumptions, which are fairly generic to dynamic structural estimation exercises, Bernal (2008) makes two special assumptions that have been especially controversial:

- (a) Mothers know their child’s cognitive ability endowment $\hat{\omega}_i$.
- (b) Mothers know the form of the cognitive ability production function.

Obviously, assumptions about what mothers know are essential if the econometrician is to solve the mother’s dynamic optimization problem. But some critics have discounted the estimation exercise entirely because of assumptions (a) and (b), which they view as highly objectionable.

Interestingly, I have heard the same critics suggest using some “simple” estimator that does not rely on such strong behavioral assumptions – in particular using either child or sibling fixed effects to remove the unobserved part of the child’s skill endowment from the estimating equation. But I will now show that such “simple” fixed effects estimators are only consistent under assumptions (a) and (b), or some equally strong alternative.²⁶

To begin, let me modify (4) by substituting an observed test score S_{it} for the child’s latent cognitive ability A_{it} , adding a measurement error term e_{it} , which I will assume is classical, and rewriting the estimating equation more compactly as:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln S_{it} = & \pi_0 + \pi_1 \cdot \hat{C}_{it} + \pi_2 \ln \hat{I}_{it} + \pi_3 \hat{H}_{it} + \pi_3 \cdot t + \pi_4 \cdot E_i \\ & + \pi_5 \cdot E_i \cdot t + \{\hat{\omega}_i + \tilde{\omega}_i t + \hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^T + \hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^g\} + e_{it}. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Here $\hat{\omega}_i$ and $\tilde{\omega}_i$ are error components that arise due to the unobserved part of the child’s skill endowment, $\hat{\omega}_i$, which we assume to be time invariant.

The $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^T$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^g$ are the mother’s tastes for time and goods inputs into child cognitive production. These presumably have permanent components, arising from the mother’s tastes for leisure and child quality, as well as transitory components, arising from shocks to offer wages, shocks to employment status (e.g., layoffs), changes in childcare availability, etc. Clearly, the transitory components of $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^T$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^g$ are potentially correlated with the inputs \hat{C}_{it} and $\ln \hat{I}_{it}$, a problem that is not addressed by fixed effects, and that requires either use of instrumental variables or joint estimation of the production function and the decision rules for the inputs. But

²³ Of course, if we view the data through the lens of a different model, we can reach yet a different conclusion. For instance, we can reconcile a small value of η with the observed life-cycle paths of hours and wages if we dispense with rational expectations, and assume that workers do not understand how much wages rise with work experience.

²⁴ It is worth emphasizing that Imai and Keane (2004) ignore corner solutions (i.e., unemployed and out-of-the-labor force states). These are more common at younger ages, so ignoring them would lead one to understate the steepness of both the life-cycle hours and wage paths. Thus, it seems unlikely that allowing for corners would greatly alter conclusions about the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. Imai and Keane also ignore aggregate shocks, treating the rental price of human capital and the interest rate as constant over time. As the life-cycle wage/hours patterns that identify the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution appear to be typical (i.e., not cohort or time period specific), it is difficult to see how a particular pattern of aggregate shocks or interest rate changes could drive the result.

²⁵ It is interesting that the long-held position of Prescott (1986) that the microempirical work on estimating the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution must be flawed, because standard theory implied that η had to be at least 2 to rationalize the macrodata, appears to be vindicated by this result.

²⁶ Todd and Wolpin (2003) provide an excellent discussion of the strong assumptions that underlie consistency of various fixed effects, value added and IV approaches to estimating child cognitive ability production functions.

let's set that problem aside, and focus on the other assumptions required for fixed effects.

Much empirical work that relies on fixed effects techniques starts by writing down an error components specification like (8). But this practice obscures the economic factors behind the error components. From (4), we see that $\hat{\omega}_i$ and $\tilde{\omega}_i$ appear in the error term of (8) for two reasons. First, because $\hat{\omega}_i$ enters the cognitive ability production function, and second, because it enters the mother's conditional decision rules for time and goods inputs. A child fixed effects estimator or, alternatively, first differencing (8), does not, in general, eliminate the error component that arises because $\hat{\omega}_i$ enters these decision rules, because, to the extent that $\hat{\omega}_i$ alters per-period inputs, its impact cumulates over time. We can avoid this problem by assuming either: (a) mothers know nothing about the child's cognitive ability endowment, or (b) mothers do know something about the child's endowment, but do not consider it when deciding on inputs.

On the other hand, suppose mothers do consider the child's ability endowment when making decisions about "quality" time and childcare inputs. Consider first the case where mothers know the ability endowment perfectly. In that case, fixed effects will not eliminate the $\tilde{\omega}_i$ term in (8), but applying fixed effects to the differenced equation (or double differencing) will do so. But, as noted by Blau (1999), existing data on test scores at pre-school ages almost never contain three observations for a single child, so as a practical matter this is not feasible, and, even if it were, efficiency loss would be a very serious problem.

Finally, consider the more difficult case where mothers have uncertainty about the child's true cognitive ability, and learn about it by observing test scores. In a learning model, a lower than expected test score at age $t - 1$ would cause the mother to update her perception of the child's ability, $\hat{\omega}_i$. If $\hat{\omega}_i$ enters the decision rules for time and goods inputs, this would affect inputs dated at time t . This violates the strict exogeneity assumption that underlies the fixed effects estimator, so fixed effects is inconsistent.

For example, suppose a child has a surprisingly poor test score at $t - 1$. To compensate, the mother increases her own time input and reduces the childcare time input between $t - 1$ and t . This induces negative correlation between a change in inputs $\bar{C}_{it} - \bar{C}_{i,t-1}$ and the differenced error $(e_{it} - e_{i,t-1})$.²⁷ It seems plausible that the effect of child-care time is biased in a negative direction.²⁸

A similar problem arises in a model where mothers do not know the cognitive ability production function. In that case, they may use child test outcomes to learn about the production technology. Hence, a child who was in full-time childcare at age $t - 1$ and who had a poor test outcome might be removed from that setting, or have childcare time reduced. This again induces a correlation between time $t - 1$ test score realizations and time t inputs, violating the strict exogeneity assumption. Here, the likely effect is to attenuate the estimated effects of the inputs.

Thus, we see that child fixed effects estimators implicitly assume either that mothers do not know child ability endowments or, if they do know them, that they do not consider them when making decisions about child-care and goods inputs or, if they do know them and consider them, that they know them perfectly (no learning), as well as knowing the production function.²⁹

²⁷ Note that, in this example, we drive down $e_{i,t-1}$, which drives up $(e_{it} - e_{i,t-1})$, and we drive down C_{it} .

²⁸ As scores are measured with error, a surprisingly bad score at $t - 1$ is likely part measurement error. Thus, it will tend to improve in the next period. Part of the improvement is falsely ascribed to the reduced child-care time input.

²⁹ Similar problems arise with household fixed effects. Consistency requires that there are no sibling specific ability endowments, or, if there are, that mothers do not know them, or do not consider them when making decisions, or, if they do consider them, that they know them perfectly (no learning). With learning about ability or the production technology, outcomes for the first child affect input choice decisions for the second child, violating strict exogeneity.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, consistency of fixed effects requires the strong assumption that the taste shocks $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^T$ and $\hat{\varepsilon}_{it}^g$ do not affect input decisions. Clearly, the assumptions required for consistency of "simple" fixed effects estimators are at least as strong as any in Bernal (2008).³⁰

7. Un-natural non-experiments and "low-grade quasi-experiments"

Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) report finding only five random outcomes arising from natural mechanisms (e.g., weather events, twin births, realizations of child gender) that have been used in the "natural experiment" literature as instruments. They refer to these events as natural "natural experiments". They list 20 papers that use these 5 instruments to estimate "effects" of education and experience on earnings, "effects" of children on female labor supply, and elasticities of consumption with respect to permanent and transitory income shocks. Given the rarity of natural experiments that truly generate something resembling treatment and control groups, the natural experiment literature would be a rather small one – except for the fact that many researchers have been willing to seriously stretch the definition of a natural experiment. In much of the literature, a "natural experiment" has come to mean any policy intervention that affects two groups differently, regardless of whether those two groups look similar initially.

For example, in recent years I have seen (1) small firms used as a control group for large firms in estimating the effect of changes in credit laws that only affect large firms' output, (2) men used as a control group for women in estimating the effect of changes in welfare rules (affecting only women) on interstate migration, (3) upland counties in the deep South used as a control group for coastal counties to estimate the impact of treatment for helminth infection, given only to residents in the latter, on child outcomes,³¹ (4) people under 65 used as a control group for people over 65 to estimate the effect of Medicare on mortality rates, etc.

Shadish et al. (2001) do not refer to such designs as "natural experiments", but rather, as "low-grade quasi-experiments". And they note (p. 485), "As scholars who have contributed to the institutionalization of the term quasi-experiment, we feel a lot of ambivalence about our role". They go on to note (p. 500) that "... the word quasi-experiment is routinely used to justify causal inferences, even though designs so referred to are so primitive in structure that causal conclusions are often problematic. We have to challenge such advocacy of low-grade quasi-experiments ..." and (p. 503) "... we want to draw attention again to a common but

³⁰ Similar issues to those discussed here are addressed by Rosenzweig (1986) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1995) in the context of estimating birthweight production functions. Say we are interested in effects of inputs like maternal diet on a child's birthweight. Problems arise if child endowments affect birthweight, and if maternal inputs are correlated with child endowments. Taking a sibling difference in birthweight outcomes can eliminate the mother-specific (or common across siblings) part of the endowment, leaving only the child-specific endowments. But the difference in maternal inputs between pregnancies may be endogenous if, say, the birthweight outcome for the first child affects the mother's behavior during the second pregnancy. But here, informational constraints imply a natural IV procedure, since the mother cannot know the first child's specific endowment during the first pregnancy (i.e., it is only revealed when the child is born and birthweight observed). Thus, maternal inputs during the first pregnancy are uncorrelated with the child specific endowments. This suggests a FE-IV procedure, using maternal inputs during the first pregnancy to instrument for the difference in maternal inputs between the two pregnancies. Unfortunately, this sort of procedure does not work in cognitive ability production function case. That case is harder, because the mother can observe something about the first child's cognitive ability when choosing inputs for the first child.

³¹ The coastal counties were chosen for treatment precisely because they had much higher initial rates of infection.

unfortunate practice in many social sciences – to say that a quasi-experiment is being done in order to provide justification that the resulting inference will be valid. Then a quasi-experimental design is described that is so deficient in the desirable structural features . . . which promote better inference, that it is probably not worth doing”.

There is now a large literature in economics applying “difference-in-difference” (DD) estimators to so-called “natural experiments” in order to estimate “casual effects” of policy interventions, but in many instances the designs should be called “low-grade quasi-experiments” at best. I will use a simple example to illustrate this approach, and the strong implicit assumptions on which it relies (Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide a good general discussion). The AFDC program in the US provided welfare benefits to single mothers with children under 18. One aspect of the 1996 welfare reform, which replaced AFDC with TANF, was the implementation of a 5-year time limit on welfare receipt.³² If women are forward looking, this creates an option value to staying off welfare today, since this choice preserves eligibility for the future. Thus, we might expect welfare participation to fall even before women run up against the limit. But, ignoring fertility, this incentive cannot apply to women whose oldest child was at least 13 when the limit was imposed, since their oldest child will reach 18 before they can use up their eligibility. Thus, the argument goes, to estimate the effect of the time limit, we can use women whose children were 13–17 when the 5-year limit was imposed as a control group, while women with younger children are the treatment group.

This idea is illustrated in Table 2, Panel A, which is adapted from Grogger (2004). In the before vs. after time limit comparison, the welfare participation rate for single mothers with youngest children in the 13–17 year age range drops from 16% to 11%. Since these women were not affected by the time limit, this drop is attributable entirely to other time varying factors (i.e., other aspects of the welfare reform, or changes in the macroeconomy). This gives 5 percentage points as our estimate of the impact of all these other factors.

Next, consider single mothers with youngest children in the 0–6 year age range. They are impacted by time limits, since they could use up 5 years of benefits long before their children reach age 18. Welfare participation dropped 17.5 percentage points among this group. Thus, using the DD approach, we attribute 5 percentage points of this drop to “other factors”, leaving 12.5 percentage points as the drop attributable to time limits. This is a very large effect, implying 71% of the drop in welfare among single mothers with young children was due to time limits.

As Grogger (2004) points out, this estimate relies on a number of strong assumptions. Most critically, it supposes that all the “other factors” have the same impact on mothers with old vs. young children. This is a very strong assumption, since mothers with young vs. old children differ in important ways. To see this, note that Table 2 also shows that welfare participation rates are much higher among single mothers who have young children (41%) than among single mothers who have older children (16%). This illustrates the dramatic difference between the two groups, and calls into serious question the assumption that they would be impacted in the same way by other aspects of welfare reform or by the business cycle.

Furthermore, the fact that the baseline participation rates differ so greatly between the two groups creates a second serious

problem for the simple DD approach. Even if it were true that unmeasured time varying factors have a common impact on each group, to use DD we need to know if the “common impact” applies when we measure impacts in levels, or percentages, or by some other metric. This point is also illustrated in Table 1. The last column shows percentage changes in participation rates for each group. The single mothers with older children had a 31% decline in welfare participation, while those with young children had a 42% decline. So, if unmeasured factors have a common effect in percentages, the DD estimate of the effect of time limits is –11%. This corresponds to only 4.6 percentage points, which is about a third as large as the 12.5 percentage point effect we obtained using the DD-levels estimator. Thus, time limits seem much less important when we measure impacts in percentages rather than levels.

The problem is obvious, but often glossed over in the natural experiment literature.³³ An exception is Meyer et al. (1995), who use low-wage workers as a control group for high-wage workers to estimate the effect of an increase in disability benefits, affecting only high earners, on weeks receiving disability. Before the program, mean weeks differed greatly for the two groups (11.2 for high earners, 6.3 for low earners). The DD-levels estimate implies a negative program effect on weeks of disability, while DD-percentages implies a positive impact.

To deal with this sort of problem, Athey and Imbens (2002) have proposed an alternative approach to DD estimation that does not require one to specify the transformation of the dependent variable. Their approach can be thought of as re-weighting the control group sample, so the control group outcome distribution is identical to that of the treatment group at baseline.³⁴ The re-weighted control group outcome distribution in the post-treatment period then provides an estimate of the impact of all the “other” factors on the treatment group.³⁵

I implement this approach for the time limit example in Panel B of Table 2. Note that 31% of the control group leaves welfare due to “other” factors. Hence, in the weighted control group, we have $(1 - .69) \cdot 41.3\% = 28.4\%$ on welfare in the post-reform period. Thus, the estimate of the effect of time limits on the treated is $23.8 - 28.4 = -4.6$ percentage points, which corresponds to –11.1%. It is no coincidence that this is the same as the DD-percentages estimate in Panel A. In the binary discrete outcome case, the Athey–Imbens estimator reduces to exactly the DD-percentage estimator.³⁶ That is, it reduces to assuming that percentage changes are the right metric for measuring the impact of “other time varying factors”.

In summary, the Athey–Imbens approach of re-weighting the control group to resemble the treatment group makes perfect

³² As an example, see Stock and Watson (2003) Fig. 11.1 in chapter 11 on “experiments” and “quasi-experiments”, and the surrounding discussion, which states that the DD estimator can eliminate bias that arises when treatment and control groups differ.

³³ I am interpreting their procedure as importance sampling, with the controls providing the “source” distribution, and the counterfactual distribution for the treated (given they receive no treatment) being the “target”.

³⁴ The re-weighted control group provides the correct counterfactual distribution for the treated (given no treatment) under Athey and Imbens’ weak monotonicity and conditional independence assumptions (which they denote as 4.1 and 4.2). These essentially mean that, if D denotes the discrete outcome, then a policy that reduces $P(D = 1)$ shifts people from $D = 1$ to $D = 0$ but not vice versa. It is worth noting that Athey and Imbens are very upfront about this being a strong assumption (e.g., I have already noted that this assumption may be violated in the draft lottery/schooling example).

³⁵ Note: If we call D the discrete outcome, and $P(D = 1)$ goes down in the control group, then their estimator is the percentage change in $P(D = 1)$ in the treatment group minus that in the control group. But, if $P(D = 1)$ goes up, their estimator is the percentage change in $P(D = 0)$ in the treatment group minus that in the control group.

³⁶ This is actually a gross oversimplification made for purposes of exposition. I urge the interested reader to refer to Fang and Keane (2004) for details of how these limits were implemented, along with evidence that they were rarely imposed strictly. That paper also discusses the problems with DD estimators in this context in more detail.

Table 2
Welfare participation rates of single mothers, by age of youngest child.

A. Difference-in-difference estimates of time limit effect						
Age of youngest child	Before time limits	After time limits	Change in percentage points	Change in percent	DD estimates:	
					Levels	Percent
0–6	41.3	23.8	–17.5	–42.4	–12.5	–11.1
7–12	23.1	13.3	–9.8	–42.4	–4.8	–11.1
13–17 (controls)	16.0	11.0	–5.0	–31.3		
All	32.0	18.8	–13.2	–41.3		

Note: Reproduced from Grogger (2004), Table 2. Data is the March CPS from 1979–1999.

B. Athey–Imbens estimator of time limit effect							
	Control group		Weighted controls		Treatment group		Time limit effect
	Before	After	Before	After	Before	After	
$D = 1$	16.0	11.0	41.3	28.4	41.3	23.8	–4.6 (–11.1%)
$D = 0$	84.0	89.0	58.7	71.6	58.7	76.2	

Note: Estimate of the effect on the treated is $23.8 - 28.4 = -4.6$ points, which is 11.1% of 41.3.

sense when the two groups are basically “similar” – in the sense that they contain identical types of agents, but where the type proportions simply differ across groups (perhaps due to imperfection in random assignment). An example might be an experiment that imposed time limits in some counties of a State but not others, and where baseline welfare participation was higher in the “treatment” counties because they had a greater representation of women with lower welfare “stigma”. Re-weighting then simply adjusts the type proportions. But the Athey–Imbens approach does not help if the treatment and control groups are fundamentally different, as in the high vs. low-wage worker or young vs. older children examples. There is no obvious economic reason why the percentage change is the “right” metric to measure impact of “other factors” in such cases.

Thus, there is no way around the problem of dissimilar treatment and control groups other than to make extensive use of theory. That is, we have to do the hard work of measuring the important “other” factors that may have differentially affected people with different characteristics over the sample period, and we need to make *a priori* theoretical assumptions about how these “other” factors differentially affect different groups. The DD approach is *not* a panacea that allows us to deal with unmeasured time varying factors in an atheoretic way.

8. Has atheoretic work led to progress in other disciplines?

One argument for an atheoretic, “let the data speak”, empiricist approach is that we must understand and catalogue a whole range of “facts” or empirical regularities *before* we can construct useful theories. I suspect this is what Angrist and Krueger (1999) have in mind when they present the quote from Sherlock Holmes: “It is a capital offense to theorize **before** all the facts are in”. (emphasis added). In contrast to this “empiricist” approach, the structural approach is viewed as imposing *a priori* theory on the data, preventing us from hearing what it has to say.

Notably, this empiricist perspective is inconsistent with the views of most researchers in the history of science who study how scientific progress is actually made across a wide range of fields. For instance, Kuhn (1962) asserts there are “three normal foci for scientific investigation”, which he lists as (i) “facts that the paradigm has shown to be important”, (ii) “facts that can be compared directly with the predictions of the paradigm theory”, and (iii) “empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory”, including determination of universal constants and universal laws (e.g., Boyle’s Law, Coulomb’s Law, etc.). Kuhn goes on to note: “Perhaps it is not apparent that a paradigm is a prerequisite to the discovery of laws like these. We often hear that they are found by

examining measurements undertaken for their own sake and without theoretical commitment. But history offers no support for so excessively Baconian a method”.

A good example of what Kuhn is talking about here is provided by the history of mechanics. This is often presented *as if* Galileo did experiments to measure rates of acceleration of falling objects simply out of interest. Then Newton comes along, takes the first two laws of motion “discovered” by Galileo, along with the celestial laws of motion “discovered” by Kepler, and from them develops *de novo* a unified theory of gravity. This distorted history ignores the fact that Galileo did not decide to roll balls down inclined planes simply out of some general curiosity. His experiments were motivated by a theoretical framework that he already had in mind, in which acceleration is zero when an object moves in parallel to the earth, and constant when an object moves vertically.³⁷ Galileo ran the experiments to see if his theoretical predictions would be born out. Only under his two assumptions about acceleration can one even think of measuring the rate of acceleration in vertical free fall by rolling balls down an inclined plane. Similarly, Kepler believed in the heliocentric system *a priori*.³⁸

Returning to the quote from Conan Doyle, it is interesting that Einstein and Infeld (1938), in their history of modern physics, also suggest an analogy of the scientist with the great detective, who “... after gathering the requisite facts, finds the right solution by pure thinking”. But they go on to say: “In one essential this comparison must be regarded as highly superficial. Both in life and in detective novels the crime is given. The detective must look for letters, fingerprints, bullets, guns, but at least he knows that a murder has been committed. This is not so for a scientist. ... The scientist must commit his own crime, as well as carry out the investigation”. Thus, regarding key experiments in the history of physics, Einstein and Infeld argue “it is hardly possible to imagine such experiments performed as accidental play, without pre-existence of more or less definite ideas about their meaning”.

In summary, I would agree with these authors that we cannot even begin the systematic assembly of facts and empirical regularities without a pre-existing theoretical framework that gives the

³⁷ Also widely forgotten is that the Aristotelian model of velocity proportional to force had been widely rejected centuries earlier. Galileo’s theory built on earlier work by such men as Philoponus (6th century) and Burdian (14th century), who rejected Aristotle by viewing impetus as permanent, thus anticipating inertia, and Heytesbury and Orsem (14th century), who developed the “Merton rule” of uniformly accelerated motion.

³⁸ It is now largely forgotten that the empirical evidence at the time actually provided strong support for a geocentric view. Tycho Brahe was unable to find any evidence of stellar parallax despite painstaking attempts, and instruments accurate enough to detect it were not developed until the mid-1800s.

facts meaning, and tells us which facts we should establish. The structural approach of viewing the data through an organizing theory is perfectly consistent with the approach that is standard and has generated success in other sciences, while an atheoretic approach is not.³⁹

9. Estimating structural models vs. other scientific activities

As I have described, the goal of structural econometric work is to estimate fully articulated models (e.g., an estimable life-cycle labor supply model), or else to estimate key parameters of economic models (e.g., the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution parameter). These activities both fall within Kuhn's third "focus" of scientific investigation, which he calls "empirical work undertaken to articulate the paradigm theory". I think that failure to clearly understand this has been a source of great confusion, both *between* structural econometricians and researchers who pursue other types of empirical work, and *within* the structural econometric community itself.

The first important thing to note is that being an advocate of structural econometrics does not mean that one is opposed to empirical investigators that fall into Kuhn's first category, the development of (i) "facts that the paradigm has shown to be important". The first category includes descriptive empirical work, as well as primary data collection, provided these efforts are guided by a theoretical framework. In fact, they almost always are. Questions on surveys like the PSID, NLS and HRS are not chosen randomly out of some universe of possible questions we might ask, but are chosen carefully to measure quantities that certain theoretical frameworks, like the life-cycle human capital model, tell us are important. People like Ken Wolpin, Chuck Manski and Bob Willis have done a lot of work in recent years to help improve how well these surveys measure key constructs of our paradigm theories.

Being an advocate of structural econometrics also does not mean that one is opposed to empirical investigations that fall within Kuhn's second category, the development of (ii) "facts that can be compared directly with the predictions of the paradigm theory". In fact, I think that the best work in the "experimentalist" school can be thought of as falling within this category. True natural experiments, as well as the un-natural quasi-experiments induced by changes in policy that affect some groups but not others, provide us with excellent opportunities to validate our models by confronting them with data. The key point, however, is that we should not be content to catalogue what happened in such events (i.e., the "treatment effects"), but rather, we must study whether our models can successfully predict what happened.

A good example is the work by Card and Krueger (1994), Neumark and Wascher (1995), and Deere et al. (1995) on effects of the sharp increases in the national minimum wage from \$3.35 on March 31, 1990 to \$4.25 on April 1, 1991, and the New Jersey specific increase to \$5.05 on April 1, 1992. These quasi-experiments provide important evidence that may help distinguish among competing labor market theories. But progress can only be made if one attempts to interpret the DD estimates of these authors in light of standard theories of labor market equilibrium, such as the search

and matching model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998), as well as bringing more data to bear to help resolve some of the ambiguities of the original studies⁴⁰ – instead of taking the destructive tack of simply concluding the data refutes the law of demand and stopping at that. Attempts by Flinn (2006) and Ahn et al. (2007) to rationalize data on minimum wage effects in terms of search models appear promising.

10. The importance of model validation and paradigm development

Given that *a priori* assumptions are indispensable in interpreting data, I would argue that structural econometricians should be less apologetic about the need to make assumptions (often many assumptions!) in order to develop estimable structural models. Of course, one is entitled to discount results from a model that, one feels, relies on "incredible" assumptions that may clearly drive the results. For example, I personally would not believe estimates of returns to schooling from models that assumed homogeneous skill endowments, or of the extent of habit persistence in choice behavior from models that assume homogeneous tastes for product attributes.

But such "incredible" assumptions are not really the issue. The typical well-executed structural estimation exercise presents a model based on a long list of assumptions, some of which seem plausible but debatable, some of which seem difficult to evaluate on *a priori* grounds, and some of which seem obviously false. Often, it is not clear if the obviously false assumptions are innocuous simplifications or whether they might have a major impact on the behavior of the model. How seriously should we take the exercise?⁴¹

In my view, determinations of the usefulness of such "well-executed" structural models – both as interpreters of existing data and vehicles for predicting the impact of policy interventions or changes in the forcing variables – should rest primarily on how well the model performs in validation exercises. By this I mean: (1) Does the model do a reasonable job of fitting important dimensions of the historical data on which it was fit? (2) Does the model do a reasonable job at out-of-sample prediction – especially when used to predict the impact of policy changes that alter the economic environment in some fundamental way from that which generated the data used in estimation?

My use of the word "reasonable" here is unapologetically vague. I believe that whether a model passes these criteria is an intrinsically subjective judgment, for which formal statistical testing provides little guidance. This perspective is consistent with how other sciences treat validation. Unfortunately, many economists have an idealized view of the "hard" sciences in which models are maintained as long as they explain all observed data, and, when an experiment or observation comes along that a model can't explain, the model is immediately rejected. In fact, this is far from the case; even in the "hard" sciences, validation is highly subjective.

As Kuhn (1962) describes, models typically receive broad acceptance within a scientific field because they explain better than other models certain observations which the members of the field regard as key. Subsequently, a great deal of "mopping up" work is

³⁹ Interestingly, even leading experimental methodologists consent to this view. As Shadish et al. (2001), p. 27, state "The logical positivists hoped to achieve foundations on which to build knowledge by tying all theory tightly to theory free observation . . . but this . . . failed to recognize that all observations are impregnated with substantive and methodological theory, making it impossible to conduct theory free tests", and (p. 29) "The experiment is not a clear window that reveals nature directly to us. To the contrary, experiments yield hypothetical and fallible knowledge that is often dependent on context and imbued with many unstated theoretical assumptions".

⁴⁰ Obviously, referring back to the discussion of DD in Section 6, this also involves modeling the "other factors" that might have differentially affected the non-randomly selected treatment and control groups in these studies.

⁴¹ Clearly, it is a serious error to reject a model as "not useful" simply because its assumptions are literally false. Good examples are the "large signal" and "small signal" models of transistors (see Fonstad, 1994). Both over-simplify the underlying physics, but each can accurately predict transistor behavior within a certain frequency range.

done to try to fit the model to many other observations, or resolve its failures to do so. A model's inability to explain all aspects of the observed data is typically treated as a problem to be worked out over time via gradual refinement, not a reason to reject the model *per se*.

As a concrete example, consider the life-cycle human capital investment model of Becker (1967), Mincer (1958) and Ben-Porath (1967). Keane and Wolpin (1997b) showed that a standard version of this model provides a poor fit to observed data on education, employment and wages. A key prediction of the framework is that schooling is concentrated at the start of the life-cycle. The standard model generates this pattern *qualitatively*, but the *quantitative* prediction is poor. The basic problem is that, given observed variability in wages, it is hard to get forward looking agents to concentrate schooling at the beginning of life to the extent they do. Observed wages are quite variable, so why not return to school whenever the offer wage draw is sufficiently low?

But, by adding a number of extra features that are not essential to the model, but that seem reasonable (like costs of returning to school, age effects in tastes for schooling, measurement error in wages, and so on), we were able to achieve what we regard as an excellent fit to the key quantitative features of the data – although formal statistical tests still rejected the hypothesis that the model is the “true” data generating process (DGP). Despite these problems, there is nothing to indicate that the profession might be ready to drop the human capital investment model as a framework for explaining school and work choices over the life-cycle.

Indeed, if we view the data through the lens of the life-cycle labor supply/human capital investment model, a lot of empirical observations seem to make sense and hang together nicely. For instance, Keane and Wolpin (2000) show that, in such a model, differences in schooling and labor supply between young black and white men can be largely explained based on the differences in their skill endowments at age 16 plus labor market discrimination. That is, the much lower educational attainment of young black men can be explained as a rational response of forward looking agents to the constraints they face. We do not need to resort to various alternative explanations like “excessive” present orientation and so on.

Similarly, work in the dynamic life-cycle framework by Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Keane and Wolpin (2000, 2001) has shown that, viewed through the lens of this framework, the wide differences in educational attainment across youth from different family backgrounds can be almost completely explained by the differences in skill endowments that youth possess at age 16. One need not resort to liquidity constraints, or stories like failure to understand returns to college, to explain the lower schooling of youth from poor backgrounds.

Furthermore, Keane and Wolpin (2001) show that a life-cycle labor supply/human capital model can match cross-sectional asset distributions by age, and generate tuition effects on college attendance that are similar to a wide range of estimates in the education literature, both in the aggregate and broken down by parental background. Arcidiacono (2005) shows that the life-cycle framework can explain decisions about college attendance and choice of major, as well as wages conditional on major, using values for returns to experience and the importance of skill “endowments” (prior to college) that are similar to those in Keane and Wolpin (2001). And Imai and Keane (2004) use the life-cycle human capital framework to explain life-cycle patterns of wages, hours and assets, using a value for the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply consistent with a wide range of macro evidence (see Prescott (1986)).

Thus, structural models in the life-cycle labor supply/human capital framework pass one test of usefulness: they can coherently

explain a wide range of key observations about wages, educational choices, demographic and racial differences in behavior, etc. They have also proven useful because the results of Cameron–Heckman and Keane–Wolpin on the crucial importance of age 16 skill endowments have focused attention on the need to get inside the black box of how these endowments are determined. This is beginning to generate structural work within the human capital paradigm on early childhood investments, thus further elucidating the paradigm.

This brings me to the second aspect of validation: out-of-sample prediction, especially attempts to predict the impact of policy changes (or quasi-experiments) that change the economic environment in an important way. I already discussed the point that a structural model can be literally rejected as the “true” data generating process (DGP) – which is not surprising since the model is a simplification of reality – yet still be useful for organizing our view of a wide range of phenomena. Similarly, a model that is literally false may still be useful for prediction. But how can we develop confidence that a structural model is useful for policy prediction?

Again, as formal statistical tests of whether a model is the “true” DGP provide little guidance, the question of usefulness is intrinsically subjective. Indeed, what gives me confidence in a model may not give you confidence. Hence, the best I can do is to describe the process that I have actually pursued (often in joint work with Ken Wolpin) in attempting to validate models.

I think our approach can be interpreted as a Bayesian updating process. We start with a prior on how likely a model is to make accurate predictions about effects of certain types of policy interventions. This influences our initial choices about details of model specification. For example, in developing life-cycle models for men, with a goal of being able to explain college attendance and responses to tuition subsidies and college loans, we might think incorporating marriage, or couples’ fertility decisions within marriage, is not very important. In contrast, we might think that life-cycle models of women that ignore marriage and fertility are unlikely to be useful for prediction. Clearly, these are *a priori* judgments, and others may disagree.

Given a model, and upon seeing its fit to the historical data, we update our prior about its usefulness. Personally, unless a model provides a reasonably good fit to the historical data, I would have little confidence in its ability to predict results of policy interventions. However, what constitutes a “reasonable” fit is clearly subjective. As I noted above, our standard is certainly not the “objective” one that the model not be rejected by formal statistical specification tests, because we expect structural models to be rejected by such tests (given enough data).

Finally comes the crucial step, which is to use the model in a range of policy prediction exercises, and evaluate the accuracy of its predictions. But here we run into a key difficulty. Policy changes that can be used to evaluate predictive ability of our models are actually rather rare.⁴² Not only must a policy change occur, but, more challenging, data from before and after the change must be available. Unlike engineering and, in some cases, the physical sciences, we cannot typically run experiments designed to test our models.

Nevertheless, the best opportunity to test the predictive ability of structural models is to attempt to predict the outcomes of those quasi-experiments that the world does present to us. Again, I view

⁴² A search of the structural estimation literature reveals few attempts to validate structural models using quasi-experiments. For references, see Keane and Wolpin (1997a,b, 2007) and Wolpin (1996). Attempts to validate reduced form or statistical models, or even estimates of causal effects derived from “natural experiments”, are also rare.

this as a Bayesian updating process. After seeing how well a model does in such a prediction exercise, we update our priors about the model's usefulness. Clearly, this is an ongoing process, where we gain or lose confidence in models over time, perhaps at some point deciding to repair or abandon them.⁴³

Still, given the rarity of such events, it seems essential to develop other ways to validate structural models. Keane and Wolpin (2007) suggest two such strategies. One is to split the historical data into subsets that were subject to different policy regimes, estimate a model on one subset, and make predictions for the other. The other is to make forecasts of hypothetical policy interventions, where we have strong priors on how the response should look. We illustrate these ideas using a model of life-cycle labor supply, human capital investment, marriage and fertility decisions of women. This model, which extends earlier work for men (i.e., Keane and Wolpin (1997a,b, 2000, 2001)), performs rather well, in our judgment, in these validation exercises.⁴⁴

Finally, it is important to stress the subjective nature of any single validation exercise. A prediction may be viewed as "reasonably" accurate by one observer but not another. And, given the same validation exercise, one observer may view success in the exercise as highly persuasive regarding the model's ability to make accurate predictions in other contexts, while another may not. Nevertheless, via multiple validation exercises, it may be possible to approach consensus.

11. Alternative approaches to validation

Besides predictive tests, another approach to model validation is to collect or obtain additional data that can be used to test or estimate certain key predictions, key mechanisms or key individual equations or parameters of the model. For example, the model of life-cycle investment in health by Khwaja (2005) predicts that subsidized insurance would not encourage unhealthy behaviors. This is because, in his dynamic model, the usual moral hazard effect that arises in a static model is counteracted by a horizon effect – better health insurance increases life expectancy, which increases the return to investment in good health. But life expectancy is not observed in the data used to estimate the model. In principle, the mechanism of the model could be tested by gathering data on life expectancy and looking at its effect, *ceteris paribus*, on health investment. Of course, this is an extremely difficult exercise, because it requires that one find an instrument that exogenously shifts life expectancy (i.e., that is uncorrelated with unobservables that shift investment in health, such as unmeasured aspects of health or tastes for health).⁴⁵

Similarly, we might attempt to estimate individual key equations or parameters of a model in ways that do not rely on the full set of assumptions that are required for full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation of the complete model. A finding that estimates are similar when these alternative approaches are used would give us more confidence in the specification of the structural model. This idea is related to the idea that, in some cases,

certain parameters of structural models can be shown to be semi-parametrically identified – that is, they are identified in a technical sense without the need for the full set of assumptions required for FIML estimation of the complete model.

It should be stressed however, that this "piecemeal" approach to estimating parts of complete models is fraught with danger for the unwary. One must be careful that one's approach to estimating some subset of parameters of a structural model is consistent with the structure of the model. A classic example of confusion on this point is the attempt to use micro-data evidence to validate the choice of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution parameter in real business cycle models. The macro models required an estimate of the elasticity with respect to the opportunity cost of time, while the micro data studies were not designed in such a way as to deliver that parameter (except under rigid assumptions about human capital).

Another example is the attempt to use "simple" estimators to estimate "returns" to schooling or experience, or to estimate "effects" of inputs on child production. As Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) discuss, such estimates are not generally interpretable as structural parameters of human capital or cognitive ability production functions. In fact, as I stressed in Sections 3–7, "simple" estimators for single equations or individual parameters of structural models typically rely on strong implicit assumptions. Estimation of a single equation in a way consistent with the overall model may require that the equation be estimated jointly with approximations to the decision rules generated by the complete model – which is the point of Heckman (1974) – or, at least, that instruments be chosen with careful guidance from theory.

12. Identification vs. validation

The literature on semi-parametric identification of structural model parameters seems to be motivated by the following notion: if it can be shown that certain key parameters of a structural model are identified even if the functional form assumptions required for FIML estimation are relaxed, then we gain confidence that the model is a useful tool for organizing the world and making predictions. In other words, there is a general notion that we can have more confidence in a particular parameter estimate – say, for example, the coefficient on education in a human capital production function – if that parameter is estimated with as little auxiliary structure as possible. This view seems to be widely accepted among applied researchers.

This line of argument poses an important challenge to the structural econometric research program, because construction of formal semi-parametric identification arguments for structural models is typically only possible for very simple, stylized models that are not rich enough to provide a reasonable fit to data. In contrast, rich structural models that can provide a good fit to data typically involve many maintained assumptions whose role in identification may be difficult to assess. In this situation, the proper response is to stress the crucial role of model validation. Indeed, I would argue a certain primacy for validation exercises over identification analysis for purposes of building confidence in models.

That is, regardless of how plausible the source of identification for a parameter may seem to be, I would not have great confidence in the estimate until it was shown that, when placed within a complete structural model, that model gives a reasonable fit to observed data and forecasts well. To give a concrete example, Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) estimate the return to schooling as roughly .12, using a simple procedure that many regard as giving a credible estimate that does not rely on many auxiliary assumptions. Of course, this is controversial, and many (including myself) would argue that the estimate is based on strong implicit assumptions. But let me put that aside for now and take it for granted that the .12 is a "robust" estimate. I personally do not find that figure credible, because, in my view, it is difficult to construct

⁴³ I expect that such a process will only in rare instances lead to complete rejection of models. Rather it may lead to refinement of our notions of the contexts where the model does and does not perform well.

⁴⁴ We also found that simple "statistical" models (i.e., logits for welfare and work using the state variables as covariates), which fit in-sample data at least as well as the structural model, did not pass this test. This led us to conclude that these models are not useful for prediction. This illustrates how theory can aid prediction.

⁴⁵ As another example, the model in Keane and Wolpin (2001) predicts that more generous student loan programs have little effect on college attendance. Instead, they primarily affect consumption, work and borrowing/transfers from parents while in school. But they do not directly observe parental transfers in their data (only inferring them from changes in assets). One could in principle gather data on transfers from parents under different student loan regimes to test this prediction.

a plausible model of behavior where the return to schooling is so high, yet people choose to get as little a schooling as they do.⁴⁶

In contrast, suppose the schooling coefficient were estimated in the context of a fully specified structural model using FIML, and this model performs well in validation exercises (i.e., it fits the data well and forecasts well). Then, we at least know that there exists a reasonable looking model that can rationalize observed behavior using such a value for the schooling parameter. Hence, I would have more confidence in the structurally estimated parameter than in the “robust” estimate. Indeed, as noted in the review by Belzil (2007), structural estimates of returns to schooling are generally lower than “simple” IV estimates.⁴⁷ This is precisely because the latter tend to be too high to rationalize schooling choice in a life-cycle framework.

13. Where structural econometricians need to do better

In my view, there is another reason that structural econometric work fell out of fashion, and here the fault lies with the structural econometricians themselves. Historically, structural econometric work tended to pay little attention to the issue of model validation. It has often been treated as a feat worthy of praise to simply estimate a structural model, regardless of whether the model can be shown to provide a good fit to the data, or perform well in out-of-sample predictive exercises. I see no reason why an estimated structural model should move my priors about, say, the likely impact of a policy intervention, if it fits the in-sample data poorly and/or has not been shown to perform reasonably well in any validation exercises. Structural econometricians need to do a much better job in this area in order for structural work to gain wider acceptance. I do think that, in recent years, our performance in this area has improved considerably.

Historically, a closely related problem is that estimation of structural models is so technically difficult that, in the mid- to late-80s, only very stylized models could be estimated. These models were of necessity too sparse to have any hope of providing a reasonable fit to the data. But advances in computation, and the development of simulation-based inference in the late-80s and early-90s, now allow us to estimate much richer structural models than would have been imaginable 10 years ago. For instance, it is now possible to accommodate rich patterns of preference heterogeneity, whereas this was not possible before. It was this prospect that convinced me to start working on structural models in the early 90s. But the perceptions of the profession as a whole about what is feasible in structural modeling have lagged behind the current frontier. For instance, Angrist and Krueger (1999) state “we ignore structural modeling since that topic is well covered elsewhere”, and then reference a survey dated 1986.

14. Conclusion

In the preface to Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard (1983) states, “Not only in the business world, but also in the world of ideas, our

age stages a real sale”. He is referring to the notion that knowledge can be obtained “cheaply”. Kierkegaard means “cheap” in both a psychological and an epistemological sense: (1) knowledge is “cheap” in the sense we don’t have to work too hard to get it, and (2) knowledge is “cheap” in the sense that there exists a process or system for accessing objective or absolute truth. The former statement can be viewed as a critique of the sociology of academia, while the later can be viewed as an attack on the Hegelian system, in favor of Kierkegaard’s subjectivism.

Kierkegaard’s critique of academic philosophy in the Europe of the mid-1800’s has interesting implications for recent trends in empirical work in economics. It is fair to say that “structural econometrics” has fallen out of fashion in the past 15 years, while “simple” empirical approaches that eschew sophisticated statistical and theoretical modeling – “just letting the data speak” – are in vogue. In my view, two of the primary reasons for this phenomenon are exactly those that Kierkegaard identified. First, structural econometric work is just very hard to do, simply in terms of the amount of labor involved. It often takes several years to write just one good paper in this genre, and this poses a daunting prospect for the young assistant professor seeking tenure, or the graduate student seeking to finish a dissertation. Using “simple” methods, one can write papers more quickly.

Second, there is a widespread belief that structural econometric modeling relies on strong *a priori* statistical and economic assumptions – which is true! – while the alternative “simple” approaches, such as “natural experiments”, enable us to obtain knowledge that is not conditional on strong *a priori* assumptions. Unfortunately, this is not true, but in “our age” this problem seems to be little appreciated.

We always need *a priori* identifying assumptions in order to learn anything of interest from data, beyond perhaps the simplest of descriptive statistics. Data cannot simply “speak” and reveal interesting aspects of economic behavior to an investigator whose mind is a blank slate, devoid of economic priors. Structural econometric work does not rely on more assumptions than “simple” atheoretic approaches. The only difference is that the assumptions are made explicit in the structural approach. This makes the estimates interpretable, which is a prerequisite for scientific progress. The “simple” path that eschews theory as the basis for empirical work has almost never led to scientific progress in the past, and it is unlikely to lead to progress in the future.

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Appendix. A simple model of child cognitive ability production

A simple model will help clarify some of the ideas discussed in Section 4. Consider a single mother with the utility function $U(X, L, A; \varepsilon)$, where X = consumption, L = leisure, A = child ability and ε is a vector of taste parameters (i.e., mother specific tastes for consumption, leisure and child quality). She has a budget constraint:

$$X = WH + B(WH) - ccC - G,$$

⁴⁶ Of course, if one looks at schooling choice data alone, one can rationalize a low rate of school attendance with a very high return to schooling simply by assuming that the (psychic) cost of schooling is great enough. However, in a model that attempts to fit both choices and wages, raising both the cost and return to schooling so as to hold the attendance rate fixed will simultaneously raise the observed wage premium for highly educated workers over uneducated workers. The difficulty comes in fitting both dimensions of the data simultaneously.

⁴⁷ As noted by Belzil (2007), structural estimates of the schooling coefficient in a Mincer type earnings equation are typically in the .05 to .08 range. For example, Keane and Wolpin (2001) obtain an estimate of .075, in a model that allows for liquidity constraints (which are often invoked as way to rationalize co-existence of high expected returns with relatively low attendance rates).

where W = wage rate, H = hours of work, cc = price of child care, C = hours of child care, G = goods input into child production. $B(WH; R)$ is the welfare benefit, given earnings WH , where R is a set of benefit rules that determine how benefits fall with earnings. For simplicity, assume that women always collect benefits to which they are entitled (i.e., there is no welfare stigma).

Next, consider the time constraint. The mother has two kinds of leisure, L_A = leisure time alone, and L_C = leisure time while taking care of the child.

$L_A = C - H \geq 0$ (i.e., the excess of child care time over hours of work).

$$L_C = \bar{T} - C - \bar{H} - T \geq 0$$

where \bar{T} is the total time endowment, \bar{H} is time required for housework, and T is “quality” time devoted to child ability production. Note that $(\bar{T} - C)$ is the time the mother spends caring for the child. Assume that a marginal unit of L_A generates more utility than a marginal unit of L_C . Thus, we can define “effective leisure” in units of L_C as:

$$L = L_C + \lambda L_A \quad \text{where } \lambda > 1.$$

The child cognitive ability production function is given by:

$$A = F(T, C, G, \omega)$$

where ω is the child cognitive ability endowment.

Next, we define the mother’s choice set. The mother chooses (H, C) from the discrete set $D = \{(0, 0), (0, 1), (0, 2), (1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2)\}$ where 2 denotes full-time, 1 denotes part time, and 0 denotes none. The feasible choice set contains only 6 elements because of the constraint $C - H \geq 0$. Assume that T and G are continuous.

A.1. Solution of the mother’s optimization problem

The mother can solve the optimization problem in a two-step process where she first solves for the optimal (T, G) conditional on each of the 6 possible choices for (H, C) . Then, given the maximized utility in each of the 6 cases, she chooses the discrete option that gives maximum utility. To set up the second-stage problem (choice of T, G conditional on H, C) problem, it is useful to define the following quantities that are determined by the choice of H, C :

$$I^*(H, C, W; cc, R) = WH + B(WH; R) - ccC = I(W, H; R) - ccC$$

$$\bar{T}^*(H, C) = \bar{T} - \bar{H} + (\lambda - 1)C - \lambda H.$$

Then, the mother’s second stage problem is:

$$\max_{T, G} U(X, L, A; \varepsilon) \quad \text{s.t. } X = I^*(H, C, W; cc, R) - G$$

$$L = \bar{T}^*(H, C) - T$$

$$A = F(T, C, G, \omega).$$

The solution delivers the following equations for optimal T and G , conditional on H and C :

$$T^* = T(I^*, T^*, \omega; \varepsilon) = T(I(W, H; R) - ccC, \bar{T} - \bar{H} + (\lambda - 1)C - \lambda H, \omega; \varepsilon)$$

$$G^* = G(I^*, T^*, \omega; \varepsilon) = G(I(W, H; R) - ccC, \bar{T} - \bar{H} + (\lambda - 1)C - \lambda H, \omega; \varepsilon). \tag{A.1}$$

Then, the mother’s first stage problem is simply:

$$\max_{(H, C) \in D} U[I^*(H, C, W; cc, R) - G^*(H, C), \bar{T}^*(H, C) - T^*(H, C), F(T^*(H, C), C, G^*(H, C), \omega); \varepsilon].$$

Now, focusing on the second stage, assume we can approximate the “conditional decision rules” for T, G given in (A.1) as linear functions of the arguments, which are $I(W, H; R), C, H$ and ω :

$$T = \phi_0 + \phi_1\omega + \phi_2W + \phi_3C + \phi_4H + \phi_5I(W, H; R) + \varepsilon^T \tag{A.2}$$

$$G = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1\omega + \gamma_2W + \gamma_3C + \gamma_4H + \gamma_5I(W, H; R) + \varepsilon^G$$

where ε^T and ε^G are functions of the taste vector ε .

It is important to note that, in (A.2), the parameters ϕ and γ are reduced form parameters, which, in general, will be functions of the price of child care cc . This is because a change in cc would change the mother’s income $I^*(H, C, W; cc, R)$ conditional on W, H , and C in a way that is not reflected in any of the variables that appear in (A.2). Thus, we cannot use functions like (A.2) to predict how changes in C induced by changes in child care subsidies would affect maternal “quality” time and goods inputs into child production.

In contrast, a change in R is reflected in a change in $I(W, H; cc, R)$, which is a variable appearing in (A.2). Thus, (A.2) can be used to predict how changes in C and I induced by changes in welfare rules R affect T and G .

These observations have important implications for estimation as well. Specifically, in the context of the model presented here, if we assume that policy variables like child care subsidies and welfare rules are varied in a way that is independent of tastes (and hence independent of the error terms in (A.2)), then welfare rule parameters R are valid instruments for C and I in estimating (A.2), while childcare subsidy parameters are not. Such subtle issues in determining validity of instruments are often ignored in the literature on estimating “causal parameters” using instrumental variables, precisely because the issues are not clear in the absence of a model.

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