Occupational choice: Teacher quality versus teacher quantity

Limor Hatsor
Tel Aviv University, Israel

ABSTRACT

This article examines the relationship between skill-biased technological changes and the decline in both teacher quality and pupil–teacher ratio—called the "quality–quantity trade-off"—in the United States and other advanced economies during the past several decades. The study presents a theory of educational production that emphasizes teachers’ occupational choices. A key assumption is that talented agents have a comparative advantage in learning. The model endogenously generates a teachers sector with intermediate abilities between two types of skilled workers with tertiary education: highly skilled workers and vocational workers. This unique feature helps specify which technological changes may lead to quality–quantity trade-offs. In particular, a crucial element is that the ratio of incomes and thus the income inequality rises within the skilled sector. In this case, the most talented teachers depart from the teachers sector to join the highly skilled sector, and as such, teacher quality declines. In other cases, both teacher quality and teacher quantity may increase. The results are consistent with the observed patterns of technology, educational attainment, educational expenditure, and wage inequality in advanced economies. Finally, another potential cause for the quality–quantity trade-off is a reduction in teacher certification requirement unless the reduction is implemented exclusively on high-ability workers.

1. Introduction

What are the implications of skill-biased technological changes (SBTCs) on the quality and quantity of teachers? Which types of SBTCs might result in quality–quantity trade-offs? How is the rising income inequality among skilled workers related to the declining quality of teachers over time? To address these questions, this research develops a theory of educational production with compulsory education and tertiary education that emphasizes teachers’ occupational choices. The data in Table 1 suggests that in the United States, real education expenditure per pupil has increased since 1955. However, the pupil–teacher ratio has consistently fallen despite the ups and downs in the enrollment dynamics, and teacher quality has also declined relative to the educated labor force. This trade-off between the quality and quantity of teachers may have occurred in other OECD countries as well (Nickell and Quintini, 2002; OECD, 2005a).

One goal of this article is to relate the quality–quantity trade-off to stylized facts in the United States and other advanced countries within a general equilibrium overlapping-generations framework. In particular, the results suggest the role of the increasing value of skill and thereby the rising income inequality among skilled workers in explaining the quality–quantity trade-off taking into account the non-pécuniaire cost of higher education.

A common cause given in the literature for the quality–quantity trade-off is SBTC, which amplifies the demand for more college-educated workers, with a corresponding increase in their wages. As a result, decision makers tend to substitute quantity for quality in their resource allocation decisions. This study takes this explanation one step further and argues that only certain types of SBTCs lead to quality–quantity trade-offs. The few theoretical models that address this question (Gilpin and Kaganovich, 2012; Lakdawalla, 2006; Stoddard, 2003; Bacolod, 2007, ‘existing TO models’), use a simplifying assumption that agents base their decisions only on income considerations. As a result, there is excess supply of low-ability teachers (whose earnings in the production sector are lower than teacher wages). Thus, the low threshold level of teachers is solely determined by the government. The current model is more comprehensive because it further emphasizes the occupational choice decisions of individuals taking into account the leisure implications of acquiring education and allowing for an optimal allocation of their time, consistent with Betts (1998) and Costrell (1994). The model further assumes that the innate ability reduces the effort needed to acquire
higher education (‘the comparative advantage assumption’). This is compatible with Spence (1973)’s assumption that the costs of signaling (in education, for example), are negatively correlated with productive capability. He mentions that signaling costs should be interpreted broadly to include psychic and other costs, as well as time. Under these assumptions, teachers endogenously have intermediate abilities typically between two types of skilled workers (with tertiary education): highly skilled and vocational. This unique division helps specify the crucial element in SBTCs that lead to quality—quantity trade-offs—that is, the rising income inequality within the skilled sector. Two strands of literature propose nuanced SBTCs as possible explanations for this element based on unobserved ability and the routinization hypothesis. In the presence of nuanced SBTC, the model provides an explanation for the quality—quantity trade-off. Workers at the upper end of the ability distribution receive exponentially larger returns for their ability relative to their less talented peers. As a result, the highly skilled sector attracts the most talented teachers, which in turn generates a downward pressure on relative teacher quality. Moreover, as the pursuit of higher education becomes worthwhile for a broader population, workers with relatively low ability are added to the skilled sector. In other types of SBTCs, when the ratio of incomes (and thus, the income inequality) does not change among skilled workers, both the supply of teachers and their quality increase. Additionally, the model relates SBTCs to observed patterns in the United States and other advanced countries since 1960: increasing educational expenditures, rising wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, rising college attendance, and equalized teacher incomes (Autor et al., 1998; Berman et al., 1998; Goldin and Katz, 1999; Katz and Murphy, 1992).

Another implication of ‘the comparative advantage assumption’ is that a reduction in the cost of becoming a teacher benefits more with low-ability agents, causing an adverse selection to the teachers’ sector thereby worsening teacher quality and increasing their numbers. This result is consistent with the observations of UNESCO (2006) that several developing countries with limited budgets and serious teacher shortages (e.g., Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, India) have decided that the most viable option is to lower entry standards for the teaching profession. This may also be the case in California, where its class-size reduction program came at a cost of hiring teachers with lower qualifications (Jepsen and Rivkin, 2002). On the other hand, policies that combine teacher lower cost certification programs with access restrictions to high-ability individuals, e.g., the well-known Teach For America, eliminate the adverse selection problem, restore teacher quality and increase the quality of education. This study further demonstrates the cost of requiring a relatively long time investment from teachers. In this case, in equilibrium even the top-quality teachers earn a higher income than their counterparts in the skilled sector, which compensates them for their greater effort in higher education.

A key insight in the analysis is that accounting for the heterogeneous learning effort in higher education is important for analyzing the quality—quantity trade-off. The evidence in Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and Sizer (1984) suggests an extremely high discount rate of students on future incomes and a high emphasis of youth culture on current leisure and consumption. In Costrell (1994) and Betts (1998), time is optimally allocated between education and leisure, and they argue that student time and effort are the most important inputs to education, given the level of ability (see also Azariadis and Drazen, 1990; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Tamura, 1991; Vaene and Zilcha, 2002). Huggett et al. (2006) show that differences in learning ability account for the bulk of the variation in earnings across agents. Accordingly, with heterogeneity in abilities, this study assumes that highly able agents have a comparative advantage in learning over low-ability workers. Therefore, low-ability workers are not interested in devoting the learning effort required for teacher

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enrollment (in thousands)</th>
<th>Teachers (in thousands)</th>
<th>Pupil/teacher ratio</th>
<th>Real expenditure per pupil</th>
<th>Expenditure as a percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Relative teacher salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>30,680</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>3090</td>
<td>3.3*</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>36,281</td>
<td>1408</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>42,173</td>
<td>1710</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>4398</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>45,894</td>
<td>2059</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>5671</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>44,819</td>
<td>2198</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6570</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>40,877</td>
<td>2184</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>6796***</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>39,422</td>
<td>2206</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>7930***</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>41,217</td>
<td>2398</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>9428</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>44,840</td>
<td>2598</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9669</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>47,204</td>
<td>2941</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>11,254</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49,113</td>
<td>3143</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12,230</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>49,386</td>
<td>3174</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12,922**</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>50,824</td>
<td>3372</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
5. 1959 data.**2007 data.***estimated. I basically reproduce Table 1 in Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012) using updated data.

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2 Much of the literature attributes the evidence of rising residual wage inequality (within education, experience, age, race, and gender groups) to SBTCs that increase the returns to unobserved learning abilities. Skill-biased revolutions trigger reallocations of capital from slow- to fast-learning workers, thus generating absolute gains for people with high cognitive ability (see Bartel and Sicherman, 1999; Caselli, 1999; Galor and Moav, 2000; Juhn et al., 1993; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Murnane et al., 1995; Nelson and Phelps, 1966). The same phenomenon of rising polarization in the income distribution is addressed by the recent routinization literature. Theoretical contributions from Manning (2004) and empirical findings from Autor et al. (2003) and Spitz-Oener (2006) and Corsini (2011) suggest that jobs that require routine tasks (typically within the vocational sector, e.g., clerks, public servants, administrative employee, bookkeeping) are being substituted by new computer technologies. Thus, the technological change is beneficial for highly skilled workers, who hold a comparative advantage in nonroutine tasks (Jepsen and Rivkin, 2002). On the other hand, policies that combine teacher lower cost certification programs with access restrictions to high-ability individuals, e.g., the well-known Teach For America, eliminate the adverse selection problem, restore teacher quality and increase the quality of education. This study further demonstrates the cost of requiring a relatively long time investment from teachers. In this case, in equilibrium even the top-quality teachers earn a higher income than their counterparts in the skilled sector, which compensates them for their greater effort in higher education.

3 Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012) derive similar outcomes through a different mechanism—a dynamic process of human capital driven economic growth (as opposed to SBTC) in a different framework and a linked human capital formation. Their competing view gives more weight to increasing dispersion in educational attainments (see their Theorem 1, Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 and their review about ‘the rising talent premium’; see related discussions throughout my paper about the distinctions between the models). Note that the two perspectives may coincide. The literature on SBTCs points to the increase in the supply of skill due to growing availability of education as its underlying cause. For instance, Acemoglu (1998) argues that when the supply of skill rises, the market size of skill-complementary technologies grows, thus their invention is more profitable.
certification. Instead, low-ability workers, who still desire tertiary education, enroll in shorter programs geared for entry into the labor market and designed to acquire practical/vocational/technical skills and know-how needed for employment in a particular occupation or trade. As a result, they earn lower incomes than teachers (but higher incomes than unskilled workers). The model further assumes that teachers are equally paid because of collective bargaining agreements. Under these assumptions, this study endogenously posits that teachers typically have intermediate abilities between vocational workers and highly skilled workers, who enroll in longer programs of higher education (typically academic and theoretically based/research preparatory). Thus, the main contribution of this article is the introduction of a more complete model of teacher self-selection that helps grasp the essential features of SBTCs that promote quality–quantity trade-offs.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops a general equilibrium model. Section 3 defines the equilibrium and provides conditions for its existence and uniqueness. Section 4 characterizes the time investment in higher education and incomes across sectors. Section 5 details the numerical example. Section 6 derives the comparative static results on teacher quality and quantity. Section 7 analyzes the case of two pathways into teaching: formal and lower cost certification and Section 8 concludes.

2. The model

2.1. Timeline

Consider an overlapping-generations model with a continuum of consumers in each period and no population growth. Assume that agents live for two periods. In the first period, childhood (the education period), they are not productive: their parents support them, and they acquire compulsory public education at a uniform level. Then, they allocate their time to higher education. In the second period, adulthood (the working period), they work, pay taxes, give birth to one child and consume their after-tax income. Tax revenues are used by the government to support the children’s public education.

2.2. Human capital formation

Let \( h_t \) be the human capital level in adulthood of an agent \( i \) born at date \( t-1 \). The term \( E_{t-1} \) denotes the public education level she acquired as a child. Public education is produced by two inputs, given from period \( t-1 \): teacher quality, \( \overline{PT}_{t-1} \), defined as the average level of human capital of the instructors, and teacher quantity, \( P_{t-1}^T \), defined as the proportion of teachers in the working population. I define the quality of public education in period \( t \) as a Cobb–Douglas function of teacher quantity and teacher quality in period \( t-1 \)

\[
E_{t-1} = \beta_{t-1} (\theta_{t-1} \overline{PT}_{t-1} \gamma), \quad \gamma > 0, \quad \eta > 0
\]  

(1)

After graduation from high school, the agent chooses the fraction of time dedicated to higher education, \( 0 < e_{t-1} < 1 \). This leads to the first assumption:

(A1). A minimal level of time investment in higher education is necessary to attain some tertiary education degree, \( \hat{e} \).

If this standard is not met, the human capital equals formal compulsory schooling. If the agent decides to acquire higher education above the minimal level, the human capital further depends on the time investment in higher education as well as the agent’s innate ability, denoted by \( \theta_{t-1} \). The term \( \theta_{t-1} \) is i.i.d. and distributed as some random variable \( \theta \) with values in the interval \([\theta, \theta_T]\), where \( \theta = 1 - \hat{e} \). To simplify the exposition (but at no cost to the essence of the matter), let \( \theta = 1 \). Note that ‘abilities’ may reflect any unobserved initial endowments related to home background or school background. The production function of human capital is given by

\[
h_t = \begin{cases} 
E_{t-1} \theta^\beta_{t-1} & \text{if } 1 \geq e_{t-1} \geq \hat{e} \\
E_{t-1} & \text{if } 0 \leq e_{t-1} < \hat{e}
\end{cases}
\]  

(2)

for some \( \beta < 1, \lambda < 1, \rho \theta^{\hat{e}} > 1 \). Thus, acquiring higher education (above the minimal level) increases the human capital. Moreover, consistent with Ben-Porath (1967), Rosen (1976), Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012) and Laitner (2000), higher education and compulsory schooling are more productive for agents with higher initial endowments. In the following discussion, for simplicity of presentation, I omit the time index.

2.3. Sectors of workers: teachers and skilled and unskilled workers

Individuals belong to a given sector on the base of their education. In particular, if the time investment in higher education is lower than \( \hat{e} \), the individual is assigned to the unskilled sector. At the same time, if she decides to acquire tertiary education above \( \hat{e} \), then she becomes a skilled worker or a teacher, based on the following classification:

(A2). Teachers must invest at least \( e_t \geq \hat{e} \) in higher education to attain a teacher certification. This level is exogenously given by governmental requirements.

The time investment of teachers acts in the model as both a sorting mechanism to the teachers sector and a source of human capital (Betts, 1998; Weiss, 1983). Accordingly, agents who invest in higher education \( e_{t} \in [\hat{e}, 1] \) are eligible for a teacher certification. Nonetheless, they are eligible for a tertiary education degree (recall

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4 E.g. nurses, nannies, dental assistants, technicians, computer/network/internet technical operators, QA (quality assurance), paramedics, investigators, bookkeepers, policemen, firemen, medical secretaries, practical engineers. Note that the classification and description of jobs within the model follows the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) developed by UNESCO (see UNESCO, 1999). The classification distinguishes between six levels of education ranging from preprimary to tertiary, with 3 levels of tertiary education. For further description of ISCED education and description of jobs within the model follows the International Standard Classification.

5 This assumption is more suitable within a specific district or a small country and within the two periods of the model. Hoxby and Leigh (2004) highlight the substantial contribution of teachers’ unions to wage compression. It is well documented that unions tie teachers’ incomes primarily to seniority, oppose linking incomes to performance, and insist on raising incomes across the board. Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012) note that the compression of teacher salaries is also attributed to the difficulty in measuring teacher productivity and determining criteria for performance-based pay.

6 Theoretical models introduced by Viaene and Zilcha (2009), Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012), Lakdawalla (2006), Stoddard (2003), Tamura (2001) and Hatsor (2008) refer to quality and quantity of teachers as the dominant inputs for public education. Numerous empirical studies estimate the contribution of teacher quality and teacher quantity to the success of the educational process in schools (e.g., Tamura, 2001; Rivkin et al., 2005; Hanushek, 2003; OECD, 2005a; Clotfelter et al., 2007; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010, see a review in Hatsor (2008)). It is fair to assume that teacher human capital has an influence on the quality of their work, as it represents their basic raw knowledge.

7 Cunha and Heckman (2007) argue that abilities are created, not solely inherited. The family plays a powerful role in shaping them through genetics, parental investments and choice of child environments.
(A1)−(A2)), thereby they are assigned to the skilled sector. Otherwise, if the requirement of $e_\gamma$ is met, i.e., $e_\gamma \geq e_T$, they can choose whether to become skilled workers or teachers.\footnote{As will become apparent in the following section, at the optimum, teachers invest in their higher education exactly $e_T$, because their income is not based on their human capital.}

Sectors differ in their income structure.\footnote{Note that the income variables in all professions, including teaching, represent lifetime incomes over the entire career. Accordingly, I do not model the wage dynamics over the career path as the worker accumulates experience (see a related discussion in Section 7).} I assume that the income of unskilled workers is uniform, denoted by $y_{u,T}$, because abilities and higher education are secondary determinants of their incomes. According to Bishop (1988), employers of high school graduates rely almost exclusively on the diploma, rather than the more complete information contained in school transcripts or employment tests. Furthermore, because teachers’ collective bargaining agreements tend to equalize their incomes, I assume that teachers are equally paid, and their income is denoted by $y_T$. In contrast, following Becker (1975), I assume that skilled workers are rewarded for their human capital, because skilled workers are employed in professions that require various levels of abilities and higher education. Their income equals $y_{s,T} = w_S h_s$, where $w_S$ is the wage rate for an effective unit of human capital. Note that income and time investment in all sectors are determined in equilibrium, except for the time investment of teachers.

2.4. Agents’ decisions: allocation of time and the labor supply

In childhood, each agent is endowed with one unit of time, which she allocates between time investment in higher education, $e_i$, and leisure. In adulthood, each agent is endowed with an additional unit of time, which she inelastically devotes to labor. Lifetime utility of agent $i$ depends on consumption, denoted by $c_i$, and effective leisure, $l_i$, for some $\theta, \mu > 1$:

\[ U_i = u_{i,1} + \varphi u_{i,2}, \quad u_{i,1} = \log (l_i^\theta), \quad u_{i,2} = \log (c_i^\phi), \quad \text{for } l_i > 0, \quad c_i > 0 \]

(3)

where $u_{i,1}$ and $u_{i,2}$ are utility of agent $i$ in periods 1 and 2, respectively and $\varphi$ is the discount factor. Rearranging Eq. (3) obtains

\[ U_i = \log(l_i^\theta) + \varphi \log (c_i^\phi) \quad \text{for } l_i > 0, \quad c_i > 0, \quad \phi > 0. \]

(4)

The effective leisure of agent $i$ is given by the following:

(A3). For some parameter $Z > 0$, $l_i = 1 - Z e_i$, where $0 \leq l_i \leq 1$. That is, $0 \leq e_i \leq \frac{1}{Z}$.\footnote{The first effect cancels (its substitution and income effects offset each other, as a common feature of the Cobb–Douglas utility function). Therefore, the optimal effective leisure in Eq. (8) is identical for all skilled workers.}

The ratio $\frac{Z}{\mu}$ represents the learning effort invested in higher education, where $\mu$ is the non-pecuniary cost of leisure. I assume that highly talented agents have a comparative advantage in learning. Therefore, the learning effort required to achieve a given level of higher education diminishes with the level of ability. Accordingly, less talented agents have lower incentives to invest in higher education at the expense of leisure. An additional assumption is necessary for the existence of the teachers sector:

(A4). The following condition holds:

\[ e_\gamma < \frac{\theta}{Z}. \]

If this condition is not satisfied, it is easy to verify from Eq. (A3) that no agent has a positive effective leisure as a teacher. I assume that the government avoids this scenario by ensuring that teachers’ time investment is sufficiently low. Note that if the cost of leisure is sufficiently low, $Z < 1$, this condition holds for all $e_\gamma$. I assume hereinafter that assumptions (A1)–(A4) hold. Given the income structure in the three sectors, $y_{s,T}, y_T$, and $y_{u,T}$ each agent chooses whether to become a teacher, a skilled worker or an unskilled worker and how much time to invest in higher education by maximizing his or her utility, given in Eq. (4), such that his or her effective leisure, given in (A3), and consumption are positive:

\[ \max_{c_i, e_i} \quad u_i = \log \left( \left(1 - Z \frac{e_i}{l_i}\right) c_i^{\phi \theta} \right) \]

\[ s.t. \]

\[ c_i \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad 0 \leq e_i \leq \frac{1}{Z} \]

(6)

One of the following options can be chosen:

(a) Choose $e_\gamma \geq e_T$ and $c_i = (1 - \tau) y_T$ (teachers)

(b) Choose $e_\gamma \geq e_T$ and $c_i = (1 - \tau) w_S h_s$ (skilled)

(c) Choose $e_\gamma$ and $c_i = y_{u,T}$ (unskilled)

where $h_s$ is defined in Eq. (2) and consumption equals the after-tax income. For simplicity, I assume the following progressive taxation: only the higher income sectors, teachers and skilled workers, pay taxes, and the tax rate, $\tau$, is exogenously given. At the optimum, because teachers and unskilled workers are not rewarded for their human capital, teachers invest in their higher education exactly the time investment required to meet the standard, $e_T$, and unskilled workers exert zero effort, $e_\gamma = 0$. I obtain the optimal time investment and effective leisure of skilled workers using (A3) and rearranging the first-order condition that equates their marginal utility from time investment in higher education to the marginal cost:

\[ e_\gamma = \frac{\phi \rho \beta}{\mu + \varphi \beta} \theta, \]

(7)

\[ l_i = \frac{\mu}{\mu + \varphi \beta}. \]

Note that innate ability has two distinct effects on the time investment in higher education: First, it amplifies the returns to education in the production of human capital (Eq. (2)), thereby the corresponding income level rises. Second, it reduces the cost needed to acquire the education (in terms of effort) (recall (A3)), thereby the incentives to invest in higher education rise. Therefore, highly able workers prefer to spend more time on higher education than less talented ones (see Eq. (7)).

Substituting Eq. (7) in Eq. (2), I derive the human capital of skilled workers as a function of the quality of public education and ability:

\[ h_i = \rho \left( \frac{\varphi \rho \beta}{Z (\mu + \varphi \beta)} \right)^{\beta - 1} E. \]

(9)

Accordingly, highly skilled workers accumulate larger levels of human capital directly (through $\lambda$) and indirectly (through $\beta$) by spending more time on higher education. Thus, they earn higher incomes than less talented skilled workers (recall Eqs. (2), (A3) and (7)). If the weight of future consumption rises, skilled workers increase the time investment in higher education in order to increase their human capital (and thus their future incomes). Without loss of generality, I assume in the rest of the paper that $\varphi = 1$. Note that teachers are also compensated for having higher ability through the lower learning effort required to attain teacher certification (recall (A2)–(A3)). Accordingly,
Corollary 1. The utility from skilled professions and from teaching increases with ability, while the utility in the unskilled sector is independent on ability.:

Thus, the least talented workers join the unskilled sector. Because of their insufficient talent for schooling, they prefer not to acquire higher education at all and enjoy the extra leisure. That is, acquiring higher education would reduce their utility because their learning effort as skilled workers or as teachers is too high relative to their incomes. Only sufficiently talented workers may acquire the minimal level of higher education required from skilled workers or teachers:

Corollary 2. Agents with sufficiently high ability, such that \( \theta > ZE(\beta + 1) \) (\( \theta > ZE_1 \)), are compatible with skilled professions (teaching), respectively.:

Corollary 2 is derived from (A1)–(A3) and Eq. (7). Namely, the optimal time investment of skilled workers exceeds the minimal level necessary to attain some higher education degree, \( e \), and the effective leisure of teachers is positive. Now, I define the utility from skilled professions relative to teaching:

Definition 1. Using Eqs. (6)–(9), the utility from skilled professions relative to teaching is the utility of agent \( i \) from skilled professions divided by his or her utility from becoming a teacher:

\[
\left( \frac{Y_i}{Y_T} \right)^\mu \left( \frac{l_T}{l_T} \right),
\]

where

\[
Y_i = \left( \frac{\delta \beta}{Z(\mu + \delta \beta)} \right)^\mu \frac{w_s g \epsilon}{y_T} \left( \theta_i \right)^{\beta-1} \quad \text{and} \quad l_T = \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta \beta} \right) \left( \frac{1 - Ze_T}{\theta_i} \right).
\]

The utility from skilled professions relative to teaching in Eq. (10) can be rewritten by gathering ability-dependent factors in \( \frac{Y_i}{Y_T} (\theta_i) \) and the other factors in \( \pi_1 \):

\[
\left( \frac{\pi_1 w_s}{Y_T} \right)^\mu \left( \frac{U_S}{U_T} (\theta_i) \right),
\]

where

\[
\frac{U_S}{U_T} (\theta_i) = \left( \frac{\theta_i}{\theta_1} \right)^{\beta-1} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_1 = \left( \frac{(\delta \beta)^\mu \mu \beta}{Z(\mu + \delta \beta)} \right) E.
\]

\( \pi_1 \) includes the weighted wage rate for an effective unit of human capital, teacher income, the quality of public education (given from the previous period) and parameters of the preference structure and the human capital formation. The following Proposition 1 and Property 1 characterize important innovative features of the labor supply:

Proposition 1. The utility from skilled professions relative to teaching is convex in ability, \( \theta_i \), and it attains a minimum at

\[
\hat{\theta} = \frac{\mu}{\delta(\beta + \lambda)} + 1 + \epsilon,
\]

where

\[
\epsilon = ZE_T = \text{Argmin} \left( \frac{U_S}{U_T} (\theta_i) \right).
\]

Proposition 1 is easily proved by deriving the utility from skilled professions relative to teaching by ability. The proofs of Proposition 1 and Property 1 are available on request.

Property 1. The slope of \( \frac{dU}{d\theta} (\theta_i) \) is steeper below \( \hat{\theta} \) than above \( \hat{\theta} \).

The convexity in ability implies that both high-ability workers (above \( \hat{\theta} \)) and low-ability workers (below \( \hat{\theta} \)) prefer skilled professions rather than teaching and that the teachers sector consists of intermediate-ability workers. This feature is generated because ability contributes to utility through two channels: income and effective leisure. High-ability workers prefer to become skilled workers than teachers because skilled occupations compensate for their high talents with augmented incomes, whereas low-ability workers prefer the skilled sector because it is more costly for them in terms of effort to attain teacher certification (recall (A3)). Specifically, workers with sufficiently low ability (\( \theta_i \rightarrow Ze_T \)) have almost no effective leisure as teachers (recall (A3) and Corollary 2), and thus their marginal utility from effective leisure is infinite. As a result, not only low-ability workers prefer skilled professions to teaching, but also the slope of \( \frac{dU}{d\theta} (\theta_i) \) is steeper below \( \hat{\theta} \) than above \( \hat{\theta} \), as Property 1 argues. (A more detailed intuition for these results appears on Appendix A). Instead of attaining the uniform time investment required for teacher certification (recall (A2)), low-ability workers optimally alleviate their learning effort by enrolling in shorter programs of higher education with fewer requirements than teaching (recall Eq. (7) and see Proposition 6 hereinafter), such as community colleges, vocational training or any practical courses beyond high school with occupational orientation. In contrast, highly skilled workers enroll in longer programs typically characterized by academic, theoretically based research preparation. This leads to Definition 2:

Definition 2. The skilled sector is also referred to as the 'total skilled' sector. It contains two sub-sectors (not interested in teaching): the high-skilled sector (The vocational sector) consists of all skilled agents with time investment in higher education greater (lesser) than that for teachers.

The division of the labor force into unskilled workers, vocational workers, teachers and highly skilled workers is formalized in the following Proposition 2 and Illustration 1 using Definitions 3–4 (1 discuss an exception for this division in Section 4; Note that the conditions that guarantee the existence of sectors are derived in Section 3):

Definition 3. The term \( \theta_k \) denotes the ability level of workers, who are indifferent between belonging to sector \( j \) and sector \( k \).

Definition 4. Assume that for some \( j \) and \( k \), \( \theta_k \) satisfies \( \theta_k < \theta_j \). If all workers with ability below (above) \( \theta_k \) prefer sector \( j \) (\( k \)) to all other sectors, sectors \( j \) and \( k \) exist and \( \theta_k \) is the threshold level between them.

Proposition 2. Sectors of workers are organized as follows:

\( a. \) If both the high-skilled sector and vocational sector exist, then \( \theta_{VT} > \hat{\theta} > \theta_{VT} > Ze_T \) and

- (1) The most talented agents, with abilities \( [\theta_{VT}, \theta] \), generate the high-skilled sector.
- (2) Agents with abilities \( [\theta_{VT}, \theta_{VT}] \) are teachers.
- (3) The vocational sector comprises agents with abilities \( [\theta_{VT}, \theta_{VT}] \) and \( \theta_{VT} < \theta_{VT} < \theta_{VT}. \)

11 Recall that teacher income, \( y_s \), and the optimal effective leisure of skilled workers, \( e \), (see Eq. (8)) are uniform. However, when workers become more talented, their incomes as skilled workers, \( y_s \), increase through \( (\theta_i)^{\beta-1} \) as a result of their greater time investment in higher education and their greater ability (recall Eq. (9)). Moreover, their effective leisure as teachers, \( l_T = 1 - \frac{Ze_T}{\theta_i} \), increases because they have a comparative advantage in making the exogenous time investment required to become teachers, \( e_T \) (recall Corollary 1).
The lowest ability agents, with abilities lower than \( \theta_{iv} \), generate the unskilled sector.

b. If the high-skilled (vocational) sector does not exist, then the upper (lower) threshold of the teachers sector is \( \bar{\theta} (\theta_{iT} \text{ and } \theta_{iv} > \theta_{iv} > \theta_{iv} > Z_e) \).

**Proof.** Because of the convexity of the utility from skilled professions relative to teaching (recall Proposition 1), indifferent workers between these sectors are represented by a unique pair of abilities \( (\theta_{iT}, \theta_{iv}) \), for which Eq. (11) equals \( 1 \):

\[
\left( \frac{y_U}{w_S} \right) = \frac{u_U}{u_S}(\theta_{iT}) = \frac{u_S}{u_T}(\theta_{iv}), \quad \text{where } \theta_{iT} > \bar{\theta} > \theta_{iv} > Z_e. \tag{13}
\]

The ability of indifferent workers between the unskilled sector and the vocational sector (the teachers sector), denoted by \( \theta_{ov} \) \((\theta_{iv})\), is obtained by equating the utility from unskilled professions and skilled professions (teaching), respectively:

\[
\frac{y_U}{w_S} = (1 - \tau)_{PV}(\theta_{ov})^{\beta_1} \Rightarrow \\
\frac{y_U}{y_T} = (1 - \tau) \left(1 - \frac{Z_e}{\theta_{ov}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma}}, \quad \text{where } \theta_{iv} > Z_e. \tag{14}
\]

\[
\frac{y_U}{w_S} = (1 - \tau) \left(1 - \frac{Z_e}{\theta_{iv}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma}}, \quad \text{where } \theta_{iv} > Z_e. \tag{15}
\]

\( \theta_{iv}, \theta_{iv} \) must be above \( Z_e \), because these workers are able to become teachers (recall Corollary 2). The other inequalities are implied by consistency of preferences. This part of the proof is relegated to Appendix A.

The numerical example is detailed in Section 5. Illustration 1 demonstrates the sectors defined in Proposition 2: ‘H’, ‘T’, ‘V’ and ‘U’ denote the high-skilled sector, the teachers sector, the vocational sector and the unskilled sector, respectively. The X-axis denotes ability. The Y-axis denotes \( \frac{w_S}{w_U}(\theta_{iv}) \), which represents the utility from skilled professions relative to teaching (recall Eq. (11)). The intersection points define the threshold levels between skilled professions and teaching. Intermediate ability workers \( (\theta_{iv}, \theta_{iv}) \) prefer teaching.

My framework emphasizes the self-selection of workers. Because of the comparative advantage assumption, low-ability workers do not want to devote the exogenously given time investment required to gain teacher certification and thus do not want to become teachers. Instead, they join the vocational sector and alleviate their learning effort. Moreover, they respond to changes in their relative incomes. Therefore, ceteris paribus, to attract more teachers, teacher income must grow, which may break the quality–quantity trade-off.\(^{13}\)

### 2.5. Labor demand

#### 2.5.1. Firms

Competitive identical firms produce one consumption good, \( q \), using total skilled labor (recall Definition 2) and unskilled labor. I denote the proportions of total skilled labor and unskilled labor in the working population used by firm \( j \) by \( p_s^j \), \( p_u^j \). I assume that the per capita production function of firm \( j \) is the following:\(^{14}\)

\[
q^j (\bar{h}, p_s^j, p_u^j) = \left( \frac{\bar{h}_s}{\bar{h}_u} p_s^j + \frac{\bar{h}_u}{\bar{h}_u} p_u^j \right)^r. \tag{16}
\]

I also assume that the quality of skilled labor, \( \bar{h}_s \), amplifies the productivity of skilled labor and unskilled labor with decreasing returns. This reflects the notion that skilled workers lead technological changes (e.g., Eicher, 1996; Acmoglu, 1998; Galor and Moav, 2000; Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Though, the spillover is larger for skilled labor. This leads to the following notation:

**Definition 5.** The net productivity augmentation of skilled labor is given by \( \sigma - \phi > 0 \).

Given the quality of skilled labor and incomes, each firm \( j \) chooses its demand for skilled and unskilled labor by maximizing its profits:

\[
\max_{p_s^j, p_u^j} \pi^j = \left( \frac{\bar{h}_s}{\bar{h}_u} p_s^j + \frac{\bar{h}_u}{\bar{h}_u} p_u^j \right)^r - W_s h_s p_s^j - y_u p_u^j. \tag{17}
\]

By rearranging the first-order conditions, I obtain the demand of firm \( j \) for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor:

\[
\frac{W_s h_s}{y_u} = (\bar{h}_s)^{-\phi - 1} \left( \frac{p_s^j}{p_u^j} \right)^{1-r}. \tag{18}
\]

Because all firms are identical, by rearranging Eq. (18), I derive the total demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor as follows:

\[
\frac{W_s h_s}{y_U} = (\bar{h}_s)^{-\phi - 1} \left( \frac{P_s}{P_u} \right)^{1-r}, \tag{19}
\]

where \( P_s, P_u \) are the aggregate proportions of total skilled labor and unskilled labor in the working population, respectively.

#### 2.5.2. The government

Recall that in this model, the taxation is progressive in the sense that unskilled workers are not taxed to finance education, and the tax rate on the other sectors, \( \tau \), is exogenously given.\(^{15}\) Tax revenues

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\(^{13}\) In contrast, in the existing TO models, the utility from skilled professions relative to teaching monotonically increases with ability because agents gain utility purely from income. Consequently, there is an excess supply of low-skilled teachers (An exception is Bacolod (2007)). The government’s choice of teacher income determines the tax rate on the other sectors, \( \tau \), is exogenously given.

\(^{14}\) Note that the results hold also under general functions \( f_1(\bar{h}_s) \) and \( f_2(\bar{h}_u) \) instead of \( (\bar{h}_s)^{\sigma} \) and \( (\bar{h}_u)^{\delta} \), respectively, assuming that they are strictly increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable.

\(^{15}\) While it is conceivable that the tax rate is set by a fiscal authority based on some decision process, I treat this as extraneous to the analysis. Nevertheless, I examine the effects of an exogenous increase of the tax rate in section 6.3.
finance teachers’ incomes at each date $t$, and the educational budget constraint is balanced:

$$y_T^t = \tau \left( w_S T_S^t + y_T^t \right).$$

(20)

By rearranging Eq. (20), teachers’ incomes after tax are funded by the skilled sector:

$$(1 - \tau) y_T^t = \tau \left( w_S T_S^t \right).$$

(21)

That is, the teachers sector cannot exist without the funds from the skilled sector. On the other hand, if the skilled sector exists, then the tax revenues are positive. Because the educational budget is not disposed, the teachers sector must exist. Accordingly,

**Corollary 3.** Given the budget constraint (21), the teachers sector exists if and only if the skilled sector exists (i.e. $P_S > 0 \iff P_T > 0$).

### 3. Equilibrium

#### 3.1. Definition of equilibrium

Let teachers’ time investment in higher education, $e_T$, the tax rate, $\tau$, the distribution of abilities, $\theta$, and the quality of public education, $E$, be given in each period $t$. Then, $\{e_T, P_S, P_T, P_H, y_T, y_U, W_S, W_U\}$, for $t = 1, 2, \ldots$, constitutes an equilibrium, if it satisfies the following conditions:

a. Given $(y_T, y_U, W_S)$, for all workers, $(e_T)$ is the optimal time dedicated to higher education and no worker can improve his or her position by moving to another sector.

b. In production, $(P_S, P_T)$ are the optimal aggregate proportions of unskilled labor and total skilled labor, respectively, given $(y_T, y_U, W_S)$.

c. The educational budget constraint (21) holds.

d. The labor market clears. The demand for each sector equals supply. 

#### 3.2. Existence of equilibrium and uniqueness

In this section, Propositions 3–5 derive conditions for the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, and for the existence of the two types of skilled workers in the equilibrium. All proofs in this section are relegated to Appendix A. Proposition 3 derives conditions for the existence of equilibrium.

**Proposition 3.** Under the aforementioned assumptions, equilibrium exists with at least three sectors: total skilled, teachers and unskilled (i.e. $P_S > 0, P_T > 0, P_H > 0$).

Thus, at least one of the two sub-sectors exists in equilibrium: the vocational sector or the high-skilled sector. In the rest of the paper, I assume the following—

(A5). The distribution of abilities is uniform.

I use the common uniformity assumption (A5), following e.g., Galor and Moav (2000) and Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012), in order to obtain tractable analytical results in the rest of the paper (besides Proposition 6), but it is not necessary for the overall intuition. 

Now, Proposition 4 derives the conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium.

**Proposition 4.** Under the aforementioned assumptions, and if the net productivity augmentation of skilled labor is sufficiently large, $\sigma - \phi > r$, equilibrium is unique with at least three sectors: total skilled, teachers and unskilled (i.e. $P_S > 0, P_T > 0, P_H > 0$).

Additional technical assumptions (A6)–(A9), specified in Appendix A, are sufficient to ensure that the high-skilled sector and the vocational sector co-exist in equilibrium. 

**Proposition 5.** Assume that assumptions (A5)–(A9) hold. Then, the number of highly skilled and vocational workers is positive in equilibrium. 

Note that in the following sections, I assume that the vocational sector and the high-skilled sector both exist. Nevertheless, I analyze the less probable case with no vocational sector in Section 6.1.

### 4. Time investment in higher education and income

This section characterizes time investment and incomes in each sector. Typically, time investment in higher education and related incomes are weakly increasing in ability (thereby sectors are organized according to Proposition 2). The model generates this result in all sectors, though it may not hold at the upper threshold level between the teachers sector and the skilled sector, as Proposition 6 and Illustration 2 depict.

**Proposition 6.** High-ability workers are more educated and earn higher incomes than low-ability workers, with the following exception: some workers with higher abilities than teachers may be less educated and earn lower incomes than teachers, and thus they belong to the vocational sector.

Illustration 2 depicts time investment in education and incomes as a function of ability (The numerical example is detailed in section 5). In illustration 2, ‘$H’$, ‘$T’$, ‘$V’$ and ‘$U’$ denote high-skilled sector, teachers sector, vocational sector and unskilled sector, respectively. Unskilled workers earn the lowest incomes and do not invest in higher education. As ability grows, workers become more educated and earn higher incomes but enjoy less effective leisure (substitute income with effective leisure), with the following exception: In Illustration 2, the time investment of skilled workers is identical to the exogenously given time investment of teachers, $e_T$, when ability equals $\theta_T$. The most talented workers, with ability above $\theta_T$, given their comparative advantage in learning, naturally choose to be more educated and thus earn higher incomes than teachers (recall (A2) and Eq. (7)). However, because $\theta_H > \theta_T$ in equilibrium, some workers, with higher abilities than teachers, i.e., $(\theta_H, e_T)$ (in the black circle), decide to become vocational workers. That is, they acquire less higher education and thus earn lower incomes than teachers. This phenomenon occurs when the intensity of ability, $\lambda$, is large. On the one hand, when the intensity of ability is low (see Appendix A for $\lambda = 0$), there exists a small high-skilled sector that includes the most talented workers, who choose to be more educated and earn higher incomes than—

---

16 It has the advantage of simplicity and it is consistent with the empirical evidence regarding the positive relation of relative teacher quality to relative teachers’ incomes (see discussion below Proposition 8). More general assumptions, that the high-skilled sector is sufficiently large near $\theta_H$, i.e., that teachers are not the top ability workers (which may not be correct only in Nordic countries) or that the effective leisure is sufficiently important (see Property 1) may produce the same qualitative results.

17 See the intuition in Appendix A.
teachers. On the other hand, when the intensity of ability is sufficiently large, the skilled sector expands and pushes the teachers’ sector to the lower end of the ability distribution. That is, the top-quality teachers join the skilled sector, and they may optimally choose to enroll in shorter higher education programs and enjoy more leisure but lower incomes than teachers.\textsuperscript{18}

5. Numerical example

The numerical example has several purposes. The first aim is to demonstrate the analytical results (specifically, Illustrations 1–5, and Figs. 1–3 on Appendix A are calibrated based on the numerical example and demonstrate the corresponding propositions). Note that Illustration 2 provides an insightful example for the exception that Proposition 6 depicts. The second goal is to verify that the restrictive assumptions in Property 1 are not necessary (by selecting the values displayed in Table 2 of \( \mu \) and \( \phi \) that do not satisfy the assumptions). Moreover, I calibrated the values of assumption (c) of Property 1 to exhibit that it is quite plausible (see comment 12). The third goal, in the following Section 7, is to obtain the effect of lower teacher certification cost program with access restrictions on relative teacher quality, which is too complicated to solve analytically.

The baseline is calibrated using conventional specifications. The population size is 300. The income distribution is uniform (recall assumption (A5)) and calibrates a Gini coefficient close to developed OECD countries (0.24). In addition, the average tax rate is between 0.11 and 0.25, the range of public expenditure per student for primary OECD countries (0.24). In the range of the medium and high tax rates in Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Su (2004). In the range of the medium and high tax rates in Card’s (1995) IV estimates.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameters’ description</th>
<th>Parameters’ value</th>
<th>Parameters’ source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firms’ production</td>
<td>Substitution between skilled and unskilled workers</td>
<td>( r = 0.925 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education technology</td>
<td>Intensity of higher education</td>
<td>( \mu = 0.16 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Intensity of human capital</td>
<td>( \lambda = 0.5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Intensity of human capital</td>
<td>( \rho = 6 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility</td>
<td>Weights of effective leisure and consumption</td>
<td>( \mu = [0.2, 0.5], \delta = [0.3, 0.45] )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Numerical example

The numerical example has several purposes. The first aim is to demonstrate the analytical results (specifically, Illustrations 1–5, and Figs. 1–3 on Appendix A are calibrated based on the numerical example and demonstrate the corresponding propositions). Note that Illustration 2 provides an insightful example for the exception that Proposition 6 depicts. The second goal is to verify that the restrictive assumptions in Property 1 are not necessary (by selecting the values displayed in Table 2 of \( \mu \) and \( \phi \) that do not satisfy the assumptions). Moreover, I calibrated the values of assumption (c) of Property 1 to exhibit that it is quite plausible (see comment 12). The third goal, in the following Section 7, is to obtain the effect of lower teacher certification cost program with access restrictions on relative teacher quality, which is too complicated to solve analytically.

The baseline is calibrated using conventional specifications. The population size is 300. The income distribution is uniform (recall assumption (A5)) and calibrates a Gini coefficient close to developed OECD countries (0.24). In addition, the average tax rate is between 0.11 and 0.25, the range of public expenditure per student for primary education as a percentage of GDP per capita in OECD countries. It lies in the range of the medium and high tax rates in Glomm and Ravikumar (2003), 0.05–0.6. I also set the standard parameters from the literature. Table 2 details the parameter values.

6. Comparative static to explain the quality–quantity trade-off

In this section, I examine the possible causes for the trends in teacher quality and teacher quantity in advanced countries. First, in the following sub-sections 6.1 and 6.2, I discuss two types of SBTCs:

(a) The returns to ability rise linearly: In this case, skilled incomes are multiplied by the same constant factor (without changing the ratio of incomes within the skilled sector). Thus, the income inequality within the skilled sector does not change (see Definition 6 in Appendix A). This factor-augmenting SBTC is common in the literature. It is carried out through the following comparative static in line with the evidence reviewed in the introduction:

i. Augmented net productivity of skilled labor, \( \sigma - \phi \).\textsuperscript{19}

ii. Augmented human capital (and thus incomes) of skilled labor, through amplified intensity of human capital, \( \rho \), or improved quality of public education, \( E \) (given at each period) (recall Eq. (2)).

(b) The returns to ability rise exponentially: This SBTC is executed through an increase in the intensity of ability, \( \lambda \). In this case, the marginal productivity of ability increases more than the marginal productivity of the other components of the human capital. As a result, workers at the upper end of the ability distribution receive exponentially larger returns for their ability. Consequently, the ratio of the incomes of highly skilled and vocational workers increases and the income inequality rises within the skilled sector.\textsuperscript{20}

In addition to the two types of SBTC, I consider in sections 6.3 and 6.4 an increase in the tax rate and a reduction of the teacher certification requirement. Now, I define relative teacher quality in line with Gilpin and Kaganovich (2012).

Definition 7. Relative teacher quality refers to teacher mean quality relative to the mean quality of the working population.\textsuperscript{21}

6.1. Type (a) SBTC

This section demonstrates that when the returns to ability rise linearly, both teacher quality and teacher quantity increase, which in turn amplify the quality of education. Thus, the quality–quantity trade-off does not occur (see Illustration 3 and Proposition 7). As the incomes of skilled workers increase, low-ability agents decide to acquire higher education and join the vocational sector (i.e., \( \theta_{UV} \) declines). Therefore, the total skilled sector expands and the unskilled sector shrinks. According to Rangazas (2002), schooling might not benefit from the increased labor productivity associated with technological changes. Much of the discussion considers schooling as

\textsuperscript{18} Devoting the exogenous time investment of teachers in higher education, \( e_{T} \), may be sub-optimal for them because their marginal cost is too high in terms of learning effort relative to the marginal utility from the income generated. See Section 6 for more details on an increase in the intensity of ability.

\textsuperscript{19} As a result, the relative demand for skilled workers increases in firms (recall the production function (16) and Definition 5). Note that type (a)(i) SBTC allows for an increase in the productivity of unskilled labor, carried by an increase in \( \sigma \). Nevertheless, the increase in the productivity of skilled workers must be larger than that for unskilled workers because \( \sigma \) rises more than \( \phi \).
suffering from the Baumol (1967) disease. Thus, in the absence of any increase in the total amount spent on teachers, the increase in the total skilled sector threatens both teacher quantity and teacher quality. However, because the funds for public education rise, teacher income grows to balance the educational budget (21). As a result, the teachers sector becomes more attractive for both highly skilled workers and vocational workers (i.e., $\theta_{TH}$ increases and $\theta_{VT}$ declines) thereby the teachers sector expands. Illustration 3 and Proposition 7 summarize the changes in the sizes of sectors.

The corresponding simulation in Fig. 1 and the Proof of Proposition 7 are relegated to Appendix A.

**Proposition 7.** If type (a) SBTC occurs, then

- **a.** The total skilled sector and the teachers sector expand.
- **b.** The vocational sector expands, and the high-skilled sector shrinks.

The following Property 2 and Proposition 8 analyze whether relative teacher quality increases or declines. The answer is not straightforward, because both highly skilled workers and vocational workers join the teachers sector.

**Property 2.** The supply of highly skilled workers is more (less) elastic with respect to shocks in their relative incomes (leisure) than the supply of vocational workers.

**Proposition 8.** Assume that type (a) SBTC occurs. Then, relative teacher quality increases.

**Proof.** Proposition 8 derives from Property 2. Because highly skilled workers are more talented, it is less costly for them in terms of effort to obtain a teacher certification than for vocational workers (recall (A3)). As a result, when teacher income increases, more highly skilled workers join the teachers sector than vocational workers (the rise in $\theta_{TH}$ is larger than the decline in $\theta_{VT}$), thereby relative teacher quality increases.

These results are consistent with the empirical evidence about a significant positive relation between teachers’ incomes relative to other occupations and their quality. As such, the quality–quantity trade-off does not occur: SBTC increases the supply of teachers without sacrificing their quality. Therefore, the quality of public education rises (in period $t+1$). In contrast, in existing TO models, there is excess supply of low-ability workers for the teachers sector. Thus, it is feasible to lower teacher income while increasing their numbers (i.e., substituting teacher quality with quantity). This policy may become optimal under SBTCs, because the cost of maintaining teacher quality rises (see Lakdawalla (2006)). In the current framework, this policy is not feasible because of the existence of vocational workers who do not want to become teachers: if teacher income declines, the supply of low-ability teachers shrinks (they join the vocational sector).

Note that under this framework, if there is no vocational sector (the less probable case), the quality–quantity trade-off occurs: as the incomes of skilled workers increase, the high-skilled sector expands and pushes the teachers sector to the lower levels of the ability distribution (i.e., $\theta_{TH}$ declines). Then, because the funds for public education increase, teacher income increases. As a result, the teachers sector expands towards the unskilled sector (i.e., $\theta_{VT}$ declines), and relative teacher quality declines, as Illustration 4 and Proposition 7 summarize (the proof is relegated to Appendix A):

**Proposition 9.** Assume that (A5) holds and type (a) SBTC occurs. If the vocational sector does not exist, the teachers sector expands, and its relative quality declines.

In the following sub-sections, I analyze other potential causes for the quality–quantity trade-off, associated with observed trends in advanced countries: type (b) SBTCs, exogenous shifts in the tax rate and a reduction of the teacher certification requirement.

### 6.2. Type (b) SBTC

When the intensity of ability, $\lambda$, increases, similarly to type (a) SBTC, more agents are attracted to the total skilled sector. Furthermore, because the funds for public education increase, teacher income increases, and thus the teachers sector expands. However, while type (a) SBTC multiplies the incomes of skilled workers by the same factor, under type (b) SBTC the growth in incomes is highly disproportionate within the skilled sector. Because they are more talented, highly skilled workers enjoy exponentially larger returns for their ability. That is, the ratio of the incomes of highly skilled and vocational workers increases, and thus income inequality rises within the skilled sector. Therefore, an additional substitution effect appears: The high-skilled sector becomes more attractive for teachers than the vocational sector. As a result, in contrast with type (a) SBTC, the high-skilled sector expands and pushes the teachers sector towards the lower levels of the ability distribution. Top-quality candidates depart the teachers sector and join the high-skilled sector, leaving the government with less talented teachers (i.e., both the upper and lower thresholds of the teachers sector, $\theta_{TH}$ and $\theta_{VT}$, decline). Thus, the quality–quantity trade-off emanates from the occupational choice of high-ability workers, whereas the government is forced (by the market) to recruit teachers with lower qualifications. This result is consistent with the empirical finding that the decline in teacher quality was primarily driven by a decrease in the proportion of the most qualified teachers, who potentially faced higher returns to their ability (see Corcoran et al., 2004; Bacolod, 2007). Accordingly, the fundamental disadvantage...
of type (b) SBTC relative to type (a) SBTC is that it entails a reduction in relative teacher quality. Illustration 5 and Proposition 10 summarize the effects of type (b) SBTC.

The corresponding simulation in Fig. 2 and the Proof of Proposition 10 are relegated to Appendix A.

Proposition 10. If type (b) SBTC occurs, then
a. The total skilled sector, the high-skilled sector and the teachers sector expand.
b. Relative teacher quality declines.26

6.3. Exogenous shifts in the tax rate22

In this section, I discuss an exogenous increase in the tax rate, \( \tau \). Within the model, all tax revenues go to education expenditures but, more in general, \( \tau \) measures the share of tax revenues used in the public education sector.23 An exogenous increase in the tax rate augments the funds for public education. To balance the educational budget (21), the government increases teacher income. Therefore, similarly to the type (a) SBTC, the quality–quantity trade-off does not occur and the quality of education rises. Proposition 11 depicts the effect on teacher quality and teacher quantity.

Proposition 11. Assume that (A5) holds and the tax rate increases. Then, the teachers sector expands, and its relative quality rises.

Proof. When the tax rate increases, \( P_T \) rises to balance Eq. (22). The increase in relative teacher quality derives from Property 2 (similar to Propositions 7(b) and 8).

6.4. Reduction in the teacher certification requirement

In this section, I discuss a reduction in the exogenous teacher certification requirement, \( e_T \).24 As a result, the learning effort required from teachers decreases (recall (A3)), and the teachers sector becomes more attractive. Therefore, the supply of teachers grows. However, because they are less talented, with a higher marginal utility from effective leisure, more vocational workers are attracted to the teaching profession than highly skilled workers (recall Property 2). Then, to balance the budget constraint (21), the government reduces teacher income. Combining these effects, because highly skilled workers are more (less) sensitive to shocks in their incomes (leisure) than vocational workers (recall Property 2), eventually the high-skilled sector expands, leaving the teachers sector with less talented candidates from the vocational sector. Accordingly, as both the upper and lower thresholds of the teachers sector (\( \theta_{lh} \) and \( \theta_{ht} \)) decline, relative teacher quality declines, and the quality–quantity trade-off occurs, as Proposition 12 summarizes. The corresponding simulation in Fig. 3 and the Proof of Proposition 12 are relegation to Appendix A.

Proposition 12. If \( e_T \) declines, then
a. The teachers sector and the high-skilled sector expand.

26 Specifying the program to the profession for high-ability agents, relative teacher quality indeed rises. The high ability of the participants compensates for their lower time investment (recall Eq. (21)). Therefore, ELCC program, if combined with eligibility conditions restores teacher quality, and the quality–quantity trade-off does not occur.27

b. Relative teacher quality declines.25

To summarize, a reduction in the cost of becoming a teacher reduces relative teacher quality because of two reasons: First, it benefits more with low-ability agents, and thus plagued by adverse selection. Second, the lower time investment damages the human capital of teachers (see Eq. (2)). Does the prediction that relative teacher quality declines contradict the observation in the United States that the relaxation of licensing requirements is typically undertaken in order to improve the teacher quality? In the following section, I demonstrate that by fairly considering the restricted access to such programs, the model’s predictions account for this observation.

7. Two pathways into teaching: formal and lower cost certification25

The analysis so far has proceeded on the assumption that there is only one pathway into teaching, the ‘formal’ teacher certification. The purpose of this section is to discuss the implications of a well-known program in the United States for teacher training called Teach For America (TFA, www.teachforamerica.org), the founder of a global program, Teach For All (www.teachforallnetwork.org), with more than 23 programs in many countries. Its prerequisites include a bachelor degree with undergraduate cumulative grade point average (GPA) of at least 2.50 on a 4.00 scale and a 3-step interview process. Then, the participants attend a short intense summer course and begin teaching by the next fall. To account for TFA, I introduce an additional pathway into teaching and demonstrate that it achieves the goal of increasing teacher quality.

Definition 8. An Exclusive lower cost teacher certification (ELCC) program is similar to the formal teacher certification program besides the following two elements: First, it requires a lower time investment in higher education. Second, only high-ability agents (who otherwise become highly skilled workers) are allowed to participate.

The introduction of an ELCC program yields the following results: Indifferent agents between high-skilled professions and formal teaching (or that slightly prefer high-skilled professions) join the ELCC program. An additional secondary effect further amplifies teacher quality. As the program requires additional budget, teacher income must decline, which pushes low-ability agents away from the teachers’ sector (A formal proof of the arguments so far is available on request). Now, I use the numerical example to determine whether relative teacher quality increases or declines.26 The simulation results demonstrate that because of the exclusivity of the program for high-ability agents, relative teacher quality indeed rises. The high ability of the participants compensates for their lower time investment (recall Eq. (21)). Therefore, ELCC program, if combined with eligibility conditions restores teacher quality, and the quality–quantity trade-off does not occur.27

25 This generalization was added thanks to an anonymous referee and provides intriguing insights.
26 Specifically, the upper graph in Fig. 3 denotes the preferences of low ability workers with a choice between formal teaching and the other sectors, and the lower graph denotes the preferences of high ability workers with the additional alternative to participate in the ELCC program.
27 This insight will not change if the model is further extended to include an option for a combined career path, that is, temporary employment as a teacher for some fraction of the working period. Actually, the TFA program requires a commitment to teach for two years, and then allows quitting. Assuming that teacher time devoted to educational activities does not pay off in the high skill labor market, it is easy to verify that in a combined career path, the total time investment, \( \tau_T = \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \mu_T \right) \), increases relative to a lifetime career in the skilled sector only (recall Eq. (7)), even for ELCC participants. Thus, in order to guarantee participation, the program must ensure that lifetime incomes of its eligible candidates relatively rise (unless they have other motivations to participate not captured in the model). Actually, while participants in the TFA program receive the same salary as other beginning teachers in the district, the program provides financial incentives to attract high-ability candidates, e.g., education awards, loan forbearance, and interest payment coverage on their current and future student loans. Moreover, their skilled income as a fraction of their working period may also increase (because the marginal productivity of time investment in higher education is decreasing), though they lose the reward to experience in both sectors.
8. Conclusion

In the United States and other advanced economies, the pupil–teacher ratio and teacher quality have declined over time. This study suggests that only certain types of SBTCs increase the income inequality within the skilled sector, thereby promote these quality–quantity trade-offs. Therefore, a drawback of these SBTCs (as opposed to SBTCs that preserve the ratio of incomes among skilled workers) is the reduction in relative teacher quality, which may have a negative feedback effect on the education quality of the subsequent generation, and thus on human capital development as a factor of economic growth. A reduction in the teacher certification requirement has similar effects, unless it is accompanied by access restrictions. While the model analyzes a one-generation period, it predicts the quality of education and the aggregate human capital in the next period based on the current occupational choices of individuals (see Eq. (1)). Thus, an intriguing issue for future research is the long-term dynamic impact of SBTCs.

The important tasks of the government in the model are to impose and collect the taxes and manage the public education system, including hiring teachers and paying their wages, as to balance the educational budget. Given that the paper focuses on the occupational choice of individuals, I leave the process by which the tax rate and the teacher certification requirement are determined outside the scope of this article. I treat them as exogenously given (similar to the existing TO models) (though I analyze the implications of exogenous shocks in their values), whereas, in fact, they depend on endogenous governmental decisions.

For example, an overall reduction in teacher time investment may be due to the optimal policy of the government to substitute teacher quality with teacher quantity in response to the rising cost of skilled workers (potentially caused by SBTC). This may have occurred in California and in several developing countries (see Jepsen and Rivkin, 2002; UNESCO, 2006). Note that the analysis suggests that policy intervention can be designed to mitigate the trend of declining teacher quality through encouraging more linear (as opposed to exponential) increases in the returns to ability by upgrading the quality of public education, supporting a division of low-ability workers to SBTCs, driving technological changes in low-ability sectors, or implementing exclusive lower certification cost programs for teacher training, similar to ‘Teach for America’. Clearly, the role of the government includes the regulation, organization and implementation of such programs to the extent they comply with its objective function.

A key contribution of the model is the introduction of disutility from higher education (non-pecuniary cost) so that individuals directly ‘pay’ for higher education with a loss of leisure during youth. Moreover, I assume that the disutility diminishes with the ability level, because for highly talented agents it is less costly to study (Spence, 1973). As a result, a desirable feature of the model is that the teachers’ sector is endogenously located between highly skilled workers and vocational workers, who avoid becoming teachers. The model generates a variety of sectors within a simplified one-dimensional heterogeneity framework. This unique division helps grasp the essential features in SBTCs that lead to quality–quantity trade-offs. Another implication of the comparative advantage assumption is that a reduction in the cost of becoming a teacher adversely selects low-ability agents to the teachers’ sector unless access restrictions are imposed. As long as this common-knowledge assumption basically holds, other mechanisms can generate the results as well. For example, the disutility from higher education may arise in the form of forgone labor time (instead of leisure time) during college.

Appendix A

**Proposition 1 and Property 1—intuition**

Skilled workers are compensated for higher ability through larger incomes, while teachers are compensated through lower effective effort (recall Corollary 1). When the ability of highly skilled workers increases, the marginal utility derived from enlaraging their incomes as skilled workers more than offsets the increase in their effective leisure as teachers. This occurs because their effective leisure as teachers (recall (A3)), which is already high, is bounded by 1. Nonetheless, their skilled incomes are unbounded and thus increase more substantially \(l_T \sim \theta \sim \phi \sim \delta \sim \omega \sim \text{recall Eqs. (10)(11)}\). As a result, highly skilled workers prefer skilled professions rather than teaching. However, when the ability of low-talented workers decreases, the decline in their skilled incomes is negligible relative to the increase in their learning effort as teachers. Specifically, for sufficiently low-ability workers \(l_T \sim \theta \sim \phi \sim \delta \sim \omega \sim \text{asymptotically} 0 \sim \text{recall Eqs. (10)(11)}\). They are also above \(\theta_i \sim \phi_i \sim \delta_i \sim \omega \sim \text{asymptotically} \).

**Proof of Proposition 2—consistency of preferences**

If \(\theta_T \geq \theta_V\), the vocational sector exists and agents \(\theta_T, \theta_V\) are the threshold levels between the vocational sector, the teachers sector and the unskilled sector. In this case, agents above \(\theta_T\) prefer teaching rather than vocational professions: \(T \succ V\). They are also above \(\theta_V\), and hence prefer vocational rather than unskilled professions \(V \succ U\). Therefore, they prefer teaching rather than both vocational and unskilled professions: \(T \succ V, V \succ U \succ T\). Agents below \(\theta_T\) prefer to become unskilled rather than vocational workers and teachers, since \(U \succ V, V \succ T \succ U\). Agents with abilities \(\theta_T \sim \theta_V\) prefer to become vocational workers rather than being teachers or unskilled. However, if \(\theta_T \sim \theta_V\), there is no vocational sector, since all

---

28 Note that the model ignores the likely increase in the demand for schooling and enrollment as a response to SBTC. As I focus on OECD countries and especially the United States, with high enrollment rates, I assume that all children attain a similar level of compulsory public education, in line with the theoretical literature (see e.g., Loury, 1981; Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Vaene and Zilcha, 2002). Recall that the empirical evidence on the declining pupil-teacher ratio is valid despite the ups and downs in the enrollment dynamics (see Table 1).

29 In fact, the numerical example indicates that type (b) SBTC increases the absolute teacher quality even though the relative teacher quality declines. This may call for the introduction of relative teacher quality in theoretical production functions of public education similar to the empirical studies, instead of the common use in absolute teacher quality; Note that the framework of analysis developed here is suitable to examine the spillover of income inequality and relative teacher quality across countries. For example, in the presence of imperfect technological diffusion, the income inequality among technological leaders is likely to be higher and relative teacher quality is likely to be lower than among followers.

30 In a political dynamic equilibrium framework, Hatsor (2008) assumes, more realistically, that the budget authority determines the tax rate according to the widely used criterion of majority voting (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1992; Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1993). Then, the public education agency allocates the educational budget. She compares an inefficient education agency which equates teacher quality to the population mean, similarly to Eckstein and Zilcha (1994), with the one that maximizes the quality of education subject to the budget constraint. The study highlights the implications of existing inefficiencies on growth, the income inequality and welfare and provides a possible answer to why educational expenditures seem to be unrelated to educational achievements according to the empirical evidence (see discussion about budgetary and allocation decisions in section 2.6 there).
agents prefer other sectors rather than the vocational sector: Agents above \( \theta_{VT} \) prefer teaching rather than both vocational and unskilled professions since \( T > V \), \( V > U \rightarrow T > U \). Agents below \( \theta_{VT} \) prefer to become unskilled rather than vocational and skilled workers, since \( U > V \), \( V > T \rightarrow U > T \). Additionally, agents between \( \theta_{VT} \), \( \theta_{UV} \) do not desire to become vocational workers, since \( U > V \), \( V > T \). In this case, agent \( \theta_{VT} \) is the threshold level between the unskilled sector and the teachers sector, such that \( \theta_{VT} < \theta_{VT} < \theta_{UV} \).

Proof of Proposition 3. I prove by 3 steps that there is at least one feasible set of \( \{P_s, 0, P_s, 0, P_s, 0\} \) that clears the labor market:\(^{33}\) Step (a) combines the equations of labor supply, the educational budget constraint and the labor demand of firms; Step (b) characterizes the proportions of sectors according to the combined labor supply and educational budget; Step (c) intersects these results with the combined labor demand and educational budget and proves that the market can clear due to continuity considerations.

a. First, I intersect the labor supply equations with the educational budget constraint and the labor demand. In particular, I substitute the labor supply (13) in the educational budget constraint (21) to obtain:

\[
\mathcal{R}_s \mathcal{P}_s = \pi_1 \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) P_t \left( u_s \right) \left( \theta_{VT} \right) jk = TH \cdot VT
\]

(22)

When the vocational sector exists, substituting the labor supply (14) in the demand Eq. (19) obtains:

\[
\left( \mathcal{R}_s \right)^{\alpha-\phi-1} \left( P_t \right)^{1-\tau} \left( \theta_{UV} \right)^{\beta-\lambda} = \frac{1}{\pi_1 (1-\tau)}
\]

(23)

In case the vocational sector does not exist, multiplying the labor supply (13) in Eq. (15) and substituting in the demand Eq. (19) yields:

\[
\left( \mathcal{R}_s \right)^{\alpha-\phi-1} \left( P_t \right)^{1-\tau} \left( \theta_{VT} - \theta_{VT} \right)^{\beta-\lambda} = \frac{1}{\pi_1 (1-\tau)}
\]

(24)

Then, substituting \( P_s = 1 - P_t - P_V \) in Eq. (22) yields:

\[
P_t = P_s \left( 1 - P_t - P_V \right)
\]

(25)

where \( P_s = \pi_3 \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \mathcal{R}_s \left( \theta_{VT} \right) + \mathcal{N}_s \) and \( jk = TH \cdot VT \)

If the vocational sector exists, \( jk = VT \); if the high-skilled sector exists, \( jk = TH \); if both sectors exist, \( jk = TH \cdot VT \).

b. Second, I characterize the proportions of sectors, using Eq. (25) , \( 0 < \pi_s < 1 \) , \( P_s = 1 - P_t - P_V \), and Eq. (22) \(^{34}\):

\[
\begin{cases}
1 > P_t > 0, & \text{if } P_U = 0 \\
1 > P_V > 0, & \text{if } 1 > P_t > 0 \\
P_t = 0, & \text{if } P_U = 1 \\
P_V = 0, & \text{if } P_U = 0
\end{cases}
\]

(26)

c. To clear the labor market, I intersect supply, educational budget and labor demand. Specifically, I substitute the proportions of sectors given in Eq. (26) in the LHS of Eqs. (23)–(24) to obtain:

\[
\begin{cases}
\text{LHS}(22) = 0, & \text{LHS}(23) = 0, \text{if } P_U = 0 \\
\text{LHS}(22) > 0, & \text{LHS}(23) > 0, \text{if } 1 > P_t > 0 \\
\text{LHS}(22) = \infty, & \text{LHS}(23) = \infty, \text{if } P_U = 1
\end{cases}
\]

(27)

To complete the proof, note that the RHS of Eqs. (23)–(24) is always positive. Therefore, at least one intersection must occur with the LHS due to continuity.

Proof of Proposition 4. Along the labor supply, when the relative wage of skilled workers, \( \frac{P_s}{P_t} \), increases, their relative supply, \( \frac{P_s}{P_t} \), grows. As \( \theta_{VT} \) decreases (see Eqs. (14) and (15)), \( \mathcal{N}_s \) declines. Nevertheless, it is easy to verify using Eq. (9) that \( P_s \mathcal{R}_s \) increases.

\[
p_s \mathcal{R}_s = P_s \left( \frac{P_s}{P_t} \mathcal{R}_s \right) + P_s \mathcal{N}_s = n \left( \frac{\theta_{VT} - \theta_{VT}}{\theta_{VT} - \theta_{VT}} \right) \left( \frac{1}{\theta_{VT} - \theta_{VT}} \right) \theta_{VT} \theta_{VT} \mathcal{R}_s
\]

(28)

Thus, \( P_s \mathcal{R}_s = \left( \frac{\pi_3}{\pi_1} \right) \mathcal{R}_s \left( \theta_{VT} - \theta_{VT} \right) \theta_{VT} \theta_{VT} \mathcal{R}_s \)

Rewriting the labor demand (19) yields:

\[
\mathcal{W}_s = \left( \frac{\pi_3}{\pi_1} \right) \mathcal{R}_s \left( \theta_{VT} - \theta_{VT} \right) \theta_{VT} \theta_{VT} \mathcal{R}_s
\]

(29)

Along the labor supply, the RHS of Eq. (29) is monotonically decreasing in \( \frac{P_s}{P_t} \). Therefore, there is one intersection between the labor supply and demand, and \( \frac{P_s}{P_t} \) that clears the market is unique.

Proposition 5—assumptions. (Note that these assumptions do not contradict the previous ones)

\( A6 \). \( \alpha^* \geq \delta \geq \alpha \), where \( \theta^* = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( 1 + \frac{\theta}{\theta^*} \right) \theta^* \) and \( \theta^* = \theta \).

\( A7 \). Public education is sufficiently large, i.e., \( E < \left( \frac{2}{\delta} - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) \left( \frac{2}{\delta} - \frac{1}{\alpha} \right) \frac{\alpha}{\delta^2} \frac{1}{\delta} \frac{1}{\delta} \) where

\[
\begin{align*}
\chi &= \theta \alpha (1-\alpha) \left( \frac{1-\tau}{\tau} \right) \\
I &= \left( \frac{\mu + \phi \mu}{\mu \phi \mu + \phi \mu} \right) ^{\frac{\alpha}{\delta}} \left( 1 - \frac{\tau}{\tau} \right) \\
F &= \left( \frac{\mu + \phi \mu}{\mu \phi \mu + \phi \mu} \right) ^{\frac{\alpha}{\delta}} \left( 1 - \frac{\tau}{\tau} \right)
\end{align*}
\]

(A8). The net productivity augmentation of skilled labor, \( \sigma - \phi \), the returns to ability, \( \alpha \), and the returns to time investment in higher education, \( \beta \), are sufficiently large, such that \( \sigma - \phi - \frac{1}{1-\tau} \frac{\alpha}{\delta} \). In this case, \( \chi - \beta > 0 \), and hence (A7) does not contradict (A8).

(A9). Effective effort is costly, i.e., \( Z > \frac{1}{\tau} \left( 1 + \frac{\theta}{\theta} \right) \left( 1 + \frac{\theta}{\theta} \right) \).
skilled sector is sufficiently attractive: If the quality of public education; the net productivity augmentation of skilled labor; the intensity of ability; and the intensity of the time investment in higher education are sufficiently large, then incomes in the skilled sector are relatively amplified. Moreover, assumption (A9) guarantees that the vocational sector exists, as it posits that the effective effort is sufficiently costly. In this case, the marginal utility from effective leisure increases. As a result, for low-ability workers, the teachers sector (with the exogenously given time investment in higher education) becomes less attractive relative to the vocational sector (in which they can optimally alleviate their learning effort; recall Eq. (7)). Moreover, as \( Z \) rises, skilled workers become cheaper to firms relative to unskilled workers (because they reduce their time investment in higher education (recall Eq. (7)). Thus, the relative demand for vocational workers increases at the expense of unskilled workers. A weaker secondary effect is that the supply of vocational workers declines relative to the supply of unskilled workers (see Eq. (14)).

**Proof of Proposition 5.**

**a.** Let us assume by contradiction that the high-skilled sector does not exist in equilibrium, i.e., \( P_S = 0 \). Since the skilled sector exists in equilibrium (see Proposition 4), it is composed of vocational workers only, i.e., \( P_S = P_V \). Additionally, \( P_V = 0 \) implies that agent \( \bar{\theta} \) prefers teaching rather than high-skilled professions. Therefore, using a monotonic transformation of Eq. (6), I obtain:

\[
u^U(\bar{\theta}) = \left(1 - (1 - \gamma) w_S(\bar{\theta})^{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\beta} \left(1 - \frac{\theta f}{\bar{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu^U(\bar{\theta}) \equiv \left( - (1 - \gamma) w_S(\bar{\theta})^{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\beta} \theta^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{30}\]

Using Eq. (9), the skilled quality equals

\[
\bar{\theta}_S = \bar{\theta}(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \tag{31}
\]

where \( \bar{\theta}(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \) is the mean of \( (\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \) for all skilled workers. Substituting in Eq. (30) and rearranging obtains

\[
\left( \frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{\theta} - Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{P_S}{P_V} \right)^{\frac{\beta + \lambda}{\beta}} \left( \frac{\frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b}}{1 - (1 - \gamma) w_S(\bar{\theta})^{\eta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{32}\]

Now, I prove that inequality (32) does not hold. Since \( Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} > 0 \), then \( \bar{\theta} > \bar{\theta}_{\ell} \). Moreover, using assumption (A5), \( P_S = P_V \) and \( \bar{\theta} > \theta_{\ell} \) (see Eq. (13)), then

\[
\frac{P_S}{P_V} = \frac{P_S}{P_V} > 1 \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{\theta} > \theta_{\ell} \tag{33}\]

Further, since \( P_S = P_V \), all skilled workers are below \( \theta_{\ell} \), and as \( \bar{\theta} > \theta_{\ell} \) (see Eq. (13)) they are below \( \bar{\theta} \). As a result,

\[
(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} < (\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \tag{34}\]

Using inequalities (33)–(34), the LHS of inequality (32) is bounded by

\[
\left( \frac{\bar{\theta}}{\bar{\theta} - Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{P_S}{P_V} \right)^{\frac{\beta + \lambda}{\beta}} \left( \frac{\frac{\nu}{\bar{\theta}}}{(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda}} \right) \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{35}\]

Inserting the lower bound of \( \nu \), given in assumption (A6)

\[
(\theta^U_{\ell})^\frac{1}{\eta} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \left(1 - (1 - \gamma) w_S(\bar{\theta})^{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \geq \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \left(1 - (1 - \gamma) w_S(\bar{\theta})^{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{36}\]

This contradicts inequality (32). Thus, the most talented worker, \( \bar{\theta} \), prefers high-skilled professions rather than teaching. Hence, the high-skilled sector exists.

**b.** According to Corollary 2, all agents \( \bar{\theta}, \bar{\theta} \), where \( \bar{\theta} = Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} \), are incompatible for teaching. Thus, they are vocational or unskilled workers. For \( Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} > 1 \) (under assumption (A9)), this set is not empty (recall that \( \theta = 1 \)). Assume by contradiction that the vocational sector does not exist in equilibrium, i.e., \( P_V = 0 \). Since the skilled sector exists in equilibrium (see Proposition 4), it is composed of highly skilled workers only, i.e., \( P_S = P_{S}\bar{\theta} \). Another implication of \( P_V = 0 \) is that the utility of agent \( \bar{\theta} \) is larger as an unskilled worker than as a vocational worker. Substituting Eq. (9) in Eq. (6),

\[
u^U(\bar{\theta}) = \left(1 - (1 - \gamma) w_S(\bar{\theta})^{\eta} \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \theta^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{37}\]

Substituting the total demand for skilled relative to unskilled workers, Eq. (19), and \( \theta = Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} \) obtains

\[
\frac{1}{(\bar{\theta})^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \left( \frac{P_S}{P_V} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}}} > \left( \frac{P_V}{P_S} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\beta}} > \left( \frac{\delta^b}{1 + \phi} \right)^{\beta \mu} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{38}\]

Inserting Eq. (31) in inequality (35), derives:

\[
\left( \frac{P_S}{P_V} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\beta}} \left( \frac{\delta^b}{1 + \phi} \right)^{\beta \mu} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{39}\]

Now, I prove that inequality (36) does not hold. Since all workers are below \( \bar{\theta} \) and the returns to skilled quality is decreasing in production, \( 1 + \phi - \alpha > 0 \) (recall Eq. (16)),

\[
(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} < (\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \tag{40}\]

Using assumption (A5), \( P_S = P_{V\theta} \theta_{V\theta} > \bar{\theta} \) (see Eq. (13)) and \( \theta_{V\theta} > Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} \) (see Corollary 2), derives

\[
\frac{P_S}{P_V} = \frac{P_S}{P_V} > \theta_{V\theta} - Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} \tag{41}\]

Using inequalities (37) and (38), the LHS of inequality (36) is bounded by

\[
\left( \frac{P_S}{P_V} \right)^{1 - \frac{1}{\beta}} \left( \frac{\delta^b}{1 + \phi} \right)^{\beta \mu} \left( \frac{\mu}{\mu + \delta^b} \right)^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \nu(\bar{\theta}) \tag{42}\]

Inserting the upper bound of \( \bar{\theta} \), given in assumption (A6)

\[
(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} < (\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \tag{43}\]

Substituting \( \bar{\theta} \) in inequality (36) and assuming \( \bar{\theta} \), given in Eq. (12) yields

\[
(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} < (\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \tag{44}\]

Under assumption (A7), we derive

\[
(\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} < (\bar{\theta})^{\beta + \lambda} \tag{45}\]

This contradicts inequality (36). Thus, agent \( \bar{\theta} = Z\bar{\theta}_{\ell} \) prefers vocational jobs rather than unskilled jobs and teaching. Hence, the
Fig. 1. The effect of type (a) SBTC—an increase in the net productivity augmentation of skilled labor (recall Eq. (16)).

Fig. 2. The effect of type (b) SBTC—an increase in the intensity of ability.

Fig. 3. The effect of reduction in the time investment of teachers in higher education, $e_T$. 
vocational sector exists. Note that assumption (A8) guarantees that as Z or e increase, the RHS in assumption (A7) decreases. Thus, assumptions (A7) and (A9) co-exist. 

c. Under assumption (A6), the high-skilled sector and the vocational sector co-exist for $\frac{\theta}{\mu} \geq 0$ in the range:

$$\frac{\mu}{\theta} = \left[1 + \left(\frac{\tau}{1-\tau}\right)\left(1 + \frac{\beta \gamma}{\mu} \right) Z e_t \right].$$

(39)

This set of $\frac{\theta}{\mu}$ is not empty for sufficiently large Z, defined in assumption (A9). Note that assumption (A8) guarantees that as Z increases, the RHS of assumption (A7) decreases. Thus, assumption (A7) is compatible with assumption (A9).

Proof of Proposition 6. Since unskilled workers choose not to invest at all in their higher education, and thus enjoy the maximum level of leisure, the other sectors must be compensated by larger incomes than in the unskilled sector. If the vocational sector exists, combining Eqs. (13) and (14) yields:

$$y_U = (1-\tau)\left(\frac{\theta_t}{\theta_T}\right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}} \left(\frac{\theta_T - Z e_T}{\theta_T}\right)^{\frac{1}{\lambda}}, \text{ where } \theta_T > Z e_T \text{ and } \theta_T > \theta_{TV} \quad (40)$$

It is easy to verify that the RHS is lower than 1. In addition, if the vocational sector does not exist, it is easy to see that the RHS of Eq. (15) is lower than 1. For $\lambda = 0$, the Argmin ability equals $\theta_t = \left(\frac{\mu}{\gamma}\right) Z e_T$ (recall Eq. (12)). Note that workers with the Argmin ability are teachers. Workers with the Argmin ability have the highest utility from teaching relative to skilled professions. Thus, if workers with the Argmin ability are reluctant to become teachers, the teachers sector is empty. Though, if they were obligated to become skilled workers, their optimal time investment in higher education would be identical to the time investment of teachers, i.e., $e_T (\theta_t) = e_T$ (recall Eq. (7)). Accordingly, highly skilled workers, who are more talented than $\theta_t$, spend more time on higher education than teachers, whereas vocational workers with lower ability than $\theta_t$, spend less time on higher education than teachers. Now, the skilled incomes relative to teachers are derived easily. Since highly skilled workers (teachers) invest more time than teachers (vocational workers) in higher education, they must be compensated by relatively higher incomes. In the presence of $\lambda > 0$, it is easy to verify from Eq. (12) that $\theta_t = \text{Argmin of } \left(\frac{\theta_t}{\mu}\right)$ is lower than $\theta_t$. Similarly, workers with the Argmin ability $\theta_t$ are teachers. Also note that $e_T (\theta_t) = e_T$ for all $\lambda$, since the optimal time allocation in the skilled sector does not depend on $\lambda$ (recall Eq. (7)). As a result, skilled workers who are less talented than $\theta_t$, have lower ability than $\theta_t$. Therefore, similar to the case of $\lambda = 0$, they spend less time on higher education and have lower incomes than teachers. Moreover, workers with higher ability than $\theta_t$, but lower ability than $\theta_t$, i.e., with $e_T > e_T$, may also become vocational workers.

Proof of Proposition 7 (see also Fig. 1).

a. It is easy to verify from the equilibrium Eqs. (22)–(23) that both the skilled sector and the teachers’ sector expand: Under type (a)(i) SBTC, both $p_1$ and $p_h$ increase by the same factor (recall Eqs. (2) and (11)), thereby Eq. (22) does not change (because the educational budget and skilled income increase by the same factor). However, $\frac{p_h}{p_1}$ rises in Eq. (23), which occurs also under type (a)(ii) SBTC. Thus, under each one of these shocks, to balance Eq. (23), $\theta_{TV}$ declines thereby $p_T$ rises. The decline in $\theta_{TV}$ further implies an increase in $p_T p_F$ (recall Eq. (28)). Now, in order to balance Eq. (22), $P_T$ increases.

b. This part emanates from the increase in $P_T$ and $p_S$. $P_T$ increases if and only if $\theta_{TV}$ rises and $\theta_{TV}$ declines, i.e., the teachers’ sector pushes both the high-skilled and the vocational sector (recall Eqs. (11) and (13), and note that the graph $\frac{dy}{d\theta_T}$ does not shift under type (a) SBTC). Because $\theta_{TV}$ rises, the high-skilled sector shrinks. Thus, the increase in the total skilled sector occurs through an increase in the vocational sector towards the unskilled sector.

Proof of Proposition 9. It is easy to verify from the equilibrium Eqs. (22) and (24) that both the skilled sector and the teachers’ sector expand: Most of the proof is similar to Proposition 7(a) (referring to Eq. (24) instead of Eq. (23)). Because $\frac{p_h}{p_1}$ rises, to balance Eq. (24), $\theta_{TV}$ or $\theta_{TV}$ declines. It is easy to verify that both $P_S$ and $P_T$ increase, and thus both $\theta_{TV}$ and $\theta_{TV}$ decline (otherwise Eq. (22) does not hold). Thus, the relative teacher quality declines.

Definition 6. Consider two income distributions represented by the random variables X and W. X is more equal than W if the Lorenz curve corresponding to X is everywhere above that of W. Thus, if X is more equal than W, it has a lower Gini coefficient. According to Atkinson (1970), a larger Lorenz curve is equivalent to second-degree stochastic dominance.

Proof of Proposition 10 (see also Fig. 2).

a. When $\lambda$ increases, $\frac{p_h}{p_1}$ increases (recall Eq. (21)). Thus, to balance Eq. (23), $\theta_{TV}$ declines thereby $p_T$ rises. In Eq. (22), when $\lambda$ increases, then $\frac{p_h}{p_1} (\theta_{TV})$ and $\frac{p_h}{p_1}$ increase. Now, in order to balance Eq. (22), for $k = TH, \theta_{TV}$ declines thereby $p_T$ rises. As $\frac{p_h}{p_1} (\theta_{TV})$ moderately increases, then to balance Eq. (22) for $k = VT, \theta_{TV}$ declines. Combining the effects, the educational budget rises thereby $P_T$ rises.

b. Relative teacher quality declines because both $\theta_{TV}$ and $\theta_{TV}$ decline.

Proof of Proposition 12 (see also Fig. 3).

a. When $e_T$ declines, $\frac{p_h}{p_1} (\theta_{TV})$ (see Eq. (11)) declines, thereby $P_T$ increases. To balance the budget constraint, teacher income declines. The increase in the high-skilled sector (i.e., $\theta_{TV}$ declines) derives from its higher (lower) sensitivity to income (leisure) changes relative to the vocational sector, according to Property 2 ($\frac{d y}{d \theta_T}$ declines and shifts to the left). Thus, the teachers’ sector increases towards the vocational sector, i.e., $\theta_{TV}$ declines.

b. Relative teacher quality declines as teachers shift to the lower end of the distribution ($\theta_{TV}$ and $\theta_{TV}$ decline).

References


55 On the one hand, if $\theta_{TV}$ declines, then $P_S$ rises. The decline in $\theta_{TV}$ further implies an increase in, $p_h p_T - p_h p_T = \left(\frac{d y}{d \theta_T}\right) \int_{\theta_T}^{\theta_{TV}} d\theta$. Now, in order to balance Eq. (22), $P_T$ must increase thereby $\theta_{TV}$ declines. On the other hand, if $\theta_{TV}$ declines, then $P_T$ rises. In order to balance Eq. (22), $p_h p_T$ must increase, which occurs through a decline in $\theta_{TV}$ thereby $P_T$ rises.