

Patrick O'Heffernan

A Mutual Exploitation Model of Media Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy

Overview

In 1963 Bernard Cohen concluded from his research that news organizations were to a significant degree the handmaidens of government when it came to foreign policy. The Gulf War offers an excellent opportunity to update this theory—born in an era of print journalism—to match the realities of global, instantaneous television.

Cohen's unit of analysis was the interaction between reporters and their sources, an appropriate focus at a time when both the foreign policy and foreign affairs news communities were part of the same small, congenial Washington establishment. Cohen depicted a symbiotic media-government relationship, with the press as a usually helpful partner in the policy process, advising policy-makers through quiet conversations and reasoned editorials in elite newspapers. He found this relationship understandable because he saw minimal public interest in foreign affairs at the time and few actors outside of Washington and New York power circles.

Critics both in and out of the media and media studies dispute this view now, arguing that the media are either tactically overwhelmed by the public-relations staffs and "spin doctors" at the White House, the Department of Defense, and in congressional offices, or that they are structurally incapable of playing a truly and intelligently critical "loyal opposition" role in American governance. These critiques were especially sharp from within the media itself after the Gulf War and extended to preparations for coverage of the 1992 elections.¹

But is this true? Are news organizations at a disadvantage when covering politics, wars, and government activities? Has the commercial nature of the American media so distorted its journalistic integrity that it is incapable of providing facts that lower ratings or investigative reporting that draws the ire of popular presidents and provokes boycotts from ad-

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vertisers? Certainly case studies and content analysis can and have been employed to demonstrate the temerity of the nation's news organizations in face of government intimidation, dissembling, and pressure. But when closely questioned, those in government describe a deeper dynamic within the media-government relationship that cannot be satisfied by a simple bi-polar competition theory based on a contest between reporters' desire for truth and governments' desire for support. In the minds of policy-makers, the reporter-source dynamic of Cohen's day has given way to a multilevel, multidimensional set of evolving, interlocking, and sometimes contradictory relationships.

A picture of these relationships does not emerge readily from case and content studies, but rather requires plumbing the perceptions of those engaged in the relationships themselves. Those perceptions, when joined with evidence from other studies, point to a complex, interdependent media-government relationship best characterized as one of "interdependent mutual exploitation."

This chapter describes the findings and conclusions of two studies of the perceptions of senior U.S. and European officials involved in the making of defense and foreign policy, of the role of the mass media in the U.S. foreign policy process. The first study was based on interviews prior to the Gulf War with American and (then) Soviet policy-makers plus earlier survey data of American foreign policy officials.² The second, conducted during and just after the Gulf War, involved interviews with American military and civilian security-policy officials, and European military leaders based at SHAPE and NATO.³

Results from both studies indicate that those involved in the policy-making, especially security policy, on both a day-to-day and a strategic basis, view media-government relations as interdependent and mutually exploitive, but not necessarily symbiotic, as Cohen and others have described. The interviews from both studies probed deeply the perception of the relationship between government and media; the later study focused on questions raised by the ongoing Gulf War.

Mutual Exploitation

The fraternal, mutually respectful reporters and sources Cohen described have been replaced by two distinct global institutions—the worldwide U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic community, and the global media industry. Both organizations promote their own version of reality around the world; the foreign policy apparatus does so to serve its own policy interests; the media do so because that is what they do. Both

are adept at supporting, manipulating, or attacking the other. The relationship is sometimes competitive and sometimes cooperative, but that is only incidental to its central driving force: self-interest.

In this model, the mass media and foreign policy institutions around the world have grown up together, each utilizing the other and learning how to better utilize the other in a dynamic, unending process.⁴ This model does not see the cooperative symbiosis of a "subtly composite unity" but a dynamic of two very desegregated, aggressive ecosystems constantly bargaining over a series of "wants" while they manipulate both the structure and output of the other for their own advantage. Sometimes the result is mutually beneficial and sometimes it is not.

This model recognizes that entertainment is actually 80 to 85 percent of all media organizations' output and is an even larger share of their income and profits. As a result, regulatory and opportunistic considerations involving entertainment are often the principal "wants" of media corporations in the ongoing bargaining within the government-media relationship. It also recognizes that media trade organizations continually try to influence the actions of government, especially at the FCC and congressional level, and that government continually tries to influence the outputs of news organizations, particularly at the Washington news bureau level. The result is not an equilibrium, but a constant evolution of the relationship, with the balance of influence changing continually depending upon the issue examined and the point in time of the examination.⁵

Most analysts have overlooked the undercutting impact of the mass media's entertainment outputs on the U.S. foreign policy and domestic policy establishment because the analysts focus primarily on news, which takes up less than 20 percent of the mass media's time and resource use. The entertainment outputs instill perceptions, values, and expectations in the public that are sometimes counter to those promulgated by government.⁶

The findings of the research reveal that security policy-makers perceive the media and government in terms of a co-evolutionary mutual exploitation model which sees a significant element of policy-making involved in using and influencing the media.⁷ Policy-makers interviewed perceived that policy-making cannot be done without news organizations and that news organizations cannot cover international affairs without government congruence (but not necessarily cooperation). The media today were seen by the policy-makers interviewed as *part of the policy process*, and that the government has become and must remain part of the media process. The Gulf War was a dramatic example

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of this mutual exploitation, in which each side tried to control the other and extract what it wanted for its own benefit.

The Television War

Audiences around the world were transfixed by images of a modern technological war as it happened live from the "enemy side." Reporters, generals, and diplomats in the Middle East answered on-air questions from callers around the world while missiles whistled overhead in Jerusalem, Riyadh, and Baghdad. Politicians and ordinary people found that television set the pace of their lives; it determined when they slept, ate, and worked because they could not stop "watching the war." The coverage of the Gulf War was both a metaphor for the medium's role in policy, and a harbinger of what was to come in later event coverage, such as the 1992 American presidential election: it provided vital information and great entertainment, and the line between the two often disappeared. As long as the information supported government policy and was useful to its action, and as long as the entertainment drew audiences that could be sold to advertisers, both parties benefited.

But television coverage of the Gulf War triggered an international debate about the mass media's involvement in the foreign policy of the United States and other nations. President Bush and political conservatives in the United States railed against *Peter Arnett's* broadcasts from Iraq, with Arnett virtually being accused of treason by U.S. Senator Alan Simpson (R.-Wyo.). Media organizations protested against censorship, intimidation, and outright disinformation from the coalition briefer (O'Heffernan 1991b). If both the media and the government benefited from the war's coverage—that is, were able to exploit each other—why the controversy? The answer appears to be that both sides seem to take the benefits of the relationship for granted but rail against the burdens and position themselves to increase their share of benefits at the other's expense in future conflicts.

Following the war, the debate on the media and their influence on or support of policy quickly narrowed to a negotiation on the degree of military restrictions that could be imposed on reporting during wartime—the rules of exploitation. The Radio and Television News Directors Association and representatives of broadcasters squared off with the Pentagon to develop ground rules after much discussion in news columns, conferences, and testy meetings.⁸ Lost in this debate over the details of permission slips was the larger void of widely available analysis of the four decades of policy that had incrementally created the conditions

for the war and the mass media's inability to raise the salience of the issue with the public before force was necessary.

Mutual Exploitation: Policy-Makers' Perceptions

Throughout the war and its regulatory and self-critical aftermath, the question of the relationship between the media and the government, especially in foreign policy matters, was raised in many forms, but a few questions dominated the discussion: should the nation's news organizations support the government in any military endeavor, or is the media's role one of a neutral observer; should the nation's news organizations remain at arm's length from the government in foreign policy matters, or should they try to influence government action; does the government control or influence the media, and should it do so during battle? The existing models could not address these questions because they assumed two distinct entities either in competition or in collusion, models that did not fit the observations.

One way to probe the actual media-government relationship is to examine the perceptions of the actors in the relationship by using interview research (Rosati 1984). Illumination of the paradigm within which the players operated may explain some of the controversies and disagreements between the foreign policy establishment and the media. A team from Georgia Tech initiated a series of interviews of senior foreign policy and defense officials during the Gulf War, probing their responses to the coverage, their consumption of media, and their internal paradigm of the media-government relationship and of the impact of media on their paradigm of national security. This followed an earlier set of interviews with journalists and officials in the United States and the former Soviet Union probing the same questions in the context of U.S.-Soviet relations.

When data from both sets of studies were examined together, the mutual exploitation theme quickly emerged.⁹ Both sets of actors acknowledged attempting to use, or using, the other. Both sets of actors could readily detail incidents in which media and government exploited each other with policy impacts, and both sets of actors described their perception of the relationship as one of both sides using each other for their own benefit.¹⁰ The questions asked focused on the following points:

- Did the Gulf War coverage change policy-makers' perception of the use of the media in the policy process?

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- Did the Gulf War coverage change their perception of the media's impact on public opinion and the decisions of other nations' governments?
- Did the Gulf War coverage affect how policy-makers used the media?

Did the Gulf War coverage change policy-makers' perception of the use of the media in the policy process?

While this specific question was not asked in the two studies used, policy-makers use of the media, their perception of its usefulness, and their ranking of various media by their utility were probed, and the responses can provide insight into their perception of the mass media as a tool available to foreign policy elites. In terms of policy-maker perception of the media as a useful source of information, the Gulf War reinforced perceptions found to exist prior to the war.

Eighty-seven percent of the interview respondents could recall cases when the media were the only source of information available for decision-making, and 65 percent agreed that the media were frequently the fastest source of information for policy-making. This was true in both the prewar study and the study conducted during the Gulf War. Policy-makers perceived that the media played distinctive, active roles in the setting of policy agendas, determining the information environments in which policy is made, and providing a "front channel" of diplomatic communication outside of routine diplomacy. During the Gulf War, both military and civilian policy-makers complained that the media were in fact diplomatic communication instruments operating out of control. But they also admitted that they themselves used the media for various purposes, including diplomatic communication.

A majority, 63 percent, of the policy personnel interviewed prior to the War indicated that the media were frequently the most rapid source of information in crisis situations. Many told of earlier situations, like the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in the Middle East, in which the media were the only source of information at the beginning of a crisis. Virtually all of those interviewed before and during the Gulf War offered an anecdote or observation from their personal involvement on the utility of the media in a crisis.

Eighty-seven percent of those interviewed prior to the war could recall situations wherein the media were the only source of information for policy-making in fast-breaking crisis or terrorist incidents. If anything, this perception was strengthened by the Gulf War and the war's

TABLE 1. Policy-Maker Use of Media Over Time

Time Spent with Media to Gain Information	1991 ¹	1988 ² (Percent of Sample)	1984-85 ³
2 hours or more per day	54	27	15
1-2 hours per day	30	43	27
Less than 1 hour per day	5	30	53

1. N = 35; interviews January-February 1991.

2. N = 25.

3. N = 93; written survey with response of 900 senior policy-makers; 93 responses were isolated as foreign policy decision-makers and tabulated.

coverage in the mass media (see table 1 on policy-maker use of the media over time). The post-Gulf interviews also revealed that policy-makers saw nothing unusual about using the media as a communication instrument to address other national leaders and populations. While the earlier research indicated that policy-makers recognized this media role as possible and as occasionally used by heads of state, the post-Gulf respondents demonstrated an attitude that this was routine and expected.

This was true equally in SHAPE and NATO headquarters, the Pentagon and the State Department, and in the offices of a (former) Communist Party Central Committee member and (former) high-level Soviet policy-makers. Many volunteered statements such as that by Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) General John Galvin, who said during the war: "Today the first indication sometimes—sometimes, I would underline—that guides intelligence and reconnaissance and acquisition of information is something that appears on television." Television is also not a purely American habit. Captain Ulrich Frike of the German Navy, assistant to the chief of staff of NATO's Military Committee said: "Today, under the present circumstances, I'm probably looking at TV for 4-6 hours a day. . . . I have to monitor the media. . . . we get the most up-to-date information by TV, so that's the first source. . . ."

Did the Gulf War change policy-makers' perception of the influence of mass media on world events and world politics?

Did the Gulf War coverage change policy-makers' perception of the media's role in influencing public opinion and input into foreign policy decisions?

While the prewar research did not ask these questions, the 1991 interviews did ask them and the results were overwhelmingly positive, although with warnings and qualifications. Policy-makers saw the media as the leading shapers of public opinion and influence on world politics

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and world order, and foresaw a major role for the mass media in a new world order.¹¹

When asked if a new world order has emerged or is emerging, without being required to specify exactly what it might be, 82 percent of the sample answered in the positive. When asked if the mass media played a role in that new world order, 82 percent of the sample answered in the affirmative (there was a slight variation among the respondents to these two questions). Many volunteered answers to the effect that the new order would not have emerged without the mass media, and that the mass media will continue to play a central role in an evolving world system. When asked if the public around the world played a role in setting security (foreign policy) agendas of their nations and of the world in general, 100 percent responded that the public was involved to some degree. When asked what the most important influence on the public was, 75 percent indicated that the media were the strongest influence, followed by the head of state, which was selected by 21 percent. Interestingly, 21 percent also volunteered that, among all media, television was the strongest influence on public opinion (some variation among respondents to these two questions).

The interview responses showed a strong perception, especially during the Gulf War, that the media and government manipulated one another for self-interest. Council on Foreign Relations vice president Alton Frye:

Presidents do not control the debate in anything like the degree they did even when we relied only on radio, and Franklin Roosevelt did the fireside chats. It's now a market place of competitive ideas with the Congress and private critics on display very broadly. I think the public, unlike myself, does see it on television very heavily. . . .

General John Galvin saw the public as the prime force of a new world order and ultimately of foreign policy, with the media an adjunct and amplifier of public demands:

The media responds to a public pulse, a public orientation, for example, Vietnam. It was not so much the media changing as it was the public changing the media. . . . There is, of course, an independent aspect of the media that has its own editorial production which it also—but I feel the media reflects rather well public thinking, public thrust, public changes. . . . I believe anyway that the message comes from within the public. It is fathomed by politi-

cal leadership, by media people and by others. The public itself fathoms its own message.

Former defense advisor to the U.S. permanent representative to NATO, Richard Stanley:

Media will play a role in foreign policy that is probably greater. I think it will de-polarize and, hopefully, the media will be a vehicle for consciousness raising. . . . The media is a communicator to a lot of people who are going to have to take actions against their short term interests. It has a good, positive, constructive role, a big role to play.

The Gulf War coverage appears to have reinforced the interdependence theme. Media use increased and perception of the usefulness of the media increased. Whether or not the government was dependent on the media during the Gulf (it was not dependent for information, but it used the media as part of the ground-attack strategy), one tentative conclusion that can be drawn from the interviews is that policy-makers used the media more during and after the Gulf War than before it, and now perceive the media as more useful and more necessary in their work.

The interpenetration theme was present but not strongly reflected in these findings, since the questions were not designed to probe that particular aspect of the media-government relationship. Some of the comments, however, especially those regarding the president's use of the media, indicate that at least some policy-makers see the media as a tool to be grasped and used as needed to implement policy.

The theme of mutual benefit was obvious in all the findings, although the responses to the questions regarding media influence on public opinion reflected a strong respect for the media's independent agendas, as well as its susceptibility to use by policy-makers.

Possibly the strongest finding of these interviews was the recognition that media use in general and television use in particular have increased among policy-makers. What this means in terms of simultaneous distribution of common images and information to policy-makers around the world remains to be seen, but it is apparent that the elite who shape international politics on a day-by-day basis, as well as those who make the grand decisions and those who are affected by those decisions, are increasingly operating from the same set of perceptions and images, if not of facts.

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The Policy Process

The policy-process picture that emerged from these interviews is that foreign policy in the United States and other countries is much more than a meeting between the president or prime minister, the secretary of state or foreign minister, the secretary of defense or defense minister, and the head of the CIA or international intelligence service, even during war. It is the end point of a long chain of events, people, and institutions that collect and shape information, options, and political leverages, and it very specifically includes a self-interested media.

Mass-media influence on foreign policy is issue-specific, with certain categories of issues more likely to successfully utilize the media to develop policy elite support. Environmental issues, those involving human rights or human suffering, and issues that touch Americans or United States residents are far more likely to move forward on the foreign policy agenda as a result of media exposure than more abstract or complex "high politics" issues such as arms control or trade terms (O'Heffernan 1990b, 1991a). Media coverage of human-interest stories during the Gulf War exemplified the media's exploitation of issues that play well with large audiences—in this case, with issues the government wanted to play up. These included the "Hi Mom" stories, mostly run by local television stations and newspapers, about homeboys on the battlefield; the "gee whiz" stories about super high-tech weapons—toys with high entertainment value, especially for male audiences; and the non-story, made up of press releases and fact-laden but contextually meaningless pronouncements by the Joint Information Bureau.

These three Gulf story categories point up an increasingly important and visible condition in the government-media relationship: the growing media savvy of the policy institutions involved. A media-sophisticated organization, like the Joint Information Bureau of the military forces in Saudi Arabia, can mitigate or even reverse the influence of the media on an issue. Media-sophisticated elites can redirect media attention away from unpleasantness, like the poor operational record of Apache helicopters in the desert, and toward less dangerous fare such as the menus of troops in the Saudi desert. Other public-relations techniques used by media-sophisticated foreign policy decision-makers and the institutions within which they operate include:

- thwarting national media from examining the basis for a policy—or the lack of it, as in the early stages of the Gulf War—by configuring its public relations to appeal to local stations and

newspapers that are more subject to public demands for local human-interest, while intimidating the deeper-digging network news teams with phone calls to network business offices questioning the patriotism of skeptical reporters;

- releasing powerful visuals which co-opt TV news agendas, such as the smart-bomb video tapes and the images of Patriot missiles appearing to knock out incoming SCUDS;
- providing a daily mountain of insignificant details in press releases and background reports that overwhelm hard-press reporters; this technique also worked well in the Joint Information Bureau's daily briefing;
- policing agency employees to control information flows and to stop leaks, as was done both in the Joint Information Bureau and in the field during the war;
- stonewalling—refusing to provide information through normal press-distribution channels, knowing that only a small percentage of the reporters have the time, expertise, or funds to dig out a story while it is relevant.

A condition that can be even more important is the cohesion of the executive. Mixed messages or disagreement from within the executive that makes its way to the media seriously undermines public-relations efforts and enhances the opportunity and likelihood of adversarial media treatment of real policy positions. The early stages of the Gulf War saw a lack of consensus, both from General Powell and from the Congress. But the administration was able to use the media and the government's (its) internal political muscle to construct a consensus and deny the doubters a broad forum, guaranteeing a positive press support for the eventual policy.

Into this mix of influence mechanisms and conditions must be added countervailing forces, forces which tend to dilute media's influence on foreign policy makers and on foreign policy outputs. Major overt countervailing forces present in the Gulf War included:

Systems of state secrecy. All nation-states, governments, governments in exile, and insurgent groups trying to become governments have secrecy systems. These systems range from the elaborate classification "Q" process of the United States, to similar processes in the former Soviet Union and most Western nations, to virtual blackouts on any foreign-policy relevant information in states such as Iran, Iraq, Albania, and Syria. During the Gulf War, information was not so much protected by systems

of state secrecy as it was withheld or provided late. Categories of information not completely provided included the actual performance of weapons, the location and amount of damage from missile and bomb hits in both Coalition and Iraq territory, and extent of civilian injuries.¹²

Overt censorship. This was seen in the Gulf War at the Joint Information Bureau and the Ministry of Information of Iraq, and similar ministries in Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iran, and Turkey. Ironically, for a period at the beginning of the war, CNN broadcasts from Iraq were probably less censored than any news from the JIB because the Iraqi Ministry of Information had not yet organized itself to deal with Peter Arnett and his satellite phone. Overall, all sides in the Gulf War were effective in censoring reporting they opposed. While the *news* organizations involved objected, they failed to join the litigation by magazines, because from a business standpoint the networks were obtaining large audiences that did not want negative reporting or stories contrary to the administration's line.

Elite consensus. Foreign policy elites often do not agree on the details or even the thrusts of policies at the early stages of policy formation, but, in the United States, the role of the White House chief of staff and his aides is to build a consensus around a desired policy (Allison 1971). When this effort is successful, as it eventually was in the case of Gulf War policy, the ability of the media to obtain critical or policy-negative information is drastically reduced. In the case of highly popular policies like the war against Saddam, the media's ability to report such information is almost eliminated (O'Heffernan 1991b). Few sources will talk regardless of their position on the issue at hand, and the next day the administration will launch an investigation of who talked and an attack on the credibility of the reporter and company.

The objections in the Pentagon were eventually silenced and the vote in Congress put an end to congressional criticism.

Physical danger to reporters. Reporting from Peru, the former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, and a handful of other countries places journalists in extreme physical danger of death, kidnapping, or torture, either from the government or government-hired hit squads, or one or the other side of an internal conflict. Not surprisingly, these locations are covered either very lightly by a few journalists willing to take the risk, from afar through interviews with travelers, from domestic broadcast monitoring, rumors, handouts. Reporting from the Gulf War carried little physical danger except to "enterprise" reporters who evaded or ignored govern-

ment orders and went to the front to gather news directly. While the danger was most likely not a factor in the small number of journalists who did venture afield, it did give the Joint Information Bureau a good excuse to forbid journalists from doing so.

Technological limitations on news gathering and transmission. It is not correct to assume that anything can be beamed from anywhere to anywhere via uplinks and satellites. Television crews must often utilize government-owned uplinks which can be denied for political reasons, or which can be given only after review and editing of copy. This was the case in the Gulf War for many reporters who did not have flyaways (portable uplinks). Even when a broadcaster is allowed (or pays bribes) to bring in a flyaway free of government control, satellite time-availability, costs, and the location of news events can impede transmission.

The Gulf War was a showcase of new technology for bringing live news direct to viewers, but it must not be assumed that because this technology exists everyone has it, or that governments have lost their ability to control it. In reality, it showed that live SNG (satellite news-gathering) technologies can be exploited by governments as readily as they can be used by media to exploit governments for high-ratings stories. Technological limits are constantly being eroded by new generations of equipment and new transmission methods, but governments can still retaliate against journalists who smuggle objectionable tape or signals out of a country for global or national broadcast. What the Gulf War demonstrated is that it is technologically possible for commercial news organizations to cover a war from both sides. The product of that technological capability can be and was as exploitive as the actors were able to make it.

Complex Reality and the Media in War

War and coverage of war is a very complex reality. The relationships among the actors in the Gulf War were not well understood, even by the actors themselves. In the process of mutual exploitation, both the media and the government and military did not clearly understand their goals and objectives, their roles and relationship, and the rules of engagement and cooperation. Live broadcasting of a war from both (all?) sides of a battlefield was simply new territory for everyone involved. Both sides continued to follow the old rules of exploiting the other for self-interest and immediate gain, using the vacuum of policy about live war-reporting to their advantage. The media wanted access, stories, audience

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appeal. The JIB and the governments on both sides wanted public support and enemy confusion. The output was a media that got record ratings, a government that got public support and little criticism and investigation, and a public that was well entertained, but not always well informed.

But given the limitations on the media side of the equation during a war described in various chapters in this volume, and the media's predilection for marketable information over critical information, isn't this the best we can expect? Isn't it unreasonable to ask more than that both sides exploit the other and the public takes what the government wants it to have and what the media thinks the public wants to have?

Not necessarily. While the culture of the media organizations is ratings-driven, the culture of news divisions, and especially of CNN, is story-driven. Reporters who are educated about war and its technology can provide insight and context to the live feeds, bypassing censorship in many cases. For instance, reporters who were knowledgeable about the Patriot missile systems would not have reported hits when they saw explosions in the sky that later research showed were misses.¹³ And news organizations familiar with military tactics and history would have seen in advance the feint General Schwarzkopf was planning when he allowed them to film the practice assaults on the Kuwaiti coast when in fact the main attack was planned over the western Saudi-Iraq border.

This does not address the larger questions of a national media organization's obligation to cooperate in a national war effort, or at least not undermine it. Nor does it address the question of government control and exploitation of the media to influence public opinion, and of media use of government information to boost ratings, to the exclusion of investigation and context. As long as the paradigm of the government-media relationship, at least in the minds of government representatives, is one of mutual exploitation, the goal of clear and complete objective reporting of hostilities will be subordinated to other interests of the institutions involved. The resolution of the questions raised by the exploitive nature of the Gulf War coverage will come within the framework Allison used to characterize the U.S. foreign policy process—continual bargainings among separate constituencies, some inside the media, some inside government, some among media and government representatives. The process will be ongoing, with new situations raising new questions, but often avoiding old questions. The model of mutual exploitation drawn from the Gulf War provides a framework for understanding the workings of these bargainings in wartime, so that the stakes, the stakeholders, and the possible outcomes are clearer, as well as

the driving forces. Unfortunately, the framework tells us that the dominant driving force is rarely clear public understanding.

Appendix

POST-GULF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS*

Gordon Adams
Director of Defense Budget Project
Washington, D.C.

Harold Baumgarten
Press Officer
NATO Information Services
Brussels, Belgium

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
(former U.S. ambassador to NATO)

Barry Blechman
President, Defense Forecast Inc.
Washington, D.C.
(former assistant director, ACDA)

Kent Brown
Internal Affairs Advisor
SACEUR
SHAPE, Mons Belgium

Richard E. Darilek
U.S. Army Concepts Analysis
Agency
Washington, D.C.
(former director, Mutual and
Balanced Force
Reduction Task Force,
Department of Defense)

General Russell E. Dougherty
(Ret.), USAF
Washington, D.C.
(former commander-in-chief,
Strategic Air Command)

General Vigleik Eide
Norwegian Army Chair,
NATO Military Committee

Captain Ulrich Fricke
German Army
Assistant to General Eide,
Public Information Officer, NATO
Military Committee
Brussels, Belgium

Alton Frye
Vice President, Council on Foreign
Relations
Washington, D.C.

General John Galvin
Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR)
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

Raymond Garthoff
Senior Research Fellow,
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
(former U.S. ambassador to
Bulgaria)

Charles W. Groover
Advanced Technology
Development Center
Atlanta, Ga.
(former deputy assistant secretary
of defense)

John Hardt
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C.

*Affiliations at time of interview. Prewar interviews described in O'Heffernan (1991a).

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Lt. Colonel Jim Holcomb
SACEUR staff
SHAPE
Mons, Belgium

Colonel John Hughes-Wilson
Basic Intelligence Branch
SHAPE
Mons, Belgium

General Sir Brian Kenny, A.O.U.K.
Deputy SACEUR
SHAPE
Mons, Belgium

Lawrence Korb
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
(former assistant secretary of
defense for manpower,
installations and logistics)

Jenny Lincoln
Special Advisor to President Carter
Carter Center, Atlanta Ga.

Major General Lutgendorf,
Belgium Army
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

Patrick Moon
Assistant Secretary, Conventional
Arms Delegation
United States Mission
Vienna, Austria

Robert Pastor
Carter Center, Atlanta Ga.
(former staff member, National
Security Council)

Colonel Charles Ricks, E7
Chief of Public Information and
Policy
SACEUR
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

Major General Alan Rogers
Assistant Chief of Staff for
Operations
SHAPE
Mons, Belgium

Eugene Rostow
Washington, D.C.
(former director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency)

Rene Schaelbroek
Director, News Analysis Section
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

General John Shaud, USAF
Chief of Staff
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

Don Snider
Center for Strategic and
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Washington, D.C.
(former staff member, NSC)

Helmet Sonnenfelt
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.
(former staff counselor,
Department of State, member of
the NSC)

Timothy Stanley
President, IESI
Washington, D.C.
(former defense advisor to the U.S.
Permanent Representative to NATO)

Leonard Sullivan, Jr.
Systems Planning Corporation
Arlington Va.

Peter Wilson
Washington, D.C.
(former member, Policy Planning
Staff,
Department of State)

Air Vice Marshall
Antony Woodford, RAF
Assistant Chief of Staff for Policy,
SHAPE, Mons, Belgium

John Woolsey, CFE
United States Ambassador,
Conventional Arms Talks
Delegation
United States Embassy, Vienna

Notes

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1. In an unusually blunt roundtable in New York City the day before the opening of the Democratic National Convention, national news anchors, executives, and producers from the broadcast networks and PBS vied with one another in criticizing their manipulation by public officials in their coverage of the Gulf War and the 1988 election, vowing to provide more substance, investigation, and issue coverage and less horse-race reporting in the 1992 election.

2. For the full text of this research, see the Appendices in O'Heffernan (1991a).

3. For the full text of this research, see O'Heffernan (1991b).

4. In this model, the word "media" includes entertainment and business elements of the organizations that produce wholesale and retail mass-distributed information.

5. The public is also a player in this relationship. For instance, the media prevailed until 1992 in the question of telephone-company access to the cable industry despite heavy pressures from an extremely well financed telephone lobby; but the public has prevailed in the move to limit children's television advertising. Since it is difficult to tell what the government's "wants" are in such issues as who pays and receives royalties for reruns and syndicated programs, when both government and media elite are divided, neither media nor government nor public has prevailed.

6. And which can themselves be manipulated, as then candidate Clinton did in his appearances on the "Arsenio Hall Show," "Larry King Live," and "MTV."

7. Co-evolution is an ecological process in which two species exploit each other so tightly that they evolve together, each affecting the direction and pace of the other's evolution. Co-evolution differs from symbiosis in that the symbiotic species, while they may derive benefits from their association, do not exploit each other and do not necessarily influence the direction of each other's evolution. See Odum (1983).

8. The author conducted one of these meetings, off-the-record, in February

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1991, at SHAPE Headquarters in Mons, Belgium, between a representative of CNN and command officers of SHAPE/NATO. While the dozen or so individuals involved showed respect for one another, some positions were tenaciously held by both sides and the discussion occasionally got quite heated.

9. Data were also obtained from Linsky's survey (1986) and analyzed.

10. Rigorous research on these questions undertaken at policy-maker level of analysis would require new elite survey research, a daunting undertaking, methodologically, in the construction of the universe and deriving a representative and statistically valid sample, and in recruiting and working with very busy subjects. While not all the questions in the ongoing research and the earlier interviews were exactly comparable, some were and the thrust of the two studies were quite similar so that a demonstration of perception change, or lack of it, can be indicated on these questions.

11. I will not engage here in the semantical and political debates surrounding this term. Suffice it to say, to the degree that international politics is vastly different today than it was 5 years ago, there is a new world order. Whether or not it is a "better" world order is another issue.

12. As later analysis has shown, the Patriot missile was 94% ineffective, not 94% effective, as claimed by the military and its contractor, but this information was not made available. See Postel (91).

13. Postel (91, 91-92).

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