COMPETING REDISTRICTING PLANS
AS EVIDENCE OF POLITICAL MOTIVES
The North Carolina Case

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Redistricting is a thoroughly political act, but the political strategies of the various actors often have been lost amid legal and representational arguments. This article looks at one set of actors—state legislators—and examines how they pursue personal and partisan interests during redistricting. Rather than treating legislators as uniform in their preferences, we divide them into two categories: those who are ambitious for higher office and those who are not. These two groups of legislators face dramatically different sets of incentives and constraints, and these differences are reflected by their strategies in the redistricting process. Using North Carolina’s 1992 redistricting as exemplar, this article outlines the redistricting debates, describes the interests of the various actors, and presents an analysis of eight redistricting plans using JudgeIt. The findings indicate that members balance individual and partisan interests when proposing plans and that for ambitious legislators, individual ambition generally outweighs partisan loyalty.

Every 10 years, 50 states engage in a highly charged political process—redrawing district lines for state and federal offices. Redistricting always has been recognized as a fundamentally political activity: It is conducted by politicians (governors and legislators), it has implications for political representation at all levels, and it is subject to ratification and sometimes decision making by the federal judiciary. In recent years, social scientists have focused most of their analytic energies on the legal debates surrounding the appropriate method of drawing and evaluating competing redistricting plans. Our emphasis in this article is somewhat different. We neither speak to issues of contiguity and compactness nor address the burgeoning literature on the representation of Black interests and on the democratic implications of minority-majority districts (see Grofman, Handley, & Niemi, 1992; Lublin, 1997; Swain, 1993; Thernstrom, 1987). Instead, following Ostdiek (1993, 1995) and Gelman and King (1994a), this project fo-
cuses on the political motivations and strategies of those actors most directly engaged in the redistricting process: the state legislators who actually draw the district lines. Redistricting is a venue in which competing sets of actors—political parties, legislators, governors, interest groups, incumbent members of Congress—attempt to further their interests while operating under a specific set of historical, political, and legal constraints. In this article, we examine the attempts of legislators to maximize their interests from partisan, racial, and individual perspectives. At the same time, we recognize and attempt to disentangle the competing and often mutually exclusive nature of legislators’ simultaneously held goals, such as maximizing a party’s potential share of the delegation (by drawing many competitive districts) versus assuring victories for incumbents already in office (by drawing many noncompetitive districts).

We differ significantly from previous work in considering the position of state legislators drawing plans for federal elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. This implies potential motivations beyond those suggested by Gelman and King (1994a), such as maximizing one’s future ability to move up the political ladder. Our expectation, however, is that self-interest will play a smaller role for many legislators in this type of redistricting because their own interests are only potentially at issue (if they have ambitions for higher office). Pressures to maximize the partisan strength of the delegation and to protect sitting incumbents therefore should play a larger role, and individual ambition should play a lesser role than has been found in analyses of state legislative redistricting (e.g., Gelman & King, 1994a, 1994b). Thus, this study draws on and extends previous redistricting studies and should help reveal the degree to which reapportionment plans can be used as evidence of legislator motivations across different levels of the political system.

COMPETING INTERESTS AND REDISTRICTING

Constitutional provisions as well as a series of Supreme Court decisions mandate that congressional district lines be redrawn following each decennial census. By aligning district lines with populations, state legislatures assure that the “one person, one vote” standard is met throughout the country. At the same time, the results of redistricting
are far from politically neutral. A craftily carved plan can cement one party’s control of the state and federal delegation and even can provide a party control where it is undeserved. Simultaneously, the results of redistricting can help or hinder current officeholders and future aspirants to federal office.

Legislators drawing up redistricting plans for federal office face a host of competing pressures. Congressional incumbents obviously are interested in keeping their own seats as safe as possible, and many state legislators recognize the advantages of having members gain seniority. However, there are countervailing forces. State legislators would like to maximize their own party’s total strength in the delegation, even if this means slicing away at the partisan advantage enjoyed by a sitting incumbent. Ostdiek (1995) describes this logic in some detail, arguing that partisan gerrymanders often result in incumbents of the dominant party becoming less safe so that opposition party seats can be made more competitive. Moreover, many state legislators are themselves aspiring members of Congress (following Canon, Schousen, & Sellers, 1994, we term these members ambitious legislators). Thus, they want to draw districts that enhance their own future electoral prospects. To the extent that a member can be identified as an aspirant for federal office, he or she may be expected to maximize his or her own chances of winning a seat, even if this conflicts with the goals of incumbency protection or party strength. Finally, legislators also may bring strong regional concerns to the table, working to keep their area in or out of a particular congressional district. As Scher, Mills, and Hotaling (1997) note, these competing pressures are most acute when the partisan balance within a state is relatively even and when a state either gains or loses seats in a reapportionment. Because the 1992 redistricting in North Carolina fits both of these conditions, it is a particularly interesting and illustrative case.

To summarize, then, we expect the following patterns of behavior by state legislators during redistricting:

We expect ambitious legislators to maximize their own chance for election to higher office. This leads to a series of complementary behaviors, which are as follows:

1. Because they have a direct personal stake in the process, these legislators will become most involved in the redistricting process (e.g., serving
on the committee, speaking up most actively, and proposing their own plans).

2. These legislators will propose plans that provide safe seats encompassing their own residence and political base.4

3. When choosing between alternative plans, ambitious legislators will look to self-interest first, even when it conflicts with party interest.

We expect all legislators to maximize their party’s strength in the delegation, thus leading to two competing subgoals, which are as follows:

1. Legislators will seek to increase the safety of incumbent members of their party, requiring the concentration of party loyalists.

2. Legislators will seek to maximize the total number of seats potentially winnable by their party, requiring the dispersion of party loyalists.

These goals are neither absolutes nor mutually exclusive. Rather, they define the ends of a continuum of competing pressures placed on legislators involved in redistricting. The tension between individual and partisan motivations, in particular, is one that is difficult to capture completely. Legislators seeking to maximize partisan interest, for example, could opt for the “safe” strategy of shoring up the party’s current incumbents to the greatest extent possible, for the riskier strategy of creating many “winnable” districts, or for some mixture of the two.5 Furthermore, partisans may maximize the number of seats won through a variety of plans, some of which also will benefit favorably situated ambitious legislators. Although we acknowledge that there is some potential overlap between the categories, we attempt, in the analysis that follows, to keep partisan and individual motivations separate. We believe that the distinction between legislators with and without ambition for higher office is both analytically useful and theoretically sound, allowing us to understand better the relative advantages of competing plans.

BACKGROUND TO THE 1992 NORTH CAROLINA REDISTRICTING6

Since the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, no question has been more central to southern politics than that of minority political
power. During the past 30 years, large numbers of Black voters have entered the political mainstream in all of the southern states, exerting considerable influence on electoral outcomes, policy decisions, and the partisan balance of power. Mere enfranchisement, however, has not been a political panacea; Blacks in the South still find themselves a relatively isolated political minority, ideologically far removed from the White majority. The Black community confronts the constraints imposed by, in the words of Merle and Earl Black (1987), “the limited leverage of a franchised minority” (p. 126). Black candidates have had a very difficult time attracting significant White support, and statewide offices in the South (as in the rest of the nation) remain the exclusive preserves of White politicians. Consequently, leaders in the Black community have long called for the creation of majority-Black electoral districts at all levels, from municipal to congressional. In the 1980s, the U.S. Justice Department began to side with these Black leaders, rejecting many southern district arrangements as improper dilutions of minority voting strength. With the federal government actively on their side, Black politicians were able to assert their demands for roughly proportional representation. This situation set the stage for bruising reapportionment battles following the census of 1990.

Despite their imminent gains in political representation, Blacks in the South, North Carolina included, faced complex and conflicting feelings about the redistricting process. On one hand, most were very pleased at the prospect of Black representatives in their state’s congressional delegation, in many cases, for the first time since Reconstruction. On the other hand, many suspected that the cooperation of Republican state legislators, and even of the Bush Justice Department, was insincere. As North Carolina State Representative Mickey Michaux (D-Durham) bluntly put it, “I’ve never known a Republican to do anything to help black people” (Van Denton, 1991c, p. 3B). Another observer of North Carolina politics (Van Denton, 1991b) wrote the following in Raleigh’s The News & Observer:

The NAACP [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People] and leaders among North Carolina blacks . . . aren’t seeing eye-to-eye. Alexander [NAACP] insists that the best way blacks can increase political power is to make sure they get as many new seats in Congress . . . as possible. But [Toby] Fitch, a key architect of the redis-
stricting process, warns...[that blacks] will find themselves confined to "political reservations" with less political influence than they have today. (p. 1A)

Thus, it was widely assumed that the creation of Black majority districts would help Republican candidates in the rest of the state, as loyal Democratic voters would be drained from the districts of White Democratic incumbents. (See Brace, Grofman, & Handley, 1987, for a discussion of this phenomenon after the 1980s reapportionment in South Carolina.) Blacks faced a quandary, as framed by Fitch (see also Lublin, 1997; Swain, 1993): Were they better off controlling a few districts and having little influence in the others or controlling no districts but having substantial influence in many? Tired of being merely the junior partners in the coalitions of moderate White Democrats, most Black leaders pushed for Black-majority districts, but not without significant reservations.

North Carolina reflects these and other trends evident throughout the South. This is particularly true regarding partisan balance. The state has turned progressively more Republican, first at the presidential level, followed by the Senate (with Jesse Helms's first victory in 1972), statewide offices (governor, lieutenant governor), and, recently, by the U.S. House of Representatives and state legislature. In the 1992 election, North Carolina chose its first African American members of Congress in 91 years. Two years later, the state legislature and the congressional delegation, for the first time since Reconstruction, were in the hands of the Republican party. These partisan trends made it quite difficult to accommodate all of North Carolina's Democratic incumbents in the 1992 redistricting, especially when many of the most Democratic voters in the state, African Americans, almost certainly were going to be placed in a minority-majority district running from the east along the northern tier of the state.

Residential patterns in North Carolina also need to be understood as a background to the 1992 redistricting. Half of the population lives in areas designated as rural, and African Americans make up 22% of the total population. It is not surprising that there are significant concentrations of rural poor, Black, White, and Lumbee Indian. Many of the African American rural poor are distributed throughout the eastern
power. During the past 30 years, large numbers of Black voters have entered the political mainstream in all of the southern states, exerting considerable influence on electoral outcomes, policy decisions, and the partisan balance of power. Mere enfranchisement, however, has not been a political panacea; Blacks in the South still find themselves a relatively isolated political minority, ideologically far removed from the White majority. The Black community confronts the constraints imposed by, in the words of Merle and Earl Black (1987), "the limited leverage of a franchised minority" (p. 126). Black candidates have had a very difficult time attracting significant White support, and statewide offices in the South (as in the rest of the nation) remain the exclusive preserves of White politicians. Consequently, leaders in the Black community have long called for the creation of majority-Black electoral districts at all levels, from municipal to congressional. In the 1980s, the U.S. Justice Department began to side with these Black leaders, rejecting many southern district arrangements as improper dilutions of minority voting strength. With the federal government actively on their side, Black politicians were able to assert their demands for roughly proportional representation. This situation set the stage for bruising reapportionment battles following the census of 1990.

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parts of North Carolina, living in small communities and tending peanut, cotton, and tobacco farms. It was immediately obvious after the passage of the 1982 renewal of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that a minority-majority district would be drawn in the east and that this district basically would meet the standards even of critics of minority-majority seats. The district would be reasonably compact and contiguous and would largely follow preexisting political lines. In fact, in contrast to past plans that defended incumbent interests, this could be a more contiguous and compact district than previously had been drawn in the area (Kousser, 1995; Mayer, 1995).

The other significant concentrated minority population, members of the Lumbee Indian tribe, resides in south central North Carolina, comprising a plurality in three counties. Thus, the potential for a second minority district combining African American and Native American populations existed in the south central region, although this would not address one of the major concerns among Black interests in North Carolina—the ability of African Americans to select a representative of their choice. The remaining significant minority population, mainly African American, lives in a string of medium-sized cities arrayed north from Charlotte through Winston-Salem, east to Durham, continuing east and north through Rocky Mount all the way to the Virginia border. This "string of pearls," as it was referred to in legal briefs filed by the NAACP, contained a minority population sufficient to form a minority-majority district, but, as is well-known by now, required a plan that violated many conventional redistricting standards, such as contiguity and compactness. The situation in North Carolina was similar to the situations in Virginia, Georgia, and Louisiana, states with a single large urban center, a series of medium-sized cities, and significant rural poor. It presented more difficult challenges than a state such as Alabama, with a large, geographically concentrated "Black Belt." There, drawing minority-majority seats at least was somewhat easier and therefore less controversial (although it still focused explicitly on race).

How does the historical context in North Carolina affect our expectations about state legislator involvement in redistricting? Although North Carolina has a history of reelecting incumbents (albeit to a lesser
extent than many Southern states), the inclusion of the minority-majority standard in 1992 complicated the situation. It altered the calculations of ambitious state legislators who may have wanted to get involved in the redistricting process. In addition to balancing their own personal ambitions with those of incumbents and their party, they also faced pressure to draw seats satisfying Justice Department demands for minority influence. For Republicans, the strategic situation seemingly could not have been better. They could continue to pursue their own self-interests and penalize Democrats, all under the protection of the Justice Department. Black Democrats, on the other hand, were cross-pressured. For African American state legislators, the inclusion of a minority-majority district plus the addition of a seat in 1992 guaranteed a golden opportunity at a safely Democratic open seat. However, as Hardaway, Fitch, House Speaker Dan Blue, and other African American legislators realized, these opportunities could come at very severe costs to the state Democratic party.

Thus, we expect that aspiring African American contenders would be more active in the redistricting process than otherwise might be expected. The new standards, at least according to the conventional wisdom, would increase statewide Republican strength. Thus, up-and-coming Republican state legislators also should be particularly active in this process. Finally, White Democrats should attempt to minimize the impact of the minority-majority districts on overall Democratic strength and on their own future chances for election. White Democrats in the state legislature clearly were operating under many difficult constraints. The general statewide partisan trend in favor of Republican candidates was compounded by the necessity to create at least one majority-Black district and the need to offer reasonable protection to the Democratic incumbents already in office. As a result, opportunities for ambitious White Democratic legislators to carve out favorable districts for themselves were minimal. In light of the background presented here and the resulting strategic constraints, it is not surprising that White Democrats in the legislature exhibited remarkable partisan unity during the redistricting process. With so little realistic opportunity to advance their own self-interests in the congressional redistricting, the best strategy was to act as "team players" and to fight for the party as a whole.
EVALUATING LEGISLATOR MOTIVES: QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE

For many state legislators, the career ladder climbs from the state house to the state senate and up into federal office. Many state legislators consider themselves "congressmen in training" (Fowler & McClure, 1989). In the 1980s, almost 50% of newly elected members of Congress had served as state legislators, and since 1970, 80% of state legislators who ended up in Congress made the jump directly from the state legislature (Canon, 1990). Clearly, however, not all state legislators intend to run for Congress; for many, it is not even a consideration. As discussed previously, we expect the behavior of ambitious legislators—those who aspire to higher office—to differ from that of their not-so-ambitious colleagues. Thus, for purposes of our analysis, it is important to settle on a set of legislators who demonstrate the ambition for higher office, have the political skills to obtain that office, and live in regions where those ambitions might be realized.

To identify this list of state legislators, we relied on three sources of evidence. First, we scanned the state's leading newspaper, Raleigh's The News & Observer, to find those legislators who were mentioned as potential contenders for Congress in the period from 1990 to 1991. Second, an undergraduate student conducted a series of interviews with informed observers of North Carolina politics. These interviews included questions about potential contenders for higher office. Finally, we identified legislators who had run for Congress in the past as individuals who could safely be deemed "ambitious."

The list of legislators was surprisingly easy to assemble and was consistent across the sources (as well as with one other academic treatment, Canon et al., 1994):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mickey Michaux (BD-Durham)</td>
<td>Ran for House in 1982 and 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tom Hardaway (BD-Enfield)</td>
<td>Identified by Canon et al. (1994) and informed observers and ran for House in 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toby Fitch (BD-Wilson County)</td>
<td>Identified by newspapers and informed observers and withdrew early in 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter B. Jones, Jr. (WD-Pitt County)</td>
<td>Son of 13-term member; identified by Canon et al. (1994), informed observers, and newspapers and ran for House in 1992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Anyone with even a passing interest in North Carolina politics will notice two omissions from this list. Eva Clayton, who now serves as the representative from the first district, was not identified as an ambitious member. She neither served on the redistricting committee (although she was the only one of the six state legislators who ran for Congress in 1992 who did not) nor was listed as an early favorite. Instead, Raleigh insiders identified Hardaway, Fitch, and Jones as the likely contenders. Second, Mel Watt, the eventual winner over Mickey Michaux in the primary for the 12th district and its current representative in Congress, was not serving in the state legislature and thus did not fall into this study. That Clayton and Watt ended up as the prime beneficiaries of the redistricting process reflects a central irony: Despite their best laid plans, several ambitious legislators worked to draw districts that ended up advantaging politicians other than themselves.

As a first cut at revealing the motives of these legislators, we turn to a timeline of redistricting in the state; this brief review also gives the reader an introduction to the plans we analyze in the quantitative section. At critical moments in the redistricting process, some of the members previously listed intervened in the process to pursue their self-interests, even going so far as to eliminate other viable contenders in their party from a spot in a district. At other times, members (mostly Republicans) withdrew from the process. The western, mainly Republican portions of the plan were decided on relatively early, and ambitious legislators from that area had little to gain by remaining involved in the game. Coy Privette, for example, was satisfied early, when the committee amended its base plan to draw his residence into a solidly Republican district. Instead of describing the activities of all the legislators previously listed, we concentrate on three exemplary cases: Mickey Michaux, Tom Hardaway, and David Balmer. The rest
of the article deals with how these three legislators were involved in and affected by the redistricting process. Their activities during redistricting support many of the hypotheses previously listed.

Before proceeding, we should say a brief word about Walter B. Jones, Jr. Jones was one of the most prominently mentioned aspirants in all sources, an attractive candidate benefiting from his father's political legacy. Indeed, he was the only White Democrat in the state legislature that informed observers considered clearly ambitious for higher office (at least in the short term). He also served on the redistricting committee and was an active participant in its deliberations. Nevertheless, we do not focus on his activities in our analysis for several reasons. To begin with, there was little debate about the eventual form of his district. Jones lived in the first district, in the northeastern part of the state, right in the middle of the Black Belt. It had been clear for 10 years that this area eventually would become part of a minority-majority district. Thus, the writing was seemingly on the wall for Jones's congressional ambitions (although he did run in 1992, finishing third in the Democratic primary behind Eva Clayton and Tom Hardaway). Later, in 1994, Jones switched both parties and districts, running (and winning) as a Republican in the third district. As a result, we exclude Jones from our analysis because of ambiguity in two key variables: party affiliation and district context. We focus instead on Michaux, Hardaway, and Balmer, from whom we get considerably more analytical leverage.

At the time of redistricting, Democrats had sizable majorities in both houses of the state legislature. The General Assembly had to consider two major changes for the 1992 cycle: a new seat due to increased population (boosting the delegation from 11 to 12 seats) and minority-majority districts. As a result, some deviation from the 1980s plan (referred to herein as Old Plan) was inevitable. At first glance, the strategic situation was relatively noncontroversial from the standpoint of White Democrats. The addition of a seat meant that most incumbent seats probably could be protected and even strengthened (in contrast to states, such as Michigan, where population loss and residential patterns virtually guaranteed that two incumbents would be placed into a single district). The minority-majority requirement might have been expected to act as a countervailing force, but the
announced retirement of Walter B. Jones, Sr., who represented the area in northeastern North Carolina, simplified the debate. The redistricting committee made a new 12th district by removing Republican-leaning areas from David Price, Tim Valentine, and Martin Lancaster’s (Democratically controlled) seats and combining them with the African American, rural poor, and largely Democratic areas of the Northeast. This plan, referred to in this article as Base-I, became the basis for early redistricting negotiations. This plan had its first reading in the redistricting committee in late May and passed with some relatively minor adjustments after a second meeting in early June 1991.

Who supported this plan? As the proposal of the Democratic establishment, it might be assumed to look out for the needs of the highest profile African American contender, Mickey Michaux. This it did, but only in part. The needs of a sitting Democratic incumbent—David Price—also were attended to. Base-I split Durham’s large African American population into two parts, awarding one portion to the new first district (which still left Durham dominant in the seat) and the remaining portion to the fourth. Nevertheless, Michaux announced early on that he would attempt to redraw the lines so that Durham County was completely within a single district, one in which he announced his intention to run. This new proposal gained little support, mainly because it penalized a favorite among the Democratic establishment, Duke University professor and former state party chair David Price. Still, this case illustrates how an ambitious legislator gets heavily involved in the process when it bears on his own career path and how he may attempt to increase his own chances at office, even at the expense of his own party’s incumbents.

An uneasy alliance formed to fight Base-I, including the state chapter of the NAACP, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and the GOP. Although each group may have had separate motives for opposing the plan, they all agreed that with a 22% African American population, it should be possible to draw a second minority-majority district. In response, in the final stages of the redistricting committee hearings and later on the floor of the state House, Representative David Balmer (R-Charlotte) proposed a series of alternative plans, all of which had two minority-majority districts. The first plan, not included in our data set, contained a minority-majority seat in the Northeast and a sprawling second district, running from Mecklenburg
County (Charlotte), through the Lumbee Indian counties along the border, all the way to African American sections of Wilmington along the coast. This plan never made much headway. Two other plans proposed by Balmer received much closer scrutiny. The plan referred to in this article as Balmer 7-4 drew the second minority district adjacent to the first in eastern North Carolina. The plan referred to as Balmer 8-1 proposed drawing the second minority-majority seat as a narrow, meandering strip running from northern Mecklenburg County, through a series of urban areas along Interstate 85, ending near the Virginia border. It was, ironically, a Republican who first came up with the idea of creating a “string of pearls” district.

Neither of the Balmer plans had any chance of passage intact in the Democratic legislature. They did, however, receive substantial attention from the Justice Department, a fact that considerably enhanced their influence in the redistricting debate. Moreover, they help to reveal the competing goals that may motivate members, which is why we play close attention to them in this article. At least one of Balmer’s plans had the merit (for his party) of substantially increasing expected Republican strength in the delegation. On the other hand, another of the plans was much less beneficial to his party but greatly benefited Balmer’s own chances for higher office. And, not surprisingly, Balmer was extremely active in the hearings during this period. His claims were that he only was looking out for the interests of Black voters in North Carolina, yet his personal motives were conveniently parallel. The very existence of plausible plans with two minority-majority seats caused a stir and provoked Assistant Attorney General John R. Dunne to reject the amended Base-1 plan (henceforth referred to as DOJ Reject) in late December. It was time to return to the drawing board.

The Justice Department’s rejection of the initial House Democratic plan threw the entire redistricting process into an uproar. What had been a relatively orderly, predictable, unexciting operation became much livelier once the federal government mandated two minority-majority districts. Given that requirement, it was clear that nothing resembling either the Old Plan or the Base-1 and DOJ Reject plans would pass muster. Many individuals and factions scrambled to take advantage of the new redistricting calculus, resulting in a flood of plans. Both African Americans and Republicans initially were heart-
ened by the Justice Department’s decision and quickly produced their own proposals. The chief African American proposal was offered by Tom Hardaway and was described by the NAACP as the “optimum” outcome for Black representation (thus referred to as Optimum). It was somewhat similar to the Balmer 8-1 plan in that it created minority-majority districts in the Northeast part of the state and along I-85, but it made more of an effort to protect incumbents and help Democrats. The Republicans countered with two plans of their own. One, offered by Representative Flaherty on behalf of the state Republican party, took the Justice Department reasoning to its most radical conclusion, creating two minority-majority districts and a third with nearly 40% Black population, leaving the rest of the districts overwhelmingly White. Although the Flaherty plan is interesting as an extreme example of concentrated Black voting strength, it was basically a Republican pipe dream with no chance of passing a Democratic legislature under any circumstances. The more realistic Republican proposal took advantage of the Lumbee Indian population in the southern part of the state to create two relatively compact minority-majority districts, one with an outright Black majority and the other with a 45% Black plurality. This plan (which we refer to as Compact) was seemingly reasonable but was handicapped by the fact that the NAACP was loath to accept anything short of two Black-majority districts.

Confronted with a rejection of their first plan and faced with a plethora of rival proposals, White Democrats were left scrambling for an acceptable alternative. They set about searching the voluminous paper and computer records of proposed plans to salvage something from the apparent triumph of Black Democrats and Republicans. And, lo and behold, there on the public access terminal was a plan that had received little attention on the House floor but that modified Balmer’s ideas to create a 12th district that was simultaneously African American majority, Democratic leaning, and in the midst of a Republican stronghold.12 Balmer could not have known it at the time, but his proposals became the foundation of the plan that eventually passed, the infamous I-85 district plan (referred to in tables as Final). It contained two minority-majority districts, as required by the Justice Department, but did not draw many Democrats from established incumbents in the Piedmont area and appeared to actually hurt Republicans.
plan brought back together a coalition of incumbent Democratic members of Congress, the national and state chapters of the NAACP, and the state Democratic party. Even if it is a tortured example of "political apartheid," as Justice O'Connor was later to write in *Shaw v. Reno* (1993), it was a stroke of political genius, representing a convergence of interests in the Democratic party, some ambitious individual legislators, and external actors (the NAACP and the Department of Justice).\textsuperscript{13}

In the section that follows, we compare each of these plans. We are particularly interested in the expected path that would be followed under the theoretical adoption of the various post-Balmer plans, because these plans should reveal the contending pressures of party, race, and individual ambition. To what degree will minority-majority seats harm overall Democratic chances? Do some plans maximize individual benefits at the price of party benefits, and do other plans manage to satisfy both of these objectives? We now turn to these questions.

**COMPARING ALTERNATIVE REDISTRICTING PLANS: QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE**

Continuing our exploration of the North Carolina redistricting, we compare analytically the eight major plans previously discussed as well as the preexisting plan. Each plan is evaluated according to the distribution of African Americans, the normal Democratic vote, the short-term probability of a Democratic win in each district, and the overall level of responsiveness and bias. We explain each of these measures and link them to our main hypotheses in the following text.

We chose these eight plans because, as shown by the qualitative evidence, each one was either a major contender for passage in 1991 to 1992 or was an exemplar of an important perspective in the redistricting debate. They provide a good sampling of the ideas of Republicans, White Democrats, Black Democrats, and individual ambitious legislators. For each plan, we are able to produce, by aggregating precinct-level data, descriptive statistics based on Census information, and the results of recent elections (the 1988 Court of Appeals race, the 1988 Lieutenant Governor’s race, and the 1990 Gantt vs. Helms Senate contest). We did not select these three elections arbitrarily; they were cho-
sen by the Legislative Research Office as good indicators of normal partisan balance. We averaged these three races to produce our normal Democratic vote measure. From the census data, we produce measures of proportion Black as an indicator of minority presence. Where the inclusion of American Indian voters in a district is significant, we have noted it in the text.

Finally, we use the JudgeIt program developed by Gelman and King (1994b) to evaluate the comparative levels of responsiveness and partisan bias in each plan. Responsiveness measures how much, on average, the distribution of seats varies according to the distribution of votes. Bias reflects how many more seats one party receives than would be fair or expected under proportionality. The actual scale of the statistics makes interpretation simple. Responsiveness is analogous to the seats-votes ratio or the increase in seats relative to a 1% increase in vote. Bias represents the degree of deviation from partisan symmetry or the proportion of additional seats that a party would be expected to win over its "fair share." For example, a partisan bias score of .05 implies that on average, the Democrats would win 5% more seats than their proportion of the vote. JudgeIt also allows the analyst to produce statistics such as the expected proportion of Democratic vote under a variety of conditions (all open seats, all incumbents, 1992 conditions with 1990 districts, etc.). Responsiveness and bias can be embedded within our theory of ambitious legislators. For Republicans, the incentives are clear: The party should benefit from this process. Republican plans should obviously show a bias in favor of the GOP, relative to the other proposals. In addition, Republican plans will pack minority voters into fewer districts, sacrificing a seat to the Democrats to benefit the party statewide. This should result in lower levels of responsiveness, as Democrats in the minority-majority districts (and, to a lesser extent, Republicans in the other districts) should be electorally secure and largely impervious to minor partisan vote swings. For Democrats, the situation is more complex. As we previously indicated, it is difficult to disentangle individual ambition and partisan maneuvering because of the limited opportunity for ambitious White Democrats to act in their individual interest. Our expectation is that White Democratic legislators will prefer, ceteris paribus, plans that are biased toward Democrats (not surprisingly). More important, they will seek to disperse minority populations to the great-
est extent possible (a strategy discussed at greater length later), thereby creating many competitive districts and increasing statewide electoral system responsiveness. Finally, Black Democrats are the most difficult to predict. The main difference with White Democrats, we believe, is that the plans proposed and supported by Black legislators will tend to err more on the side of maximizing minority concentration, even if this penalizes the party. So, relative to other Democratic plans, Black plans may be somewhat less favorable to the party but should display a high percentage of Blacks in the minority-majority seats (with corresponding depressed responsiveness).¹⁷

An analysis of the data reveals several interesting patterns. Table 1 compares the distribution of the Black population among the districts in the eight plans. As the table indicates, Blacks composed just more than 20% of the voting age population in North Carolina at the time of the redistricting. The apportionment plan in effect in the 1980s distributed this population fairly evenly, with most districts being roughly 20% Black. This even distribution is reflected in the plan’s low Black population standard deviation (8.66). Not surprisingly, the initial House Democratic plans (Base-1 and DOJ Reject) come closest to the prior apportionment, adding one minority-majority seat but still retaining relatively low Black population standard deviations of around 11.5 (in an attempt to protect Democratic incumbents as much as possible). All other plans, in their attempt to create two Black-majority districts, inevitably resulted in a highly skewed distribution of the state’s Black population, with several districts in each plan being less than 10% Black. Not surprisingly, the most partisan Republican plan (Flaherty) really packs the Black population into three districts and has the highest standard deviation of all (16.5). Another partisan Republican plan, Balmer 8-1, has a similarly skewed distribution. Both of these plans have appreciably higher concentrations of the Black population than the Optimum NAACP/Hardaway plan (15.4), in effect giving the North Carolina Black community too much of a good thing. As reflected in the table, the plan finally adopted has a Black population standard deviation of 15.79, substantially more than that of the initial Democratic plan and almost twice that of the 1980s apportionment. Clearly, the distribution of the Black population was a central element of contention among the competing plans.
# TABLE 1
Percentage of Black Voting Age Population by District

<table>
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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Old Plan</th>
<th>DOJ Reject</th>
<th>Base-1</th>
<th>Compact</th>
<th>Balmer 7-4</th>
<th>Optimum</th>
<th>Final Plan</th>
<th>Balmer 8-1</th>
<th>Flaherty</th>
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<tr>
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<td>22.0</td>
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<td>49.7&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>54.9&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>17.2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Redistricting data provided by the North Carolina Legislative Research Office.

a. Minority-controlled districts.
Even more interesting, however, are the differing distributions of partisan loyalty among the various plans. Differences among the plans offer some insight into the strategies pursued by the competing actors in the redistricting process. In attempting to maximize their party’s share of the congressional delegation, Democrats in the state legislature faced a daunting challenge: to produce a Democratic majority when the statewide normal Democratic vote was less than 50% and when large numbers of Black voters had to be used to create at least one minority-majority district. The luxury, previously enjoyed by southern Democrats, of drawing multiple solid Democratic seats was no longer a realistic option given the ongoing partisan realignment in the state and region. Consequently, Democrats in the legislature avoided drawing a few districts in which their party normally would be impregnable, opting instead for multiple districts in which their party normally would at least be competitive (a strategy consistent with the argument in Ostdiek, 1995).18 Their hope apparently was that in these competitive districts, Democratic incumbents could parlay their advantage from name recognition, seniority, and constituency service into electoral victory, overcoming slight disadvantages in normal partisan allegiance. This strategy is reflected clearly in a comparison of Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 represents the normal Democratic vote in each district under the various plans. In the initial House Democratic plan, only two districts are solidly Democratic, but at the same time, only two are solidly Republican. The other eight districts fall into the normally competitive range. Given the incumbency advantage of Democrats, this results in a situation in 1992 (reflected in Table 3) in which Democrats could reasonably expect to win 7 or 8 of the 12 seats.

This strategy of maximizing winnable seats rather than absolutely safe ones offered Democrats in the legislature two important advantages. First of all, it largely obviated the contentious debate over which Democratic incumbents were to be protected and which ones were to be left very vulnerable. By creating a large number of winnable seats and few safe ones, no Democratic incumbents were tremendously favored over others. More important, maintaining Democratic competitiveness statewide afforded the greatest possible opportunity for future congressional runs by aspiring Democratic state legislators. Thus, the strategy of sacrificing a few safe seats for many competitive ones provided a good compromise for Democrats among a variety of
### Table 2
Normal Democratic Vote Percentage by District

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Old Plan</th>
<th>DOJ Reject</th>
<th>Base-1</th>
<th>Compact</th>
<th>Balmer 7-4</th>
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<th>Final Plan</th>
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<th>Flaherty</th>
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**Solid**
- **Democrat**: 2
  - 2
  - 2
  - 2
  - 3
  - 2
  - 2
  - 3
  - 3

**Solid**
- **Republican**: 1
  - 2
  - 2
  - 4
  - 4
  - 3
  - 3
  - 5
  - 6

**Competitive**: 8
- 8
- 8
- 6
- 5
- 7
- 7
- 4
- 3

---

**NOTE**: Voting data provided by the North Carolina Legislative Research Office. Normal vote is the average of the Democratic vote in precincts within each congressional district for these three races: the 1988 Court of Appeals race, the 1988 Lieutenant Governor race, and the 1990 Senate race. A solid district is defined as one in which a party's normal vote share, by this measure, is greater than 55%.

*Solidly Democratic districts.*
<table>
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<th>District</th>
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<th>Balmer 7</th>
<th>Balmer 8</th>
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<th>Compact</th>
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<th>Final Plan</th>
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</table>

Greater than

| 50% Democrat | 7 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 7 | 8 |
| 20% Democrat  | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 9 | 8 | 8 |
| 80% Democrat  | 2 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

*a. Expected Democratic seats (greater than 50% probability).
competing interests while still producing a slight overall Democratic advantage (see Table 4). Viewed in this light, the logic underlying the Base-1 and DOJ Rejected plans becomes apparent.

Similarly, the strategic motivations of the two Balmer plans also are fairly clear. Under his first plan (Balmer 7-4), there normally would be three solidly Democratic seats, four solidly Republican ones, and five seats in the competitive range. Under 1992 conditions, most likely, this plan's outcome would be a seven-to-five Republican edge in the congressional delegation. The Republican slant of this plan (nearly 5%; see Table 4), however, was readily apparent to all, and it was thus unacceptable to Democratic legislators. Balmer therefore responded with a new plan (Balmer 8-1) that was somewhat less biased (only 3%) in favor of his own party and that made more of an effort to protect Democratic incumbents. In exchange for this seeming sacrifice, however, Balmer exacted a considerable measure of personal gain. Although Republicans statewide did not fare nearly as well in Balmer 8-1 as in Balmer 7-4, Balmer's own congressional prospects brightened considerably. As reflected in Table 3, the chance of a 1992 Democratic victory in Balmer's home ninth district declined from a somewhat competitive 16.2% in the Balmer 7-4 plan to a paltry 3.7% in Balmer 8-1. Thus, a comparison of the two Balmer plans reveals much about the interaction of partisan and personal interest in the redistricting process.

### Table 4

<table>
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<th>Plan</th>
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</table>

NOTE: Interpretation of the responsiveness and bias figures is explained in the text. Positive bias numbers mean Democratic advantage; negative numbers indicate Republican advantage.
Perhaps the strangest plan of all is the one finally adopted with significant prodding from the Justice Department. As shown in Table 3, the final plan presented a scenario in which all eight Democratic incumbents had a good chance of winning reelection in 1992. The overall partisan bias of the plan was almost 6% in the Democratic direction, a much greater advantage for Democrats than even they had initially proposed. Finally, this plan was less responsive to electoral shifts than almost all of the others, as reflected in Table 4. That such a plan would arise from the prodding of the Bush Justice Department was very strange. In any event, Democratic legislators were grateful for this version of the “string of pearls” arrangement, which represented just about the only conceivable scenario in which two majority-Black Democratic districts could be drawn while still preserving a statewide Democratic advantage. Republicans were left to lament, at least for the time being, a plan approved by their own administration in Washington that was both relatively nonresponsive and highly biased against them.

Overall, the JudgeIt results on responsiveness and partisan bias are consistent with our hypotheses. Both parties seek to maximize their interests by proposing plans biased in their favor (at least to the extent that this is possible, given external constraints). It is more interesting that the responsiveness figures are exactly as we anticipated. The plans proposed by White Democrats are the most responsive, reflecting their goals of dispersing minority populations and maintaining partisan competitiveness in as many districts as possible. The plans of Black Democrats and of Republicans, by contrast, are less responsive, as they share the objective (for different reasons) of concentrating minority populations and making several districts noncompetitive. Thus, the quantitative evidence on this score from JudgeIt serves to reinforce and substantiate the insights into different redistricting strategies gleaned from the qualitative sources.

DISCUSSION

Our examination of the 1992 redistricting in North Carolina reveals considerable support for our theoretical distinction between legislators with and without ambition for higher office and for our hypothe-
ses about differing partisan strategies. The various Democratic plans reveal attempts to balance the conflicting goals of incumbent protection and partisan seat maximization, generally resolved in favor of the latter (Ostdiek, 1995). More important, all of our hypotheses about the behavior of ambitious legislators are confirmed in the qualitative and quantitative data. With the sole exception of Eva Clayton, every state legislator who sought a congressional seat in 1992 was heavily involved in the redistricting process, generally by serving on the redistricting committee. These members actively sought to influence the various plans so that their own residence would be drawn into a district with a heavy advantage for their party. Finally, we see clear evidence of a number of legislators pursuing personal gain at the expense of racial or partisan interests. All of this suggests that the conventional view of redistricting as a simple exercise in incumbent protection and partisan gerrymandering is inadequate. To fully understand the process, one must appreciate the distinction between the motives of these two different classes of legislators.

The cases of Mickey Michaux, Tom Hardaway, and David Balmer illustrate the insights provided by this research. The evidence from the North Carolina redistricting hearings and from newspaper sources, along with the quantitative results from JudgeIt, indicates that at least two actors, Republican David Balmer and Democrat Tom Hardaway, had to balance their own individual interests in winning a seat with the party's interest in maximizing its strength in the delegation. Balmer presents a very illustrative case, because he proposed a "Republican" plan (Balmer 8-1), which, by at least one measure, was less favorable toward Republicans than was the plan first passed by the Democratic legislature. The plan, however, did benefit substantially any Republican running in the Charlotte area, as Balmer ended up doing (and losing in the primary to Sue Myrick). The tendency of individual interest to trump partisan loyalty among ambitious legislators is reflected clearly in this plan.

Tom Hardaway likewise had clear motives in redistricting. As a leader among African Americans in the legislature, Tom Hardaway was an outspoken advocate of minority-majority seats. In addition, Hardaway would be competitive in any seat drawn in the northeastern portion of North Carolina. As a result, Hardaway played a quiet but central role in drawing a potential competitor for the seat, Mickey
Michaux of Durham, out of the new first district. By placing northern Durham in the 12th district, Hardaway ensured that the first district would not be dominated by the city of Durham (and thus probably be won by Michaux), as it would have been in the DOJ Rejected plan. At the same time, however, Hardaway’s Optimum plan provided a substantial advantage to Democrats statewide (as reflected in our quantitative results). Tom Hardaway’s political ambitions and partisan loyalties pointed in the same direction, but he had strong incentives to work against another leading Black political figure in the state. With these multiple interests and agendas, Hardaway became an active and central participant in the redistricting hearings.

These results indicate that there is substantial gain in examining the strategies and motives of individual state legislators in the redistricting process. State legislators are the largest pool from which future candidates for the U.S. Congress are drawn. It is not surprising then that legislators draw district lines partially in anticipation of future runs for office. Other forces compete with self-interest: maximizing one party’s share of the state delegation, currying influence by returning incumbents, and providing for representation of minority voices. This study clearly indicates that comparing redistricting plans can be extremely valuable in untangling this complex set of competing motivations.

Although our analysis focuses on North Carolina, we believe that the circumstances and conclusions presented here have considerable generalizability. Certainly, there were idiosyncratic factors at work that are specific to this particular redistricting battle. In addition, the trend toward Republican control of legislatures in several southern states (including North Carolina) changes the partisan dynamic somewhat. However, the two factors of expanding population and minority demands for descriptive representation were applicable in all southern states in 1990, and in many western ones as well, and will continue to apply after 2000. Moreover, the competing pressures of party, race, and individual ambition are relevant to understanding virtually every redistricting battle in the country, regardless of which party controls the process. We find substantial evidence that in North Carolina, legislators with clear ambitions for higher office behaved differently than did other legislators in measurable, verifiable ways. Although our empirical test is confined to one state, there is no reason to suspect that
the theory itself is geographically circumscribed. Indeed, a very prof-
it able direction for future research would be to apply the theoretical
distinction between different types of legislators established here and
test it in a variety of regional, partisan, and ethnic contexts. We have
considerable confidence in its robustness and general validity.

The combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods
employed here lends itself to many other areas of future inquiry as
well. The records of the redistricting hearings can be plumbed to dis-
cover the motives of legislators and to evaluate the claims that these
legislators made in a public forum about the intent of a particular plan.
With the JudgeIt program, scholars can evaluate the competing plans
objectively according to responsiveness, bias, and predicted out-
comes, thus providing a uniform, quantifiable standard of comparison
and considerable insight into legislators’ true motives. Through the
combination of these sources, we are able to reveal a face of the redis-
tricting process that is often hidden in the thicket of legal debate over
contiguity and compactness and the contentious political debate over
who can best represent African American interests.

APPENDIX
The JudgeIt Program

JudgeIt presumes a random components regression model of elections:

\[ v_i = X' \beta + y_i + \varepsilon_i \]

where \( v_i \) is the vote result by district, \( X_i \) is a matrix of explanatory variables (such as
incumbency status, normal vote, and proportion African American), \( y_i \) is the random
components portion of the regression, and \( \varepsilon \) is the conventional error term.\(^a\) The
model then produces a set of simulated, hypothetical election results based on the esti-
mates from the first-stage equation and a fixed statewide swing and three quantities of
interest, \( \beta \), \( \lambda \), and \( \varepsilon \).

\[ v^{(hyp)} = X^{(hyp)} \beta + \delta^{(hyp)} + \gamma + \varepsilon^{(hyp)} \]

\[ y_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2_y) \]

\[ \varepsilon_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2_\varepsilon) \]

\[ \sigma^2 = \sigma^2_\varepsilon + \sigma^2 \]
The key insight from Gelman and King's (1994b) work is that the regression (\(\beta\)) allows us to predict future elections and the error bands about those predictions are a function both of systematic effects not in our equation (\(\lambda\)) and stochastic error (\(\varepsilon\)). These estimates describe the steady state of the system—the predictability of the system (the degree to which future elections can be predicted) and the dynamic nature of the system (the magnitude of statewide swings and the amount of uncertainty in any specific forecast). And, by substituting substantively important values for the dependent and independent variables (e.g., seat gain and loss for small percentage vote shifts, when no incumbents run, under weak or strong national tides), the model provides a set of quantities that help us compare the various redistricting proposals. Gelman and King describe the program in much greater detail.

a. Intuitively, \(\gamma_i\) is that portion of the dependent variable that is systematic but is not represented by variables in our model. If we had all the \(X\) influences in our model, then \(\gamma_i\) would be zero, and we would be left only with the stochastic portion of the error.

b. Reliable estimates of these quantities are obtained easily, assuming a sufficient electoral history. The figures in this article are based on North Carolina House results from the 1970s and 1980s. The independent variables in the model were Vote\(_{(t-1)}\), percentage of Democratic vote for the 1988 Lieutenant Governor’s race, percentage Black, and an incumbency and party control dummy variable. \(R^2\) across the years was at or more than .92. In general, the more elaborate the data set, the smaller the standard errors of the estimates (as the uncertainty of the forecasts is reduced).

NOTES

1. The extant literature here is too voluminous to cite. Social scientists have been active in writing both legal briefs and articles for law journals (e.g., Grofman, 1985; Kousser, 1995), whereas others have served as advisers (Gary King, Bruce Cain) or even nonpartisan directors (Donald Stokes) of redistricting committees.

2. The 1980 California “Burton” plan often is cited in this respect (Butler & Cain, 1992). A more recent example is the 1992 Texas plan, which provided Democrats with a substantial advantage.

3. There are other players in the redistricting “game”: incumbent members of Congress, governors, Justice Department lawyers, and the judiciary. For this article, we choose to focus primarily on legislators, because they remain the central actors in the process. Because the North Carolina governor had no veto power before 1996, he was largely irrelevant in congressional redistricting.

4. By drawing a safe seat for a sitting incumbent, however, an ambitious legislator ironically could close off future chances at the seat. We believe that in this case, where party goals and self-interest point mostly in the same direction, the legislator will choose to maximize his party’s strength in the district.

5. California Democrats following the 1980 census pursued the safe strategy, whereas Indiana Republicans pursued the risky one. Both plans are considered partisan gerrymanders. For our purposes, however, the key distinction between party-oriented legislators and individually
ambitious ones is that the former will tend to struggle with statewide issues of concentration versus dispersion, whereas the latter concern themselves more with drawing personally favorable plans.

6. We are indebted to Dan Simon (1993), who wrote an honors thesis on this topic under the direction of Paul Gronke and William Bianco, in which much of the data used in this section was assembled.

7. Ironically, Fitch made sure that at least one minority-majority district contained his residence because he had ambitions to enter the U.S. House.

8. In addition, it is important to note that the preexisting districts, drawn by Democratically dominated state legislatures in the past, were fairly well suited to ambitious Democratic legislators in the first place.

9. The interviews were conducted by Dan Simon with capitol beat reporters, op-ed writers, and political commentators from a number of leading papers and specialized political publications around the state. Interviewees were assured of anonymity. See Simon (1993), available through Paul Gronke, for more information.

10. This timeline is drawn from a careful reading of the public records concerning redistricting—the records of the redistricting hearings concerning the main plans as well as press coverage from the leading newspapers (The Charlotte Observer, the Durham Herald Sun, The News & Observer), and a specialized political publication, the North Carolina Insider.

11. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) felt that more should be done to increase minority representation, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) felt that the plan was a simple incumbent gerrymander, and the GOP argued that the plan, which was predicted to result in an increase in Democratic strength, was a blatant partisan gerrymander (Van Denton, 1991a).

12. In North Carolina, plans that were drafted on the public access terminal become public records. Because the access terminal is the only place where anyone besides legislative staff could draft plans, including legislators, this meant that virtually every alternative plan is stored as a public record. The fact that the basis for the final plan came from the public access terminal was revealed to the authors by administrative assistants in the office of the state House of Representatives.

13. Clearly, however, not everyone was happy, and a court challenge, Shaw v. Reno (1993), resulted in an overturning of the plan.

14. We have borrowed liberally from Gelman and King (1994b) for this description. The interested reader should turn to that work for more extensive descriptions and justifications of these measures.

15. Unless otherwise indicated, all JudgeIt analysis presented here is based on actual 1992 conditions with regard to vote distribution, incumbency, and so forth.

16. Their expectations were well-founded, at least according to political science research. Lublin (1997) and Brace, Grofman, and Handley (1987) found a direct correspondence between increases in Black representation and Republican power in the legislature.

17. We have made an important assumption: Black members endorse one type of minority influence—electing members of color—rather than another—having significant influence in many districts. Public comments by members, such as statements made by Fitch (Van Denton, 1991b) and Michaux (Van Denton, 1991c), show that members recognized this tradeoff. The positions in favor of two minority-majority seats, taken by the Black caucus in the state legislature, the Durham Committee for the Affairs of Black People, and the state NAACP, all seem to indicate that Blacks endorsed the first option.

18. Thus, North Carolina Democrats opted for the riskier strategy of maximizing winnable seats rather than affording maximum safety to incumbents. Although this worked out well in the
1992 elections, it came back to haunt the party in 1994, when a statewide partisan swing resulted in major Republican gains. Thus, much like Indiana Republicans in the early 1980s, North Carolina Democrats suffered some adverse consequences from the adoption of a relatively risky strategy.

REFERENCES


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