The defendant, Keith Bowles, who is serving a sentence of 15 years to life for murder, had argued that given the judge’s erroneous instruction — that he had 18 days to file an appeal instead of the 14 that federal law allows — his case should come within the “unique circumstances” doctrine that the Supreme Court created to recognize unusual instances when jurisdictional rules need not be strictly enforced.
The court, however, used the case to announce it was overruling the two precedents the Supreme Court had used when it established the “unique circumstances” doctrine in the 1960s. Writing for the majority, Justice Clarence Thomas said the court now regarded the doctrine as illegitimate. “If rigorous rules like the one applied today are thought to be inequitable,” Justice Thomas added, the remedy should come from Congress.
Justice David H. Souter, writing for the four dissenters in the case, Bowles v. Russell, No. 06-5306, objected that “it is intolerable for the judicial system to treat people this way.” He added, “There is not even a technical justification for condoning this bait and switch.”
The court’s 5-to-4 division was the familiar one: Justice Thomas was joined in the majority by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Samuel A. Alito Jr., while Justice Souter’s fellow dissenters were Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
This was the same alignment by which the court last month enforced a deadline in a different context, when it ruled that pay discriminations suits were barred unless the employee had filed a formal complaint within 180 days of the initial pay decision, a ruling that some Congressional Democrats are trying to override through legislation.
It was not clear why the federal district judge, whom the opinion did not identify, gave Mr. Bowles, who was convicted of murder in Ohio, 18 days to file a notice of appeal in his habeas corpus case, when both a federal statute and Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide only 14 days in Mr. Bowles’s particular circumstance. Mr. Bowles’s lawyer filed on the 17th day.
In any event, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, did not notice the problem and accepted jurisdiction. Briefing was completed when the appeals court, informed of the error in a brief filed by the State of Ohio, announced that it had no jurisdiction and dismissed the case. After the Supreme Court agreed to hear Mr. Bowles’s appeal that given the federal district judge’s erroneous instruction, his case should come within the “unique circumstances” doctrine, the Solicitor General’s office entered the case to place the federal government on Ohio’s side.
The debate between the court’s two sides was vigorous and appeared to extend beyond the outcome of the particular case. Justice Souter argued that the court for several years had been taking a more, rather than less, flexible approach to jurisdiction in circumstances like this one. “Why does today’s majority refuse to come to terms with the steady stream of unanimous statements from this court in the past four years” in cases rejecting presumed limitations on jurisdiction, Justice Souter asked, adding that “the majority leaves the court incoherent.”
Justice Thomas said the court was simply carrying out the will of Congress. “Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them,” he said.
In another decision on Thursday, the court unanimously rejected a constitutional challenge to a state law in Washington that bars unions from spending nonmembers’ fees on political activity without first receiving their permission.
This so-called “opt in” rule, adopted by the state’s voters in a 1992 referendum, is the opposite of the usual practice, under which unions must give nonmembers a chance to “opt out” of the use of their fees for purposes not related to collective bargaining; if there is no objection, the union may spend the money.
The Washington Supreme Court held in this case, Davenport v. Washington Education Association, No. 05-1589, that the opt in variant was too onerous and placed an unconstitutional burden on unions’ right of free speech and association.
That decision reflected a misunderstanding by the state court of the United States Supreme Court’s precedents in this area, Justice Scalia wrote for the court.
The effect of the decision is likely to be very limited. Washington is the only state to have such a provision, and an amendment that Gov. Christine Gregoire signed into law last month removed the aspect that the Washington Education Association, the teachers’ union that had challenged the law, found objectionable.
Under the amendment, a union will no longer be regarded as misusing nonmembers’ fees for political purposes as long as it has enough money in its general treasury or from other sources to cover the expenditures. The union informed the court in a supplemental brief last month that it no longer had a constitutional objection to the provision, now that it would not face liability simply for commingling members’ dues and nonmembers’ fees.