It was the Roberts Court's first encounter with the unfinished business of the Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution, during which the court curbed Congress's power to make federal law binding on the states.
If the ground was familiar, the mood during the genteel argument was less so. In the hands of Solicitor General Paul D. Clement, the federal side of the debate appeared to make considerable headway. Even skeptics like Justice Antonin Scalia seemed receptive to the argument that Congress can permit prisoners to sue, at a minimum, for violations of their constitutional rights.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. also appeared to find reassurance in Mr. Clement's assertion that in the context of prisons, the Americans With Disabilities Act conferred little in the way of rights that the Constitution itself did not already protect.
Neither justice showed his hand completely, and the outcome of the complicated case was difficult to predict. Whatever the court decides, this case will help define both where the federalism revolution stands today, and where it might be headed.
The case involves a Georgia inmate, Tony Goodman, a paraplegic who has been in prison since 1995, when he was convicted of aggravated assault, possession of a weapon and intent to distribute cocaine.
Mr. Goodman asserts that his cell, where he is confined 23 or 24 hours a day, is too small at 12 feet by 3 feet to allow him to maneuver his wheelchair, that he lacks an accessible toilet and shower and that guards leave him sitting in his own waste rather than assist him. Further, he says he lacks access to recreational facilities and to the prison law library.
The state disputes many of his accusations, which remain unproven because his lawsuit, filed under the Americans With Disabilities Act, has not gone to trial. The federal district court and the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, both in Atlanta, dismissed it, saying the state was immune under the 11th Amendment from a suit for damages under the disabilities law. The federal government entered the case at the appeals court stage to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
When Congress passed the Americans With Disabilities Act in 1990, it applied the law to the states, including state prisons, and declared its intention to abrogate the states' immunity under the 11th Amendment, which the Supreme Court has interpreted broadly to bar suits for damages against states in federal court unless a particular statute meets the Supreme Court's test.
That test, as defined in a series of decisions since the 1990's, limits Congress to providing a "congruent" and "proportional" remedy for a documented constitutional violation.
Applying that test four years ago, the court ruled that states were immune from being sued by their employees under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of disability. Congress did not have a valid basis for abrogating the states' immunity under that section of the law, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote in his 5-to-4 decision, because there was not a sufficient history of unconstitutional discrimination by the states.
Two years ago, the court interpreted Title II of the act, which protects the right to have access to public services and programs. The court allowed suits against states for failing to provide accessible courtrooms.
Mr. Clement, the solicitor general, argued on Wednesday that the court should take the same approach in this case, United States v. Georgia, No. 04-1203, which is also covered under Title II. As applied to "the class of cases involving the unconstitutional treatment of inmates," Mr. Clement said, the statute "easily passes constitutional muster" because, properly interpreted, it leaves prison administrators with "inherent flexibility" and requires no more than reasonable accommodations to the needs of disabled prisoners.
Chief Justice Roberts posed one of the first questions. "Are you suggesting that the A.D.A. just tracks the Constitution and doesn't add to the burden on state officials?" he asked Mr. Clement.
There was at most a "narrow band" of actions that the law would require but that the Constitution did not demand, Mr. Clement replied. "The prophylactic gap here is not large," he added.
In the court's federalism debate, "prophylactic" is a fighting word. One of the court's sharpest divisions is over whether Congress should define constitutional guarantees more expansively than the court's own precedents. A narrow majority has held that Congress strays beyond its authority when it does more than remedy existing constitutional violations as defined by the court.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, a law professor at Washington University in St. Louis and a specialist in disability rights, represented the inmate and shared the government's side of the argument with Mr. Clement. Chief Justice Roberts addressed the same question to him, adding, "I'm just wondering if that's a reasonable reading of the A.D.A., which I had always understood to change the rights of the disabled."
Mr. Bagenstos replied that there was little difference in the specific context of prisons because "this is one of the few areas where the government has an affirmative constitutional duty."
Gregory A. Castanias, a Washington lawyer arguing for Georgia, said the inmate's claims in this case went well beyond constitutional requirements. Several justices then suggested that the law might be interpreted to apply only to constitutional violations. Justice Scalia asked, "To the extent that it includes constitutional violations, why isn't that lawsuit perfectly O.K.?"
Coming from Justice Scalia, a strong ally of the states in this line of cases, the question was a surprise, and Mr. Castanias was taken aback. He asked for a moment to think of an answer. Then he said it would "not be congruent with the Constitution" for Congress to place disabled inmates in a privileged position to "assert rights that apply to all."