There was no dispute in this case that a federal judge in St. Louis improperly denied a motion to permit a lawyer from California to represent the defendant, Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez, in a narcotics case.
The lawyer, Joseph Low, a specialist in defending drug cases, was not admitted to practice before the Federal District Court in St. Louis and needed permission to appear there. Failure to grant the motion was a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis, later ruled.
The question for the Supreme Court was what the remedy should be for that violation. The Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction, ruling that the Sixth Amendment violation was so basic that it could never be considered "harmless," even if the lawyers were equivalent and the outcome of the trial was unaffected.
The federal government appealed that ruling, arguing that because the question was whether the defendant had received a fair trial, the conviction should be overturned only if the defendant could demonstrate harm from the unwanted representation.
But the government's analysis reflected a misunderstanding of the right to "assistance of counsel," Justice Antonin Scalia said for the majority. The right to counsel and the right to a fair trial were two separate rights, he said, adding that the right to counsel "commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided — to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best."
Justice Scalia noted that the Sixth Amendment also guarantees the right to "effective" legal representation and that the court's precedents require defendants claiming a violation of that right to show that they have suffered "prejudice" from ineffective counsel.
The distinction was logical, Justice Scalia said, because a violation of the right to effective representation "is not 'complete' until the defendant is prejudiced." By contrast, he said, the right to counsel of choice is a violation "because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous" and "no additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete.' "
The decision, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, No. 05-352, produced one of the court's more uncommon lineups. Justice Scalia's opinion was joined by the court's four most liberal members, Justices John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer. This arrangement in a 5-to-4 case occurred once before, in an arbitration ruling in 2003. Justice Scalia has become known for a strict, almost absolutist position on the Sixth Amendment's various guarantees.
The decision found the two new justices, Samuel A. Alito Jr. and John G. Roberts Jr., in dissent, along with Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and Clarence Thomas.
Justice Alito, speaking for all four in a dissenting opinion, said the
Sixth Amendment's assistance-of-counsel guarantee "focuses on what a
defendant is entitled to receive ('assistance') rather than on the identity
of the provider.
He added that "automatic reversal is strong medicine" that should be reserved for serious errors that "always or necessarily" make a trial unfair.
The Supreme Court term, now in its closing days, is expected to continue past Wednesday, when the justices will issue their next round of opinions. These were among the other rulings on Monday:
Kansas Death Penalty
By a vote of 5 to 4, the court upheld the constitutionality of the Kansas death penalty law, which the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated in a 2004 decision. The decision, Kansas v. Marsh, No. 04-1170, will have the effect of reinstating the death sentence for Michael Lee Marsh II, convicted of murdering a woman and her baby, and the sentences of seven other men on the state's death row.
The question for the justices was the validity of the sentencing system under which a death sentence results automatically if the jury finds that the aggravating and mitigating factors are "in equipoise," neither outweighing the other.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, said the statute was valid under the court's death penalty precedents because it did not limit the mitigating evidence that a defendant could put before the sentencing jury and did not interfere "in a constitutionally significant way" with the jury's consideration of that evidence.
The case was argued twice, once before Justice Alito joined the court and then again in April. It is therefore likely that Justice Alito's vote with the majority made the difference. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Scalia also voted with the majority.
The tone of Justice Souter's dissent, which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer joined, was passionate, and this case appeared to have galvanized the court as few others have in the term. Justice Souter cited evidence of recent exonerations in capital cases.
"In the face of evidence of the hazards of capital prosecution," he said, "maintaining a sentencing system mandating death when the sentencer finds the evidence pro and con to be in equipoise is obtuse by any moral or social measure."
The dissent produced an angry outburst from Justice Scalia. He said there has not been "a single verifiable case" of an innocent person put to death and that the possibility of such a mistake "has been reduced to an insignificant minimum." Justice Scalia said the dissenting opinion "will be trumpeted abroad as vindication" of what he called "sanctimonious criticism of America's death penalty" in other parts of the world.
Parents' Costs
The court ruled, 6 to 3, that the federal law requiring public schools to provide a free and "appropriate" education for children with disabilities does not require school districts to reimburse parents for the cost of putting on expert testimony in hearings called to evaluate a proposed special-education plan.
The decision, Arlington Central School District v. Murphy, No. 05-18, overturned a ruling by the federal appeals court in New York.
The federal law, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, provides that parents who prevail at such hearings can be reimbursed for their lawyers' fees. Congress did not explicitly provide for the fees of expert witnesses, Justice Alito wrote for the majority. Justices Breyer, Stevens and Souter dissented.