ASHINGTON,
June 28 - The Supreme Court on Monday rejected a police interrogation tactic
designed to induce suspects to give incriminating statements after purposely
delaying Miranda warnings.
The tactic, taught in police training courses, has been growing in
popularity, and the Supreme Court decision, a murder case from Missouri, was
consequently eagerly awaited by both prosecutors and defense lawyers.
The 5-to-4 vote against the strategy, in an opinion by Justice David H.
Souter, was apparently the product of a prolonged struggle inside the court.
This case and another Miranda case announced Monday, the second by a 5-to-4
vote in favor of the prosecution, were argued Dec. 9 and were the oldest
undecided cases on the docket. In neither case did the five justices in the
majority fully agree on a single rationale.
Under the tactic the court invalidated in the Missouri case, the police
first question a suspect while withholding the advice required by the
Miranda decision of the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer
before answering questions. In not giving the warnings, the police know that
any incriminating statements elicited in this phase of the questioning will
be inadmissible in court.
The officers then give the suspect a short break before resuming the
interrogation, this time with the warnings. Typically, suspects will waive
their Miranda rights and then repeat what they had said earlier, prompted by
the officers' leading questions and by the sense that it is now too late to
turn back.
The issue for the Supreme Court on Monday was whether the answers from
that second phase of questioning could be used in court, and the majority's
answer was no. Justice Souter said the facts of this case "by any objective
measure reveal a police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings."
He said the police had created a situation for the defendant, a woman
suspected of murder, "in which it would have been unnatural to refuse to
repeat at the second stage what had been said before."
The case, Missouri v. Seibert, No. 02-1371, was a variant of a case the
court decided in 1985 called Oregon v. Elstad. In that case, the police went
to a young suspect's house to tell his mother that they were arresting him
on a burglary charge. Without receiving any Miranda warnings, the suspect
gave an incriminating statement. He was then taken to the police station,
received the warnings, and gave a full confession. In deciding that the
evidence was admissible, the court treated the initial failure to give the
warnings as inadvertent rather than strategic, based on confusion about
whether the suspect was formally in custody at the time.
Justice Souter said Monday that it "disfigures that case" to regard the
Oregon v. Elstad precedent as dictating the admissibility of the statements
in the Missouri case. He also noted that four years ago, in Dickerson v.
United States, the court rejected a challenge to the Miranda decision
itself. Now, he said, "strategists dedicated to draining the substance out
of Miranda cannot accomplish by training instructions what Dickerson held
Congress could not do by statute."
The defendant in the Missouri case, Patrice Seibert, was interrogated
after a fire in her family's mobile home killed a young man who was staying
there and caring for her disabled son. Both before and after receiving
Miranda warnings, Ms. Seibert admitted her role in setting the fire. The
Missouri trial court suppressed the first admissions but allowed the
prosecution to introduce the statements she made after receiving the
warnings. Ms. Seibert was convicted of murder. The Missouri Supreme Court
overturned the conviction, and the state appealed.
Justice Souter's opinion was joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote
separately in agreement with the result, proposing a test under which fewer
statements would be likely to be excluded than under the majority's
approach.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said the court's
decision "devours Oregon v. Elstad," a precedent she described as requiring
the opposite result. Justice O'Connor said the subjective intent of the
officers should make no difference, because a suspect could not know what
was in an officer's mind.
Rather, she said, the test should be the voluntariness of the second
statements. If the statements were voluntary, they should be admitted, she
said, while if involuntary, they should be kept out of court even if the
Miranda warnings were given. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas joined the dissent.
The lineup in the second Miranda case was the same with the exception of
Justice Kennedy, who voted on the prosecution side. The question in United
States v. Patane, No. 02-1183, was whether physical evidence, a gun in this
case, found as the result of statements obtained without Miranda warnings,
could be admitted in court. The court's answer was yes.
Federal firearms agents went to Samuel F. Patane's home in Colorado
Springs to question him about a report that he had a gun. Before the agents
could finish reading Mr. Patane his Miranda rights, he interrupted them,
saying that he knew his rights. He then directed them to the gun in his
bedroom.
Interpreting the Oregon v. Elstad precedent, the federal appeals court in
Denver said the gun could not be introduced as evidence. The Supreme Court
overturned that ruling. Justice Thomas, writing for himself, the chief
justice and Justice Scalia, said the Miranda rule could not be violated
unless statements were actually introduced in court.
Writing separately, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor said there was no need
to reach that sweeping conclusion about the underlying meaning of Miranda in
order to conclude under the Elstad precedent that the gun was admissible.
Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer dissented.