The War in Vietnam, 1954-1964

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Located in Southeast Asia, Vietnam was, prior to World War II, part of what was known as French Indochina. After the war, the French continued to occupy Vietnam and faced a restive movement for independence led by Ho Chi Minh.  Although Ho appealed to western powers for support, the developing Cold War and preoccupation with European problems led the United States and other nations to support the French.  Ho, seeking support for his nationalist movement, turned to the Soviets and Chinese. Thus Vietnam became part of the Cold War.  

      
Ho Chi Minh

Dien Bien Phu
April-May 1954

In the spring of 1954, the French Expeditionary Forces established a garrison at Dien Bien Phu and prepared for a decisive battle. The "high ground" around the garrison was, however, occupied by the nationalist-communist forces. What followed was a 60-day battle in which the French forces were decimated. During the course of this battle, the French appealed to the United States for military intervention.  President Eisenhower, after consultation with his advisors and congressional leaders, refused. Eisenhower believed that U.S. intervention would be "the wrong war, the wrong time, and the wrong place."  The U.S., to that time, had been making substantial monetary contributions to the French effort. The French forces ultimately surrendered and the battle of Dien Bien Phu effectively ended the French presence in Vietnam.

The Geneva Conference
July 1954

In July of 1954, a conference was convened in Geneva in an attempt to resolve the problems in Indochina.  Although an agreement was reached, its provisions were quickly violated and the plan never came to fruition. The agreement reached on the 20th and 21st of July included:

            (1) the nation of Vietnam was guaranteed its independence
            (2) national elections, under international supervision, would be held
                 two years hence (July 1956)
            (3) in the interim period, Vietnam would be divided at the 17th Parallel
                 (just to the north of Hue on the map). Control of the north would 
                 be held by the Viet Minh forces led by Ho Chi Minh while control in the 
                 South would be held by forces who had fought with the French. 

The United States disapproved of the agreement, did not sign the accord, and announced that it felt no obligation to abide by it. Instead, in September 1954, the United States became, along with Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand,   
Pakistan, the Philippines, and  Thailand, a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). This alliance was designed to resist the spread of communism in southeast Asia. 

Two Vietnams

Thereafter, the situation evolved such that there were two Vietnams. The north defined itself as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. It became a communist regime led by Ho Chi Minh with its capital in Hanoi. The "southern" nation was called the Republic of Vietnam. It established its capital in Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) and was led by the French-educated Catholic, Ngo Dinh Diem.  South Vietnam quickly became an ally of the United States and Diem was "our man" in Vietnam.

   
Ngo Dinh Diem with President Eisenhower & Secretary of State Dulles                                        

The rationale developed by the Eisenhower Administration to explain its economic and military support of South Vietnam became known as the "domino theory."  Likening the countries of southeast Asia as a row of dominos, the President argued that if one country fell, it would trigger the fall of others (like a row of dominos).  In The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Brookings Institution, 1969), Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts point to the rise of a decision rule within the Eisenhower and subsequent administrations: "Do what was necessary to avoid losing South Vietnam by force."  The history of the war is, in part, the growing economic, political, and human costs of  "what was necessary" to prevent this domino from falling.

The Kennedy Years
1961-1963

The threat to the South Vietnamese regime was threefold. First, and most obviously, North Vietnam had designs on the South. The objective of Ho Chi Minh was to unify the country under a nationalist and communist regime.  The second was the indigenous movement within South Vietnam  known as the National Liberation Front. The Viet Cong, as they came to be called, operated throughout the south and particularly in the countryside among the peasants. They were indistinguishable from normal South Vietnamese citizens, employed unconventional guerilla tactics, and fed off the political opposition to the Diem regime.  The third problem was Diem and his family. His brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, headed the security forces of South Vietnam and operated in a repressive and cruel manner. His outspoken wife, Madame Nhu, added to the controversy.

U.S. policy from 1961-1963 focused on the countryside and the effort to counter Viet Cong inroads and build support for the regime.  To this end, the Kennedy Administration emphasized "counterinsurgency warfare." It  relied upon U.S. special forces to advise the South Vietnamese military and to conduct clandestine operations. Thus, the "Green Berets" became the military poster boys of the Kennedy Administration.

The administration also launched a program of "strategic hamlets" in which villages were either relocated or "fenced in" to secure them against the operations of the Viet Cong. Finally, there was a continuous effort to convince Diem and Nhu that their government must win the loyalty of peasants --- their "hearts and minds" --- in the areas where Viet Cong strength was highest and their terror most effective.

 
Security Chief, Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of Diem

Diem and his family became increasingly troublesome to U.S. decision makers. Newspapers were shut down, opposition political parties were banned, and criticism of the Diem government resulted in arrest (especially among students). Diem, Nhu and other members of his family were Catholic and their base lay in the Catholic population of South Vietnamese cities such as Saigon.  The majority of the population, however, was Buddhist.  The friction between the Buddhists and the Diem regime increased as Nhu grew increasingly repressive.  Buddhist celebrations were prohibited and a series of attacks were launched on their pagodas. The "Buddhist Uprising" gained widespread publicity as a number of Buddhist monks engaged in the deadly protest of self-immolation.

In response, Madame Nhu was dismissive of the protests and was quoted in the press as calling them nothing but "Buddhist barbecues."

The situation, in the minds of the U.S. decision makers, was growing intolerable. On November 1, 1963, elements of South Vietnamese military --- with U.S. "encouragement" and promises of support for the new regime --- staged a coup d'etat. Diem and his brother Nhu were captured and executed. The South Vietnamese formed a new government, headed by General Duong Van "Big" Minh.  Three weeks later, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. 

[Clip from the Zapruder film capturing the assassination of JFK]

For the Kennedy Administration, then, the objective of preserving "South Vietnam" involved a growing commitment. The following is a summary:

The Johnson Administration
1963-1964

The successor to Kennedy was Vice President Lyndon Johnson of Texas. Johnson had served in the U.S. House of Representatives and as a Senator, rose to the position of Majority Leader.  One of his initial decisions was to ask the Kennedy team of advisors to remain in the administration. This team, dubbed The Best and the Brightest (in a book of that name authored by David Halberstam) included (from left to right): Secretary of  Defense Robert McNamara (called the "architect" of the Vietnam War), Secretary of State Dean Rusk, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor, who would serve as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam, and Walt Rostow, who would succeed Bundy as National Security Advisor.

The situation in Vietnam inherited by Johnson grew increasingly unstable. The government of South Vietnam became "coup central" with seven changes in the military government during Johnson's first year in office. And Johnson was confronted with a classic "Cold War" dilemma.  If South Vietnam fell, Johnson and the Democrats would be blamed.  Johnson was keenly aware of this since he served in the Senate when Republicans launched an attack on the Truman Administration for the "loss of China."  However, as early as 1964, Johnson was informed by his advisors that "preventing the fall of Vietnam" would require a substantial commitment of U.S. forces for a period of at least five years.  Johnson saw the situation as "the biggest damn mess" and, potentially, a "no win" situation.  His uncertainty and even anguish can be heard in several telephone conversations in May of 1964 that were secretly recorded  (click on the link):

[Lyndon Johnson and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy
10 minutes]

[Lyndon Johnson and Senator Richard Russell of Georgia,
Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee and former "mentor" to Johnson
26 minutes]

Political considerations weighed on LBJ's thinking as well. In 1963 and 1964, he sought to pursue an ambitious domestic agenda and establish a record "in his own right."  He did not want the "costs of a war" to fuel opposition to this domestic agenda. Additionally, 1964 was an election year. The Republicans and Johnson's opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, were criticizing the president as "soft" on the situation in Vietnam.  From a political standpoint then, LBJ's strategy was to refrain from discussions about "Americanizing" the war in Vietnam, paint his Republican opponent as an "extremist," and find a pretext for a show of strength in Southeast Asia.

August 1964
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

The pretext became available in early August of the election year.  On August 2nd, it was reported that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had attacked an American vessel, the Maddox, in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.  A warning was issued by the administration. Two days later, another attacked was reported.  In response, Johnson ordered retaliatory bombing strikes against within North Vietnam and appeared on national television to announce his decision.

The next day, in a special message to the United States Congress, Johnson asked for a resolution of support to handle the crisis. The result was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Within two days, it was approved in the House of Representatives by a vote of 414-0 and in the Senate by a vote of 88-2 (with no votes by Morse of Oregon and Greuning of Alaska).

[Text of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution & Johnson's Message to Congress]

Lyndon Johnson had made his "show of strength" and, in so doing, had obtained congressional authorization for the use of force.  The authorization was broad and Johnson was backed by what appeared to be a congressional consensus.

There is a three-part epilogue to the Gulf of Tonkin story. First, the President went on to campaign as the "candidate of peace" in 1964 and won an overwhelming victory in the November election.  Johnson was now president in his own right and not simply the successor to the slain Kennedy.

Second, in the years after 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution would be cited by the administration as the legal equivalent of a declaration of war and used to justify the expansion of the war. Votes in favor of the resolution would also be used as "leverage" over members of Congress who later became critical of the war. They would be called, in LBJ's words, "nervous Nellies."

Finally, historical research later called into question whether a second attack had even occurred and the administration's veracity in explaining the incident (see, for example, Gelb and Betts, The Irony of Vietnam). Thus, Tonkin, at one and the same time, was the high water mark of congressional deference to the president and the beginning of the "credibility gap" that later plagued the Johnson Administration.

All Text & Analysis, Copyright ©, August 2002, Dennis M. Simon