Bo Chen's Research


 

Research Interest

 

Repeated Games, Mechanism Design, Matching Problems

 


 

Publications

 

v A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting (Joint with Satoru Takahashi), Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 76, Issue 2, 571 – 581 (November, 2012).

 

 

v  All-or-Nothing Payments, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 48, Issue 3, 133 – 142 (May, 2012).

 

 

v On the Feasible Payoff Set of a General Two-Player Repeated Game with Unequal Discounting (Joint with Satoru Fujishige), International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 42, Issue 1, 295 – 303 (February, 2013).

 

 

v Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Countervailing Positive Externalities and an Application to Tradable Retaliation in the WTO (Joint with Tanapong Potipiti), Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 46, Issue 5, 825 – 843. Working Paper Version: Externalities (September, 2010).

 

 

v All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment, American Economic Review, Volume 100, Issue 1, 625 – 627 (March, 2010).

 

 

v  A Belief-Based Approach to the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Asymmetric Private Monitoring, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 145, Issue 1, 402 – 420 (January, 2010).
 

 

v On Effective Minimax Payoffs and Unequal Discounting, Economics Letters, Volume 100, Issue 1, 105 – 107 (July, 2008).

 

 

v The Pareto Frontier of a Finitely Repeated Game with Unequal Discounting, Economics Letters, Volume 94, Issue 2, Pages 177 – 184 (February, 2007).

 


 

Working Papers

 

v An Investigation of the Average Bid Mechanism for Procurement Auctions, (Joint with Wei-Shiun Chang and Tim Salmon)

 

 

v Decentralized Market Processes to Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries (Joint with Satoru Fujishige and Zaifu Yang)

 


 

Working in Progress

 

v Coordination Failure in a Dynamic Game with Imperfect Information (Joint with Rajat Deb and Laura Razzolini).

 

 

v Optimal Time-Contingent Contract Design (Joint with Zaifu Yang) (new version coming soon).

 

 

v Uninformed Manipulation.

 

 

v Random Endowment and Inheritance Rules for the House Allocation Problem.